Soldat patruljerer i Brussel under økt terrorberedskap.
Program
Konsortiet for terrorismeforskning
Daglig leder
Arrangementer
Konsortiet for terrorismeforskning (tidligere Konsortiet for forskning på terrorisme og internasjonal kriminalitet) har eksistert siden 2002, og består i dag av Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt (NUPI), Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt (FFI), Politihøgskolen (PHS) og Senter for ekstremismeforskning (C-REX). Konsortiet utgjør et av de tyngste og mest anerkjente forskningsmiljøene i Europa på disse temaene. Det er en arena for forskningsformidling, informasjonsutveksling og oppbygging av kompetanse på tvers av institusjoner.
Konsortiet blir finansiert gjennom departementer, direktorater og næringsorganisasjoner som ønsker å støtte norsk forskning på terrorisme og internasjonal kriminalitet, og som ønsker å dra nytte av ekspertisen som Konsortiet innehar. Forskere i Konsortiet har også vært aktive støttespillere i politikkutforming og utvikling av tiltak. Eksempler er Handlingsplanen mot voldelig ekstremisme og radikalisering og Stortingsmeldingen om globale sikkerhetstrusler i utenrikspolitikken.
Temaene som konsortiets forskere har spisskompetanse på, og som står i fokus for nåværende forskningsaktiviteter, er forebygging av voldelig ekstremisme og terrorisme, islamistisk terrorisme i Europa og resten av verden, høyreekstremisme og anti-jihadistiske bevegelser, solo-terrorisme, terroristers målutvelgelse, terrorbekjempelse, organisert og internasjonal kriminalitet i Europa og i naboregionene, politikkutforming i bekjempelse av organisert kriminalitet, organisert kriminalitet og statsdannelse, illegal økonomi og opprørsgrupper i Vest-Afrika og Nord-Afrika, piratvirksomhet, samfunnssikkerhet, trusler mot eksportsektoren, gjengkonflikter, krisehåndtering og internasjonalt politisamarbeid.
Se her for publikasjoner av konsortiets forskere
NUPI-forskere som er tilknyttet konsortiet:
Eksterne forskere som er tilknyttet konsortiet:
- Tore Bjørgo, (C-REX), faglig leder
Kontaktperson:
Aktuelt
Risiko for radikalisering – kan det egentlig måles?
Blir verktøy som skal måle risiko for å bli radikalisert brukt riktig?
Derfor står kurderne imot radikalisering og voldelig ekstremisme i Irak
Terrorkonsortiet i 2021
Radikalisering og motstandsdyktighet i Mali og Sahel
Høydepunkter fra konsortiet i 2019
Radikalisering i fengsel, retur av fremmedkrigere og akselerasjonsterrorisme er bare noen av temaene Konsortiet har hatt på agendaen i løpet av det siste året.
Ei bru som samlar eller splittar folket?
NUPI Podkast: Farer, forpliktelser, og utfordringer ved retur av fremmedkrigere og deres familier
Flere tusen menn, kvinner og barn sitter i fangenskap i Syria og Irak etter IS' fall. Hva kan bli skjebnen til disse? Og hvem skal ta ansvaret for dem?
Risikovurderingsverktøy mot terrorisme og ekstremisme
I mange europeiske land sitter mange titalls personer fengslet for terrorisme eller terrorismerelaterte forbrytelser. Brorparten soner korte dommer som gjør at de vil bli løslatt innen få år. Er det trygt? Hvordan kan man være sikker på at de ikke lenger utgjør en fare for samfunnet den dagen de slipper ut?
Podkast: De fleste radikaliseres ikke
Hvorfor er det i noen samfunn større sannsynlighet for voldelig ekstremisme enn i andre? Og hvorfor er det slik at de fleste mennesker som lever i såkalte radikaliseringsfremmende miljøer likevel ikke blir radikaliserte?
