Helge Blakkisrud

Russia before and after Crimea: Nationalism and Identity, 2010-17

Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 marked a watershed in post-Cold War European history and brought East–West relations to a low. At the same time, by selling this fateful action in starkly nationalist language, the Putin regime achieved record-high popularity. This book shows how, after the large-scale 2011–13 anti-Putin demonstrations in major Russian cities and the parallel rise in xenophobia related to the Kremlin’s perceived inability to deal with the influx of Central Asian labour migrants, the annexation of Crimea generated strong ‘rallying around the nation’ and ‘rallying around the leader’ effects. The contributors to this collection go beyond the news headlines to focus on overlooked aspects of Russian society such as intellectual racism and growing xenophobia. These developments are contextualised with an overview of Russian nationalism: state-led, grassroots and the tensions between the two.

Introduction: Exploring Russian nationalisms

In the introductory chapter, the two editors, Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud, argue that in Putin's third period as president, nationalism has become even more important for understanding Russian politics and society than before. Prior to the annexation of Crimea, the influx of low-skilled labour from Central Asia and the Caucasus had been creating strong migrantophobic sentiments in sectors of the Russian population, boosting support for ethno-nationalism. The dramatic events in Ukraine in 2014 onwards, however, radically changed the political scene in Russia. Nationalist movements in opposition to the Kremlin went into steep decline, while the nation rallied around its leader, President Putin, who for the first time explicitly used nationalist themes in his propaganda. At first glance, this development may appear radically new. However, our introductory chapter, drawing on insights from several of the chapters in the volume, shows how this pattern has precedents in Russian history: Russian state authorities have generally tended to use other methods of legitimation than nationalism, leaving the nationalist field to various societal forces. However, in times of crisis – as during the Great Patriotic War– a state-focused, imperialistic nationalism is fully exploited as a mobilising device, and any autonomous, popular expressions of nationalism are suppressed. Seemingly an oxymoron, 'imperialist nationalism' has in fact been a strong current throughout Russian history, competing with cultural and ethnic nationalism.

Tradition, Nation und der böse Westen: Putin, Erdoğan und die Legitimation ihrer Herrschaft

Gateway or Garrison? Border regions in times of geopolitical crisis

Russia's border regions have had moments as open 'gateways' to cooperation. More often, however, the border has been viewed as a 'garrison': an outpost of state power. This chapter places the Russian Far East in the broader context of Russia's pursuit of economic development and security concerns, noting that Russian foreign policy is not necessarily uniform: there are elements of compartmentalization/disaggregation along geographical vectors. The chapter broaches the question that informs all case studies in this volume: has Russia intensified its diplomatic and economic outreach to its eastern border areas and beyond because of the recent breakdown in relations with the West—or would such a shift have taken place anyway, given the economic pull of the Asia-Pacific region?

Afterword: 6400 kilometers away - but not a policy world apart

The Afterword presents two key findings from this volume. First, while numerous new strategy documents and instruments have been adopted in recent years, contributing authors voice concern about the steps Moscow has taken to translate lofty ideas into practical policies. Second, the key initiatives were formulated well before the current crisis in Russia's relations with the West. While a certain rebalancing of the Western and Eastern vectors is taking place, there is still a long way to go before Russia's 'window to the East' can match its 'window to the West'. Only long-term commitment on the part of Moscow can transform the Russian Far East from a neglected periphery and military outpost into a viable gateway to the Asia-Pacific.

Mannen, myten og utenrikspolitikken: Putin som utenrikspolitisk aktør

I henhold til den russiske grunnloven tilligger utenriks- og forsvarspolitikk formelt presidentens domene. Etter at Putin nå i snart tjue år har vært med på å prege politikken, er det etter hvert vanskelig å skille mellom hva som er Putins personlige stil og påvirkning og hva som representerer grunntonen og de lengre linjer i russisk utenrikspolitikk. Men hvor står Putin ved inngangen til sin fjerde – og i henhold til grunnloven siste – presidentperiode? Hva kjennetegner ham som person og politiker? Og hva kan vi forvente fra Putin på den utenrikspolitiske arenaen i løpet av den neste seksårsperioden?

Russia's Turn to the East - Domestic Policymaking and Regional Cooperation

This book is open access under a CC BY license. This book explores if and how Russian policies towards the Far East region of the country – and East Asia more broadly – have changed since the onset of the Ukraine crisis and Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Following the 2014 annexation and the subsequent enactment of a sanctions regime against the country, the Kremlin has emphasized the eastern vector in its external relations. But to what extent has Russia’s 'pivot to the East' intensified or changed in nature – domestically and internationally – since the onset of the current crisis in relations with the West? Rather than taking the declared 'pivot' as a fact and exploring the consequences of it, the contributors to this volume explore whether a pivot has indeed happened or if what we see today is the continuation of longer-duration trends, concerns and ambitions.