World of the Right: Alternative visions of global order

Myter om ytre høyre

De kalles gjerne populister, antiliberale og Russland-vennlige - men er det så enkelt?

USAs autoritære vending

Amerikanske institusjoner som ble bygd opp for å spre demokrati internasjonalt, vender nå kritikken mot eget land

Brothers in Arms and Faith? The Emerging US-Central and Eastern Europe ‘Special Relationship’

In this policy note, we explore the nature, strength and tensions of the contemporary US-Central Eastern Europe relationship. We describe the expanding US-CEE ‘brotherhood in arms’: growing trade relations, intensified military cooperation, and rekindled diplomatic ties. Further, we unpack the striking and largely ignored dimensions of the US-CEE ‘brotherhood in faith’: the many ways in which the United States and Central and Eastern Europe are tied together by overlapping ideologies of national conservatism and a particular version of Christian ‘family values’. This involves addressing the complexities of an increasingly influential and ambitious Visegrád Group, whose key players – Poland and Hungary – may be brothers, but are by no means twins. It also means raising some broader, burning discussions about the future of NATO and the meaning of ‘Europe’. Universalist, multicultural and postnational? Or conservative, Christian and sovereigntist?

Drømmen om å gjenkristne Europa

Lederne i Ungarn, Polen og Russland snakker om å beskytte andre kristne – og om å redde Europa fra seg selv, skriver Minda Holm i denne Dagsavisen-kronikken.

Står den liberale epoken for fall?

30 år etter murens fall er verden mer preget av kontinuitet enn endring.

Russland og det ytre høyre

Båndene mellom Russland og ytre høyre i Europa er mer kompliserte enn man kan få inntrykk av i vestlig media, skriver Minda Holm i denne kronikken.

Mutual Lack of Introspection and the ‘Russia Factor’ in the Liberal West

Minda Holm makes three claims in this article: one about the representation of Russia as an external enemy and the reflex to blame Russia for unwanted domestic developments; one about the liberal Western Self’s continuous violation of the principles it judges others by; and one about the seemingly deliberate lack of critical introspection amongst Russian and Western elites. The Western Self is largely viewed as liberal by default, irrespective of the extensive illiberal actions – seen in, for example, the post-9/11 era. Whereas politics is messy and full of contradictions, Western liberal morality is often presented as somehow standing monolithically above those contradictory actions: despite torture, a secret extraordinary rendition and detention program and wide-ranging breaches of international law, the US Self under Bush Jr. remained decidedly ‘good’. Whilst the Self’s identity as liberal persists despite violating those liberal principles, states such as Russia are stigmatized for the same types of violations. That this creates frustration with those defined as standing on the outside or, better, denied access to the true inside, should not come as a surprise. But, Russia’s continuous denialism and whataboutism, and the role of academics in this negative cycle, doesn’t bode well for the future of Russia-West relations.

Visions of an Illiberal World Order? The National Right in Europe, Russia and the US

The rise of a national Right in both Europe and the US is disrupting the security agendas of Western foreign– and defense ministries. Long accustomed to directing the gaze and measures of Western security only outwards – towards Africa, the Middle East, China – these centers of policy formulation now find themselves forced to confront a more introspective line of questioning: Is the identity of ‘the liberal West’ and its agenda of a rule-based, institutionalized world order under threat from within? In this brief we unpack the visions of world order espoused by the new Western Right, its ideological overlap with conservative ideas in Putin’s Russia, as well as the built-in tensions and uncertainties of that emerging alliance. Our focus is on potential implications of these political developments for i) international institutionalism, and ii) interventionism. In short, we argue that anti-globalism must not be mistaken for anti-internationalism. The most basic political agenda of the national Right – from the Trumpian US to Putin’s Russia – is one of battling globalism and its liberal vision of a trans-national or cosmopolitan world order, by defending older Western concepts of sovereignty-centred, inter-national co-existence. In contrast to the extreme Right, the current European-US-Russian alliance of national Right politicians largely want to fight this battle from the inside and through, not outside, established institutions such as the UN and the EU.

States before relations: On misrecognition and the bifurcated regime of sovereignty

The symbolic structure of the international system, organised around sovereignty, is sustained by an institutional infrastructure that shapes how states seek sovereign agency. We investigate how the modern legal category of the state is an institutional expression of the idea of the state as a liberal person, dependent on a one-off recognition in establishing the sovereign state. We then discuss how this institutional rule co-exists with the on-going frustrated search for recognition in terms of socio-political registers. While the first set of rules establishes a protective shield against others, regardless of behaviour, the second set of rules specify rules for behaviour of statehood, which produces a distinct form of misrecognition. States are, at one level, already recognised as sovereign and are granted rights akin to individuals in liberal thought, and yet they are continually misrecognised in their quest to actualise the sovereign agency they associate with statehood. We draw on examples from two contemporary phenomena - fragile states, and assertions of non-interference and sovereignty from the populist right and non-Western great powers, to discuss the misrecognition processes embedded in the bifurcated symbolic structure of sovereignty, and its implications for debates about hierarchy and sovereignty in world affairs.