Exploring the Continuum of Lethality: Militant Islamists' Targeting Preferences in Europe
Doctoral Research Fellow at Politihøgskolen (The Police Academy) and Senior Advisor at the Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation, Cato Hemmingby, has published an article that provides an in-depth analysis of the targeting preferences of militant Islamists operating in Western Europe.
KRONIKK: Mali kan bli verre enn Afghanistan
NUPIpodden: Afrikas opprørere - hvem er de?
NY BOK: Morten Bøås snakker om sin nyeste bok om Afrikas opprørere.
KRONIKK: Hvem utgjør en terrorist?
Etter 11. september har stadig flere ikke-statlige grupper fått merkelappen terrorister.
Radicalization and foreign fighters in the Kosovo context: An analysis of international media coverage of the phenomena
Senior Research Fellow and consortium coordinator, Rita Augestad Knudsen, has published a new critical study of the international media coverage of the phenomena of radicalisation and foreign fighters in Kosovo:
Fanatismens seier? Jihadismens frammarsj i den arabiske verden
Jihadismens frammarsj som ideologi og global opprørsbevegelse er blant de mest fremtredende utviklingstrekkene i Midtøsten de siste 15årene. Hvordan har jihadistbevegelsen kunnet vokse seg så mye sterkere i tidsrommet etter 11. september-angrepene, samtidig som USA og dets allierte i regionen har brukt enorme ressurser på nettopp å nedkjempe opprørsgrupper og nettverk knyttet til al-Qaida og den bredere jihadistbevegelsen?
Op-Ed: Three Myths Holding Back Afghan Peace Talks
Konsortiumforsker Anne Stenersen skriver i IPI Global Observatory om fredsforhandlingene med Taliban:
Når Russland går til krig
Hva er det som gjør at krig blir akseptabelt? Se Julie Wilhelmsen lansere sin ferskeste bok i samtale med Aftenpostens Helene Skjeggestad.
Nye publikasjoner
Naturalisation through mainstreaming Counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation in UN and EU discourse
Etter terrorangrepene mot USA 11. september 200, ble kontraterror en viktigere form for “hard sikkerhet” for land verden over. I vesten omtaler mange myndigheter terrorisme som et unikt trusselfenomen som legitimerer dedikerte budsjetter, systemer og strukturer innen politi og forsvar. Men med det etterhvert økte fokuset på radikalisering som en antatt forløper for terrorisme, og kontraradikalisering som en sentral del av kontraterror, spredte feltet seg langt utover det som vanligvis forstås som “hard sikkerhet”. Kontraradikalisering gjorde at kontraterror som felt spredte seg til “mykere” deler av samfunnet. Dette bokkapitlet agrumenterer for at dette skiftet bør forstås som en type “mainstreaming”. Kapitlet starter med å se på begrepet “mainstreaming” og hvordan det favner utviklingen beskrevet ovenfor. Deretter analyserer kapittelet antiradikaliseringsdiskursen i EU- og FN-dokumenter om kontraterror. På grunnlag av dette konkluderer kapitlet kontraradikalisering og kontraterror er blitt “mainstreamet” som naturlige foretak for områder langt utenfor sikkerhetssektoren.
Why Terrorism Researchers Should Care about Criminal Responsibility
Criminal responsibility is a basic principle in holding individuals to account for criminal actions. Making exemptions to criminal responsibility when individuals cannot be held responsible for their actions is equally central, and most countries have frameworks allowing for such exemptions for reasons of serious mental health problems. However, despite the recent years’ enormous interests in the possible links between individual ‘mental health’ and involvement in terrorism, the issue of criminal responsibility has apparently so far not been the subject of much interest in the field of terrorism research. This Research Note makes the simple point that criminal responsibility should be of particular interest to terrorism researchers, for two main reasons: the centrality of (political, religious, ideological) motivations for defining a crime as terrorism-related and the sometimes-difficult boundary-setting between such motivations and (psychotic) delusions; and the political nature of terrorism-related crimes.
