Publikasjoner
Den norske Atlanterhavskomité: Spranget inn i fremtiden
Europa er i krig. Putins overfall på Ukraina 24. februar 2022 utgjør et vendepunkt i europeisk sikkerhet. Krigen er også et foreløpig klimaks i russisk revisjonisme, som har aner tilbake til 1990 og som ble mer markant fra 2007 og 2014. Noen så krigen komme. Fra oktober 2021 ble innsiktsfulle analytikere og aktører i etterretnings- og beslutningskretser i USA, NATO Belgia og enkelte miljøer i Norge stadig mer sikre på at det gikk mot krig. De innerste sirkler hadde tilgang til svært god etterretning. Personer i posisjon med dyp innsikt i russisk historie så med stigende uro på at Russlands blodstenkte imperietradisjon gjenoppsto, brutal og usminket – denne utrivelige uvanen hos romanover og kommunister til å fortære naboer. Beleste personer i posisjon med bred kunnskap om styresett så at det autoritære russiske regimet gikk i totalitær retning og kapslet seg inn, noe vi gjenkjenner fra andre totalitære regimer. Eksperter i det offentlige rom så ikke krig som sannsynlig, med noen unntak. Det var ikke rasjonelt, liksom. De hadde heller ikke forestilt seg at Sovjet-imperiet ville rakne. Vi ser hva vi har sett før: At eksperter er best til å forklare i ettertid at slik måtte det nødvendigvis gå. Og til å klandre politikerne for at de ikke reagerte i tide. Ingen vet hvor lenge krigen vil vare og hvor lenge Putins Russland vil forbli en paria. Man registrerer at en rekke europeiske statsledere verker etter å skape fred, flere av dem på en slik måte at de selv kan skinne. Her skal vi skue bortenfor selve krigen og ha et særlig øye til tradisjonell makt- og interessepolitikk: Hva er de langsiktige utfordringer og trusler av betydning for Norge? Hvordan bør vi innrette vår sikkerhetspolitikk og vårt forsvar? Dette er en tid med store utfordringer, men også mange muligheter. Kriser skaper muligheter. Det finnes anledning til å gjøre Norge bedre rustet til å håndtere store endringer i geopolitikk og teknologi. Vi skal dvele ved omgivelsene, spesielt Russland og nord. Vi skal drøfte Norden i NATO som sikkerhetspolitisk prosjekt. Vi skal diskutere Forsvarets design, spesielt evnen til å tenke konsistent fra tanke til handling. Og vi skal til sist fremsette fem frimodige postulater, som overskrider konvensjonell tenkning, om hva Norge vil kunne prioritere i årene fremover.
Revisiting nuclear hedging: ballistic missiles and the Iranian example
Teknologiske endringer har gjort atomvåpenarsenaler mer sårbare. I denne artikkelen hevder Henrik Stålhane Hiim at det gir særlig stater med en såkalt «garderingsstrategi» sterke grunner til å utvikle ballistiske missiler. Stater som driver med kjernefysisk «gardering» - som Iran – ønsker å opprettholde evnen til å utvikle atomvåpen, men uten å krysse den kjernefysiske terskelen. Artikkelen analyserer Irans missil- og rakettprogrammer, og demonstrerer hvordan disse programmene er en sentral del av Irans garderingsstrategi. Flere av missilene Iran kan være velegnet til bruk i et kjernevåpenprogram.
RESOLVED: Japan Should Maintain Investments in Russian Oil and Gas Projects
In this issue of Debating Japan, experts assess Japan’s investments in Russian oil and gas and whether Japan should fully divest from Russian energy.
