Kva betyr Trumps Space Force for Europa?
Den amerikanske presidenten ønskjer seg ein eigen romkommando, og det kan vere med på å endre dynamikken i verdsrommet som til no har vore prega av samarbeid.
Murer og andre tiltak mot irregulær migrasjon – er USAs tilnærming eigentleg så ulik den europeiske?
Under seminaret på Litteraturhuset 5. juni ser vi nærare på politikken USA og Europa førar langs sørlege grenser, og på kva konsekvensar dette har for naboland og migrasjonsstraumar.
Why Franco-German leadership on European defense is not in sight
Emmanuel Macron, already as a presidential candidate, bet heavily on Europe and the Franco-German tandem. This choice, which required a certain amount of political capital, resulted in a number of initiatives, many of them outlined in his September 2017 Sorbonne speech. It also resulted in the bilateral Aachen Treaty Macron and Angela Merkel signed in January 2019, intended to renew the 1963 Elysée Treaty. But the pomp surrounding the signing ceremony in Aachen barely hides the fact that things are not going too well in Franco-German relations. Frustration with Berlin has reached new peaks in Paris, not least due to Germany’s failure to provide an “answer” to Macron’s vision for Europe. When the Christian Democrats’ new president, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, wrote a debate article in March 2019,1 this was widely considered too little too late – in addition to the protocol faux pas of a party president without any government position responding to a head of state. It seems clear that Germany is not willing to embark on a great journey toward “refounding Europe” together with Macron’s France, although Paris and Berlin of course do cooperate on many issues.
To engage or not engage? Libyan Salafis and state institutions
At the beginning of the recent escalation of hostilities in Libya in April 2019, one of the key questions posed was what role, if any, quietist Salafis would play. Followers of this trend have grown significantly in influence in recent years, including in the security sphere and government institutions. As a result, their decisions, especially those regarding military engagement, have the potential to have important consequences at the national level. The fact that these “quietist” Salafis in Libya are armed already poses interesting ideological questions. Moreover, the fact that their behaviour during the recent fighting in Tripoliihas been somewhat unpredictable indicates that their ideology of obedience to the sitting ruler requires further interrogation.This research brief looks at the way in which the quietist Salafis have evolved to gain such a strong position in Libya, assessing their behaviour in four distinct periods. It contrasts this behaviour with other Salafi trends in Libya, particularly the political Salafism associated with certain former leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). It argues that Libyan Salafis have adapted and renegotiated ideologies in the changing political context after 2011. More than pure ideology, the way in which they have responded to the constraints and opportunities created by this context has been the key factor in the evolution of the different groups and ultimately their fortunes.
Sunnism, Salafism, Sheikism: Urban Pathways of Resistance in Sidon, Lebanon
This brief analyses Salafism as an urban phenomenon, with an emphasis on the contentious period following the Syrian uprising turned civil war (2011–present). To understand Salafism’s popular appeal, it is necessary to examine the pathways of resistance in specific urban contexts. In Lebanon, Salafism expanded from its Tripoli centre to secondary towns and cities such as Sidon, where Sheikh Ahmad Assir’s neo-Salafism became a political force and can be classified as a “new social movement”. Neo-Salafism, is not built on religious credentials and authority, but combines populism with sectarianism. This also accounts for its popular appeal, especially after 2011, when the Syrian conflict stoked Sunni-Shia tensions and anti-Hizbollah rhetoric. The erosion of Sunni political pre-eminence (“Sunnism”) and the crises in the Sunni religious (Dar al-Fatwa) and political establishment (Future Movement), prompted a temporary shift from “Harirism” to “Sheikism” that transferred the moral leadership of the Sunni community from the political elite to the lay town preacher; Sheikh Ahmad al-Assir. This also involved a shift in the locus of contentious politics from the capital Beirut to secondary cities such as Sidon and a strategic shift from electoral politics to grassroots’ protests, sit-ins and rallies. Ultimately this led to an armed confrontation that crushed the Assir-movement, eroded its popular support and was followed by an electoral defeat that made political elites reassert control. HYRES – Hybrid Pathways to Resistance in the Islamic World HYRES studies the interaction between Islamist movements and the state in the cases of Iraq, Lebanon, Libya and Mali, and is designed to answer the following question: Why do some Islamist groups pursue their political and religious project within the state to which they belong – while other Islamist groups refuse to accept these borders, seeking instead to establish new polities, such as restoring the Islamic Caliphate?