Psykisk helse, terrorisme, ekstremisme og radikalisering
Det mulige forholdet mellom psykisk helse, radikalisering, ekstremisme og terrorinvolvering har fått mye oppmerksomhet i det siste. Men hva vet man egentlig om dette forholdet? Hva vet man ikke, og hvordan kan utfordringene rundt dette håndteres? Denne policy briefen går gjennom disse spørsmålene og rydder opp i kunnskapsstatusen på feltet.
Policy brief summarising the lessons learned from assessing the EU’s measures to prevent violent extremism in a comparative perspective
Elapsing 30 months into the PREVEX consortium’s work, synchronizing results from both PREVEX-generated and external research outputs, this policy brief presents three key lessons from the analysis of the EU’s measures to prevent violent extremism (PVE) across its three regional focal areas: MENA, Maghreb/ Sahel and the Balkans. It then teases out three policy recommendations emanating from these lessons. While lesson #1 speaks to the broader framework of the EU’s PVE efforts, lessons #2 & #3 are more specifically geared toward the regions under PREVEX’ scrutiny: The Balkans (#2) and MENA and Maghreb/Sahel (#3).
Working Paper on a comparison of ‘enabling environments’, drivers and occurrence/nonoccurrence of violent extremism in the Balkans and the MENA region
The following working paper presents a cross-sectional and cross-regional comparison of the findings by PREVEX project partners across their three respective regional domains: the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the Balkans, and the Maghreb-Sahel, as stemming from their studies into the question of the occurrence and non-occurrence of violent extremism (VE). PREVEX deals with both ethno-nationalist and Islamic violent extremism (IVE).
Background study: Cross-regional comparison of ‘DOs and DON’Ts’ in the EU’s PVE Measures: Balkans, Maghreb/ Sahel & Middle East
The following report presents the research findings of a cross-societal comparison of PREVEX-related regions, with the aim of providing ideas about what has been successful and what has proven detrimental to the EU’s preventing violent extremism (PVE) efforts. As per the PREVEX consortium’s project architecture, structured comparisons serve as a central pillar for the extrapolation and generation of cross-cutting lessons and policy recommendations concerning PVE. While sporadic, intra-regional, comparative elements are already apparent within three PREVEX regional Policy Briefs – on the Balkans (D5.1), the Maghreb/Sahel (D6.1) and the Middle East (D7.1) – these documents are confined to countries within these respective regions that partly share territorial, societal, and cultural similarities. In contrast, the explicit mandate for the research to be undertaken here under Work Package 8 is to conduct cross-cutting comparisons between these radically different regions – all without losing sight of domestic-specific PVE aspects, the highlighting of which might help to generate ideas for other contexts. The conduct of such cross-regional comparisons is premised upon the methodological prerequisite of being aware, as the comparisons are being conducted, of some wide qualitative differences between the regions compared. The identification of lessons for policymaking will be considerably stronger if one can demonstrate that, despite considerable divergences, certain PVE strategies continue to perform well across the board. The consolidation of such lessons – based on validations from across different cultures, structural contexts, and radically divergent Islamic traditions – provides for an additional measure of confirmation as to their pertinence. The overt attempt of the authors of this study has been to search diligently for such ‘across-the-board’ lessons.