Ideologenes kamp

To innflytelsesrike ideologer – en russisk, en amerikansk – bygger høyreradikale nettverk i Europa. Selv om ideologien springer ut fra like kilder, har de ulike visjoner.

Kampen om suverenitet

Stadig flere stater vektlegger respekt for deres «indre anliggender». Hvor går grensene for staters suverenitet i dag?

Norge, USA og folkeretten

Når det gjelder USA og folkeretten, er problemet ikke så mye Trump, som at USA konsekvent bryter de verdiene de selv forfekter, skriver MInda Holm i denne Dagsavisen-kronikken.

Hatet mot George Soros

Ingen enkeltperson er hatet så mye av både det nasjonalistiske og ekstreme høyre som ungarsk-amerikanske George Soros.

Vår fiende Russland?

De siste fire årene har fiendebildet av Russland i mange land vokst seg svært sterkt, tidvis på unyansert grunnlag. Parallelt har regimet blitt vanskeligere å forsvare.

Familien i internasjonal politikk

Tradisjonelle familieverdier» blir stadig oftere brukt for å rettferdiggjøre systematisk stigmatisering av homofile i vidt forskjellige land verden over, skriver Minda Holm i denne kronikken.

Frykten for populismen

Det snakkes mye og negativt om populistenes fremmarsj i Europa. Men det er ofte uklart hva som menes med populisme.

What, When, and Where, Then, is the Concept of Sovereignty?

It is difficult to overstate the importance of the concept sovereignty for international relations (IR). And yet, understanding the historical emergence of sovereignty in international relations has long been curtailed by the all-encompassing myth of the Peace of Westphalia. While criticism of this myth has opened space for further historical inquiry in recent years, it has also raised important questions of historical interpretation and methodology relevant to IR, as applying our current conceptual framework to distant historical cases is far from unproblematic. Central among these questions is the when, what, and how of sovereignty: from when can we use “sovereignty” to analyze international politics and for which polities? Can sovereignty be used when the actors themselves did not have recourse to the terminology? And what about polities that do not have recourse to the term at all? What are the theoretical implications of applying the concept of sovereignty to early polities? From different theoretical and methodological perspectives, the contributions in this forum shed light on these questions of sovereignty and how to treat the concept analytically when applied to a period or place when/where the term did not exist as such. In doing so, this forum makes the case for a sensitivity to the historical dimension of our arguments about sovereignty—and, by extension, international relations past and present—as this holds the key to the types of claims we can make about the polities of the world and their relations.

Norge, USA og det liberale verdifellesskapet

Trumps delvis anti-liberale politikk setter flere av USAs europeiske allierte, inkludert Norge, i en kinkig posisjon. Én mulig respons er å opptre varsomt, og la de amerikanske institusjonene selv «gjøre jobben» i møte med mer illiberale initiativer fra den nye administrasjonen. Samtidig kan det tenkes at flere av Trumps posisjoner vil modereres i møte med både byråkrati og allierte. Problemet med en slik tilnærming – der Norge står på sidelinjen, og eventuelt tar ad hoc beslutninger om å kritisere - er at det ikke tar utfordringene som de liberale verdiene og institusjonene står overfor seriøst nok. Problemet for verdifellesskapet er tross alt ikke bare Trump, men en internasjonal dreining mot det illiberale i både innenriks- og utenrikspolitikken til land som vi har antatt har vært en del av det samme fellesskapet. Hvor langt er Norge villig til å gå for å forsvare de verdiene som vi definerer oss gjennom utad?

Tryggingspolitikk sett frå Tyrkia og Russland

Det illiberale Europa

Det er klare fellestrekk i landenes politiske utvikling. Gjennom lovendringer svekker myndighetene uavhengigheten til domstolene, sivilsamfunnet og media. I tillegg deler de et konservativt politisk tankegods, hvor regjeringene vektlegger statlig suverenitet, religion, familie og nasjon som et alternativ til det liberaldemokratiske tankegodset i EU.

Ytre Høyre, Foren Eder!

Ytre høyre forfekter nasjonalstaten, men er stadig mer internasjonale. Båndene er særlig sterke mellom bevegelser i USA og Russland.

Kreml og den liberale idéen

Hvor radikal er egentlig Kremls anti-liberalisme?