UN Peacekeeping Operations at a Crossroads: The Implementation of Protection Mandates in Contested and Congested Spaces
Beskyttelse av sivile er fortsatt et kritisk trekk ved FNs fredsbevarende operasjoner, og tilbyr unik støtte til befolkninger i faresonen i skjøre og sviktende stater, med fokus på langsiktig stabilitet og fred. Vertsnasjoner engasjerer imidlertid i økende grad støtte fra bilateralt utplasserte styrker og private militærkontraktører for å oppnå militære og sikkerhetsmessige mål, ofte på bekostning av eksisterende fred og diplomatiske prosesser og menneskerettigheter. Tilpasning og respons til disse skiftende miljøene er avgjørende for FN-oppdragene når det gjelder å beholde deres relevans og realisere deres pålagte beskyttelsesmål. Dette krever forbedret støtte og ressursallokering og forbedret utnyttelse av eksisterende ressurser. Med utgangspunkt i dybdeintervjuer og samtaler med representanter for FNs fredsbevarende operasjoner og FNs hovedkvarter, utforsker denne rapporten utfordringer og muligheter i implementeringen av beskyttelsesmandater for fire flerdimensjonale fredsbevarende operasjoner, nemlig MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO og UNMISS. Det gir innsikt i kontekstuelle utfordringer som oppstår fra flyktigheten i miljøene de jobber i og interne utfordringer knyttet til den komplekse naturen av felles implementering av sivile, militære og politibeskyttelsesaktiviteter. Gitt korsveien FNs fredsbevarende operasjoner befinner seg ved, gir rapporten fremtidsrettede anbefalinger og oppfordrer til refleksjon og fleksibilitet for å støtte økt engasjement i sentrale beskyttelsesspørsmål som er integrert i internasjonal fred og sikkerhet.
Global networks in national governance? Changes of professional expertise in Amazon environmental governance
I 2019 fornyet skogbranner i Amazonas internasjonal bekymring for Brasils miljøpolitikk, ledet av Jair Bolsonaro. Som et av de største depotene for verdens biologiske mangfold, har Amazonas regnskog vært en kilde til bekymring i global miljøstyring. Gitt den fremtredende betydningen skulle man forvente at innenlandsk styring ville være sterkt gjennomsyret av fagfolk med internasjonal sirkulasjon, og at transnasjonale bånd ville være et sentralt mål for Bolsonaros populistiske nasjonalistiske politikk. I denne artikkelen søker jeg å forstå om og hvordan fagpersoner involvert i politikkutforming i det brasilianske miljødepartementet er koblet til nasjonale og internasjonale organisasjoner, ved å analysere nettverkene av karriereveier til høytstående ansatte i Rousseff-, Temer- og Bolsonaro-administrasjonene . Dataene viser en gjennomgående lav prosentandel av bånd mellom fagfolk og internasjonale organisasjoner. Imidlertid har typene internasjonal erfaring og kunnskap som anses som viktige endret seg betydelig under Bolsonaro. Denne publikasjonen er del av prosjektet Market for Anarchy.
Re-imagining African—Nordic relations in a changing global order
This study asks how the special relationship between countries in Africa and the Nordic region may be affected by a changing global order, that the African-Nordic cooperation can continue to evolve and remain relevant for both regions. The meeting in Helsinki on 14 June 2022 is the 20th meeting of the forum of African–Nordic Foreign Ministers. The forum was established in 2000 between five Nordic countries and ten African countries. It was intended to emphasize the political importance of Africa and to demonstrate that Africa–Nordic relations went beyond development cooperation. The forum meets alternately and rotates among African and Nordic countries and African hosts have included Benin, Botswana, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania. The number of African countries expanded over time and now numbers around 25. The annual meeting is an opportunity to consolidate the special relationship between African and Nordic countries and creates a space where political issues of mutual concern can be discussed. As such, it has helped to broaden the African–Nordic relations beyond development cooperation and towards a more politically-oriented and interest-based strategic partnership. Beyond the annual foreign ministers meeting, the other aspect the report looks into is what the sum-total of African-Nordic bilateral relations in the areas of trade, development, peace and security and multilateral cooperation reveals about the status of the overall relationship. Africa pursues strategic partnerships that helps it to develop and strengthen the continent’s economic potential, political identity, and its role on the global stage. In this study we pay particular attention to Africa’s relationship with China, Europe, India, Russia and Turkey. One of the dominant features of Africa’s international relations has been its non-alignment. African countries have been careful to seek partnerships with many different states and regions, without being pulled into any one alliance that may prevent it from also gaining support for its development from others. Therefore, in its strategic partnerships, African countries seeks engagements that will help it to grow its economies.