Policy brief comparing the EU and other stakeholders’ prevention strategy towards violent extremism in the Balkans and the broader MENA region
This policy brief offers a cross-regional comparison of PREVEX findings regarding the efficacity of the EU’s PVE efforts. Based upon an amalgamation of PREVEX partners’ policy briefs over the Balkans (D5.1), the Maghreb/Sahel (D6.1) and the Middle East (D7.1), two reports on respectively EU’s policies and instruments for PVE (D4.1) and the implementation of these (D4.2), further corroborated by an extensive validation background study (D8), we have the following recommendations to the EU: EU – ‘DOs’ -Increase cooperation with High Muslim Councils -Enhance their standing -Empower them to act against IVE EU – ‘DON’Ts’ – A, B, C -Avoid the all-out securitization of everything ‘Islamic’. -Block imported Islamic ‘Madhhab’ (Wahabism) from entering European spheres -Consult ‘elders’ and rethink funding youth projects that lack proven PVEimpact
Policy brief summarizing lessons learnt on the EU’s measures to prevent violent extremism in the region
There are a number of grievances attributed as drivers of violent extremism. Poverty, autocratic governance and human rights violations, precarious masculinities, or the lack of education, mentioning just some, all create what we may term “enabling environments” – areas in which various factors create a conducive situation where segments of its population become prone to violent extremism. Still, the majority living in such enabling environments and experiencing these grievances do not engage in any acts of violence or join any extremist organizations. This begs the question, why do some communities display far greater resilience to violent extremist ideologies than others? In our newly released PREVEX working paper analyzing the drivers, occurrence, and non-occurrence of violent extremism in the MENA region, we study four cases of the nonoccurrence of violent extremism in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq.1 Specifically, we analyze why segments among disenfranchised Islamist Egyptian youth, the majority of Jordanian jihadists, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), and the Syrian village Swedan in the Deir Ez-Zor province have displayed a far greater resilience to carrying out violent extremism than others. We assess the role and importance of local community and religious leaders, the role of tribal affiliation, ideological exposure, good governance and political inclusion, poverty and marginalization, and state repression. We address both a scholarly puzzle and a policy problem. If the aforementioned grievances create enabling environments conducive to violent extremism, why is it that the majority in these situations actually abstain from violence and reject extremist ideologies? What does that tell us about the role and dynamics of enabling environments? The policy problem relates to how one evaluates, weighs, and approaches populations in enabling environments and who are thus perceived to be prone to violent extremism. Put bluntly, should a population residing in an enabling environment be treated as future extremists or terrorists, to wit, a problem in need of securitization? Necessarily, these findings have consequences for how we perceive the feasibility of past and current EU funding programs intended to prevent violent extremism in the Middle East.
Working Paper on ´enabling environments´, drivers and occurrence/nonoccurrence of violent extremism in the region
There are a number of grievances attributed as drivers of violent extremism. Poverty, autocratic governance, human rights violations, precarious masculinities, or the lack of education, mentioning just some, all create what we may term “enabling environments”. Still, the majority living in such enabling environments and who experience such grievances do not engage in any acts of violence or join any violent extremist organizations. This begs the question, why do some communities display far greater resilience to violent extremist ideologies than others? Based on in-depth fieldwork in Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, we study and analyze four cases of the non-occurrence of violent extremism in the Middle East to further our understanding of enabling environments, community resilience, and the decisive moments pushing people to, or away from, violence.
Working Paper on enabling environments, drivers, and occurrence/nonoccurrence of violent extremism
Based on extensive desk research and fieldwork, the present paper aims to analyze the various drivers of violent extremism (VE) in the contemporary Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, the Republic of North Macedonia, and Serbia) and the elaboration of a refined, nuanced and context-sensitive understanding of the concept of ‘enabling environment’, i.e., the cluster or combination of various factors in a given society that renders the emergence of violent extremism likely. When approaching the varying impact of ideological radicalization and hate speech, we seek to make a distinction between contexts, where radicalization morphs into violence (“occurrence”), and contexts, where it does not (“non-occurrence”). Thus, the paper seeks to provide an analytical explanation of the central question of why some communities tend to be more resilient to violent extremist ideologies than others, despite identical “enabling” conditions. Given the geopolitical significance of the Western Balkan region, an approach that prioritizes non-occurrence of violence may respond more adequately to the strategic need for strengthening resilience to radicalization, extremism and terrorism there.
