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Helge Blakkisrud
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Sammendrag
Helge Blakkisrud forsker på utviklingen av russisk føderalisme og sentrum-periferi relasjoner med et særlig fokus på utviklingen av institusjonen med regionale guvernører.
Han jobber også med russisk nordområdepolitikk, minoritetspolitikk og russisk nasjonalisme. I tillegg er han interessert i stats- og nasjonsbyggingsprosesser i Eurasia med særlig vekt på utvikingen i ikke-anerkjente stater.
Blakkisrud er redaktør for Nordisk Østforum, et nordisk, fagfellevurdert tidsskrift for russlands- og østeuropastudier.
Han har vært gjesteforeleser ved OSSE-akademiet i Bisjkek, Kirgisistan, siden 2008. I 2009–2010 var han Fulbright Visiting Fellow ved UC Berkeley.
Ekspertise
Utdanning
1996 Doktorgradsprogrammet (statsvitenskap), Universitetet i Oslo
1995 Cand. polit. (statsvitenskap), Universitet i Oslo. Oppgave: De russiske minoritetene i Estland og Latvia.
Arbeidserfaring
1995- Forsker/leder Forskningsgruppen for Russland, Asia og internasjonal handel
2018- Tilknyttet Det norske universitetssenter i St. Petersburg i en amanuensis II-stilling
2005-2009 Tilknyttet Det norske universitetssenter i St. Petersburg i en II-stilling
1995- Valgobservatør for OSSE på Balkan og i det postsovjetiske området
1994- Ansvarlig redaktør, Nordisk Østforum
Aktivitet
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Ti år etter krigen mellom Russland og Georgia: geopolitikk i Sør-Kaukasus og i Svartehavsregionen
Georgias utanriksminister David Zalkaliani skal snakke om situasjonen i landet og områda rundt ti år etter slutten av krigen.
Korleis ser russarane på konfrontasjonen med Vesten?
Lev Gudkov gir deg eit innblikk i den russiske folkemeininga i 2018.
AVLYST: Ny konservatisme som nasjonal konsensus i Russland?
På grunn av uventa hendingar må vi dessverre avlyse dette seminaret.
Valdai Paper #92: Russia’s Far East Initiatives in Troubled Geopolitical Times
The China–Russia rapprochement forms the centrepiece of Russia’s much hyped policy of a ‘turn to the East’, a policy aimed at transforming the Russian Far East from a territorial backwater into a new gateway to China, North-East Asia and beyond. In 2013, President Vladimir Putin declared the development of the Far East a ‘national priority for the entire twenty-first century’. Historically, the Russian Far East was rather a garrison on the distant frontier. But today there is a new development model for the region that is expected to turn it into the gateway to the East, the region of growth and cooperation aimed to reap the benefits of rising Asia, particularly China. New institutions, projects, and financing have been provided for this purpose. What progress has been made so far in implementing the Eastern vector in Russian domestic and foreign policy? Have the ambitious plans indeed borne fruits, like President Xi declared? And what are the main drivers behind the ‘turn to the East’? Do worsened geopolitical relations with Western European actors intensify the turn? Or is it driven by the perceptions of opportunities and long-term objectives in the Asia-Pacific region? The Valdai Paper #92 presents a critical and independent view on Russia’s Turn to the East by the European authors.
Korleis førebur Russland seg på eit maktskifte?
I samsvar med grunnloven er dette Putins siste presidentperiode. Korleis førebur det russiske politiske systemet seg på eit maktskifte?
Seks nye år med Putin – kva no?
18. mars blir Vladimir Putin etter alle solemerke attvalt for ein ny seksårsperiode som president. Kva har det å seie for Russland?
An Asian Pivot Starts at Home: The Russian Far East in Russian Regional Policy
To realize its ambitious goals of turning the Far East into Russia’s gateway to the Asia-Pacific, the Kremlin in 2012 established the Ministry for the Development of the Far East. Structurally, this ministry is a hybrid, with offices at the federal and the regional levels, reflecting both Moscow’s centralized take on policy formulation and the difficulties of micro-managing politics in a region distant in time and space. Analysing whether the new ministry has been a success, the author concludes that, while Moscow’s primary goal has been to open a Far Eastern gateway, a side-effect might be that the Far East will become better integrated with the rest of the country, providing for more balanced development throughout the Federation.
'Restore Moscow to the Muscovites': Othering 'the migrants' in the 2013 Moscow mayoral elections
Today, the Russian Federation has the second largest migrant population in the world in absolute numbers. The chapter looks at what role these migrants – and migrantophobia – play in Russian contemporary identity discourse through the lens of the 2013 Moscow mayoral elections. On the eve of these elections, Muscovites identified the large numbers of labour migrants in the capital as the most important campaign issue. This chapter explores how 'the migrant issue' was addressed at the candidate level as well as how it was perceived by ordinary Muscovites. First, it traces what images of 'the migrant' the candidates presented; how they assessed the potential for integration into Russian society; and what measures they proposed for regulating the flow of new migrants. Next, drawing on survey data, the chapter discusses to what extent campaign promises reflected the positions of the electorate on the same issues. It concludes that the Moscow electoral experiment of allowing semi-competitive elections contributed to pushing the borders of what mainstream politicians in Russia perceived as acceptable positions on migrants and migration policy, for at least two reasons: Firstly, incumbent mayor Sobianin faced stiff competition from the rising star of the non-systemic opposition, liberal-nationalist Aleksei Navalnyi, and had to find a way of outbidding him on the migrant issue. Second, in this more competitive environment, Sobianin could not rely on administrative resources alone, but had to respond to popular demands, to ensure an acceptable win: therefore, he had to appear as 'tough' on migrants. The experiment with semi-competitive elections in Moscow in 2013 thus demonstrated the limits of the Kremlin’s ability to fully control Russian nationalist discourse and also contributed to reinforcing the idea of 'the migrant' as the new 'Other' in Russian identity discourse.