Er NATO ein allianse for framtida?
NATO møter stadig nye, store utfordringar i dagens tryggingsmiljø. Kor godt er alliansen førebudd på desse utfordringane, og er NATO i stand til å møte dei?
Should I stay or should I go? Security considerations for members leaving al-Shabaab in Somalia
Den militante islamistiske organisasjonen al-Shabaab utgjør en trussel både i og utenfor Somalia. I januar i år utførte gruppen igjen et stor-skala terrorangrep i nabolandet Kenya. Mange unge medlemmer av al-Shabaab ønsker å forlate gruppen, men i en kontekst som Somalia, med store sikkerhetsutfordringer, er dette vanskelig. I denne policy briefen argumenterer Ingvild Magnæs Gjelsvik for at et gjennomgående fokus på sikkerhet og sikkerhetstiltak på ulike nivåer er avgjørende for å kunne lykkes med initiativer og programmer som har som formål å bistå og legge til rette for en utvei fra ekstreme miljøer under en pågående konflikt.
Lunsjseminar: Krig, fred og alliansar i cyberspace
Kva er cyberoperasjoner? Korleis skilje konfliktar i cyberspace seg frå fysiske konfliktar? Og kva forskjellar og likskapar kan ein finne mellom cyberoperasjoner og informasjonskrigføring?
Comparing Cyber Security. Critical Infrastructure protection in Norway, the UK and Finland.
Cyber security and protecting critical infrastructures from digital harm are of increasing importance for governments around the globe. Tackling this issue is challenged by two distinct features of cyber security in Western states: Firstly, the transnational nature of digital risks and threats necessitates cooperation and engagements beyond the state, through international and regional organizations and institutions. Secondly, the considerable extent of private ownership forces states to rely on and engage with private companies, through regulation or public–private partnerships (PPP). Through comparative analysis of the approaches taken to PPP and European cooperation for energy and telecommunication in Finland, Norway and the UK, this report examines how states engage with these issues. The greatest difference is found to lie between the two Nordic states and the UK. This is not the result of divergent national perceptions and understandings, but of the more centralized and intelligence-centred approach taken by the UK in contrast to the whole-of-society trust-based approach of the Nordic states. Both approaches entail distinct benefits and drawbacks. The major concern in the Nordic states is the lack of public resources and capacity, as well as the fragmentation of responsibility and capabilities. Realizing the importance of culture, context and history in shaping how public authorities respond to cyber-security concerns is of vital importance for enabling better policies. This report concludes by presenting a set of best practices identified in the three case countries.
The Politics of Stability: Cement and Change in Cyber Affairs
In November 2018, the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, inaugurated one year earlier ‘to develop proposals for norms and policies to enhance international security and stability and guide responsible state and non-state behavior in cyberspace’, launched six norms pointing ‘the way to new opportunities for increasing the stability of cyberspace’. However, the Commission has not examined or explained the very concept it was established to explore. Quite the contrary, the Commission argues that its proposed norms will be used to define what cyber stability actually is. Focusing on the interrelationship between international peace and stability, and ways of achieving both in the context of ICTs, the authors will offer a model of stability of cyberspace. They begin by examining the concepts of ‘stability’ and ‘strategic stability’ as understood with regard to international security. This conceptual analysis is followed by a presentation of the political claims of stability expressed in national and international cyber-and information-security discourses. Drawing on the conceptual approaches and the political claims, the report then model the stability of cyberspace in three interlinked and reinforcing dimensions: 1) equal and inclusive international relations; 2) prevention of war: the minimal peace, with emphasis on averting a devastating nuclear war between the superpowers; and 3) the functionality of global and national technical systems and services. After discussing how international law, preventive diplomacy, confidence-building measures, and norms of responsible state behaviour can support cyberspace stability, this report concludes with recommendations for action aimed at helping to create and maintain a stable - resilient and adaptive - cyberspace.