Policy brief summarizing lessons learnt on the EU’s measures to prevent violent extremism in the region
While most research on violent extremism (VE) focuses on why people turn to violence, this policy brief looks at the issue the other way round. We sum up the lessons learnt from our findings on why the majority of those living in enabling environments often choose not to get involved in violence and, against this background, to (re-)consider the EU’s measures for prevention and countering of violent extremism (P/CVE) in the Western Balkans (WB).
Policy brief summarizing lessons learnt on the EU’s measures to prevent violent extremism in the region
How do EU initiatives that are geared to help prevent and counter violent extremism in North Africa and the Sahel match the underlying drivers of radicalisation? This PREVEX Policy Brief offers a reading of EU strategies in the backlight of our findings, which stem from fieldwork that was conducted in cases of both occurrence and non-occurrence of violent extremist escalation across North Africa and the Sahel. As scholarly literature lays emphasis on how phenomena such as violent extremism are highly context-dependent, it is crucial to understand regional and local dynamics of social change and intermediation. This brief therefore provides an overall assessment of EU P/CVE policies and projects in North Africa and the Sahel, focusing on key contextual policy issues: democratic governance, rule of law, education, gender, reintegration. It argues that EU’s emphasis on rule of law is particularly appropriate, while there is room for greater engagement in the fields of education and reintegration – provided that conflict-sensitive lenses are carefully applied. In the fields of democratic governance and gender, instead, a mismatch between general strategies and on-the-ground implementation can be observed. Targeted research in these critical areas of intervention and assistance is highly needed. Overall, our analysis invites to consider radicalisation processes not as social pathology but as ongoing social phenomena that take place in a space where several actors rival for material and ideational resources, and therefore require careful assessment and multi-scalar prioritisation, including at the regional and transnational level.
Working Paper on enabling environments, drivers, and occurrence/nonoccurrence of violent extremism
Why does violent extremism not occur in enabling environments? Based on recent field work in the Sahel and the Maghreb region this is the main question we seek to understand in this working paper. To understand non-occurrence and thereby the foundations of social and individual resilience, we also need to understand the drivers of violent extremism and why they gain traction among some populations while others show much higher degrees of resilience. To achieve this, we will zoom in on cases in Mali, Niger, Tunisia and Morocco, showcasing different trajectories of occurrence and non-occurrence.
Policy brief summarizing the EU and other stakeholders’ prevention strategy towards violent extremism in the Maghreb and the Sahel
What is the European Union (EU) doing to prevent and counter violent extremism (P/CVE) in north-western Africa, specifically in the Maghreb and Sahel region? Building upon the EU Counter Terrorism Strategy (EU Council 2005), the EU Strategy for combating radicalization and recruitment to terrorism has increasingly emphasized the ‘internal-external security nexus’ and the need to strengthen co-operation with key third countries in the fields of counterterrorism, anti-radicalization, prevention, and countering of violent extremism (EU Parliament 2015; EU Parliament and EU Council 2017). The fight against violent extremism has thus become one of the most prominent objectives in EU external action, especially as far as the (enlarged) neighbourhood is concerned (Durac 2017). Yet scientific inquiry into the EU’s role in this
Policy brief summarising the EU and other stakeholder’s prevention strategy towards violent extremism in the region, Middle East
The EU-Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Preventive Violent Extremism (PvE) co-operation is wide-ranging, and has been since a formalized partnership between the EU and MENA countries was outlined in the 1995 Barcelona Declaration. It has nevertheless received added attention following numerous terrorist attacks within the EU during the last decade; and European foreign fighters have been linked to the attacks in Paris in 2015; in Brussels, Berlin, and Nice in 2016; and in Manchester, London, and Barcelona in 2017.
Policy brief on the implementation of the EU’s policies
Violent extremism is not a new phenomenon and terrorism has a long history in Europe, often linked to separatist movements, anarchism, and far-right and far-left extremism. The trends, means, and patterns of radicalization have evolved rapidly since the Arab uprisings flared exactly a decade ago. Counter-terrorism (CT) and preventing violent extremism (PVE) strategies have developed alongside these trends at the national and supranational level. In the wake of a series of Jihad-inspired terror attacks in Spain, France, Germany, Belgium, the UK, and elsewhere, European Union (EU) member states ramped up their military campaigns against the Islamic State (ISIS, aka Daesh) and al-Qaeda in Syria and Iraq. But since the fall of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), governments’ interest in fighting terrorism in the Middle East has decreased. Nevertheless, some European countries remain on the front foot in their securitized PVE approach. Although there is no apparent connection between the anti-jihad war waged by the French army in Mali and the radicalization in France, the government is calling for more support from European countries to fight against jihadi movements in the Sahel. But the appetite for costly expeditionary campaigns is decreasing. By and large, the phenomenon of violent extremism is perceived as homegrown. And whereas large differences remain in individual countries’ approaches to tackling the challenges posed by violent extremism, it has nevertheless become increasingly clear that today’s security challenges – whether it is terrorism, organized crime, cyberattacks, disinformation, or other evolving cyber-enabled threats – are shared threats that require a transnational approach. Indeed, Europe as a whole faces new security issues and specific challenges for preventive work that (lone) actors and (returning) foreign terrorist fighters raise, while the internet and social media give extremist and terrorist groups and their sympathisers new opportunities for spreading their propaganda, mobilization, and communication. It is against this changed backdrop that this policy brief asks what lessons the EU can learn from best practices identified at the national level, and in the co0ordination efforts with the supranational institutions.
Working paper on the implementation of the EU’s policies
This working paper builds on earlier research in which we mapped and analysed the toolbox of the European Union (EU) and a handful of European countries by providing a comprehensive overview of existing measures aimed at counter-terrorism (CT) and preventing violent extremism (PVE) within and outside the EU. It listed the institutional setup, the decision-making processes, and co-ordinating practices at both the EU and state levels. In addition to an analysis of CT and PVE strategies at the level of EU institutions, the toolbox of four EU member states (Germany, France, Ireland, Spain) and one former member state (UK) was unpacked because of their particular experiences with and competences in the area of prevention of violent extremism. Overall, our research found that the PVE agenda is quite a recent phenomenon in most member states and principally aims at preventing violent Islamist extremism through community engagement. The UK has been a pioneer in developing a ‘prevent’ pillar as part of its 2003 CT strategy and has since then actively contributed to the development of an EUlevel PVE framework. This EU framework has in turn pushed other member states, such as Ireland and Spain, to develop their own national PVE strategies in recent years. While Germany has also over the past decade made significant strides in preventing involvement in extremism and has brought its national practices to the EU level, France has generally favoured a more securitized than preventive approach. The present working paper takes the research one step further by looking more closely at the implementation of adopted PVE measures and practices in the EU and the abovementioned key states, both domestically as well as vis-à-vis the Western Balkans and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. As such, we present a more evaluative overview geared towards identifying best practices and lessons learned in this field. The paper not only focuses on how policy is implemented and followed up, but also assesses the EU’s experiences in co-operating with member states and vice versa. In doing so, the research tries to take on board key recent developments, in particular in France and at the EU level, in response to a new series of terrorist attacks that took place in Paris, Nice, and Vienna between the end of October and mid-November 2020. The research builds on a set of in-depth interviews with PVE officials and practitioners within the EU and national administrations.
Working paper on EU’s policies and instruments for PVE
This working paper maps and analyses the toolbox of the EU and a handful of European countries by providing a comprehensive overview of existing measures aimed at preventing violent extremism (PVE) within and outside the EU. It lists the institutional set-up, the decisionmaking processes and coordinating practices at both the EU and state levels. In addition to an analysis of counter-terrorism and PVE strategies at the level of EU institutions, the toolbox of four EU member states (Germany, France, Ireland, Spain) and one former member state (UK) is analysed because of their particular experiences with and competences in the area of prevention of violent extremism.