On the formation of content for 'political remittances': an analysis of Polish and Romanian migrants comparative evaluations of 'here' and 'there'
Migration may affect migrants’ ideas as they become exposed to different contexts over time. But how does such exposure and opportunities for comparative evaluation of origin and settlement contexts, translate into content for potential political remittances? To answer this question, we analyse 80 interviews with Polish and Romanian migrants living in Barcelona (Spain) and Oslo (Norway). Starting from the established ‘social remittances’, literature, our contribution is to unpack the process of their formation by focusing on what happens at the content-creation stage. We do so through analysis of migrants’ comparative evaluation of their ‘origin’ and ‘settlement’ contexts in regard to three explicitly political issues: corruption, public institutions and democracy. We analyse how exposure to, and comparative evaluation of, different contexts inform migrants’ views, and find non-linearity and inconsistency between migrant groups’ and in individuals’ own patterns of views. This underscores the salience of, first, recognising how the change that migration prompts in migrants’ outlooks may or may not be stronger than preceding political preferences, anchored in ongoing processes of (re)socialisation; and second, of better understanding how migration impacts migrants’ outlooks, by considering the specifics of exposure and comparative evaluation, whether or not ultimately articulated in forms traceable as ‘political remittances’.
Shifting from External Dependency: Remodelling the G5 Sahel Joint Force for the Future
After a decade of battling jihadist and violent extremist groups in West Africa, France has initiated the restructuring and relocation of its largest overseas military mission in the Sahel with an announcement of the withdrawal of Operation Barkhane (the French military counterterrorism intervention) from Mali. The exit over the coming months may signify an important shift of western military operations in Mali and the Sahel. France’s deployment in the Sahel was initially triggered by the activities of Tuareg separatists in the northern part of Mali. Islamic extremists closely associated with Al-Qaeda took advantage of the situation, seizing north Mali and spreading their activities southwards in 2012. Despite French counterterrorism operations, instability worsened, and Islamists controlled vast swathes of northern and central Mali, parts of Burkina Faso, and western Niger. Over time, under the motivation of France, the G5 Sahel Joint Force (G5S-JF) was created to address the everyday challenges of terrorism and transnational organised crime among the five member states (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger). For a force supported by three United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2359 (2017), 2391 (2017) and 2480 (2019); and with a force strength of 5600 troops organised around three sectors,1 its operational successes have been a mixed bag (ten joint border operations). Operation Barkhane together with European Union Training Mission Mali (EUTM), the Capacity Building Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) and Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), has enhanced the operational readiness and capabilities of the G5 Sahel through mentoring, training, and funding of the joint-force operations. Additionally, these external operations, particularly Barkhane, have been supportive of the activities of G5S-JF by providing intelligence, supporting logistical and joint planning, providing aerial and air support, and engaging in medical evacuation. Notwithstanding, the Joint Force has been contending with weak intelligence, shortfalls in equipment, limited aerial capabilities and a lack of rapid response, which invariably hinders operational effectiveness. The Joint Force represents an essential step toward addressing the instability that affects Mali and the broader Sahel, but as of yet, the G5S-JF has been unable to fully demonstrate its effectiveness as a force despite significant support from donor countries such as France. Moreover, it is uncertain how Mali´s withdrawal from the Joint Force will impact on the overall strategy of the G5S-JF and its sustainability going forward, especially given Mali’s recent announcement of withdrawing from the G5 Sahel. The departure of Barkhane, together with Takuba and other European arrangements from Mali, raises many unanswered questions about the funding, operational capacity and political cooperation between the other member states of the Joint Force. Even though France has reiterated that it will continue to support peacekeepers serving under MINUSMA; and Malian troops continuing to battle Islamic violent extremism after the Barkhane withdrawal, the response time to jihadist attacks and activities inside Malian territory will not be the same. Without Barkhane, the G5S-JF will struggle to protect civilians, evacuate soldiers in need of medical attention, and support effective joint planning and coordination of G5S-JF and intelligence sharing —which has been instrumental in the fight against jihadist. To address emerging challenges, enhance the ability of the G5S-JF and sustain its support, this report proposes four possible options that could fill the gap resulting from the current security vacuum being created following the possible withdrawal of some of the external military forces from Mali, and Mali itself from the G5S-JF. In arriving at these proposed options, emphasis is placed on regional perspectives, which draws on African frameworks and the use of African resources, experience, capabilities and understanding. The report argues that this would allow better ownership and closer proximity to the issues, ensuring that international partners are not dictating how the region and African Union (AU) Member States (MS) should solve challenges. The evaluation considered the full spectrum of options to include: • A reconfigured and scaled-up G5 Sahel Joint Force (Plus); • A reconfigured G5 Sahel Joint Force and revised MISAHEL through the AU, ECOWAS, ECCAS and CENSAD; • An integrated ECOWAS (deployment of the African Standby Force) utilising the G5 Sahel force; and • Elevating the G5 Sahel force to an AU (Peace Enforcement mission) with UN support. The proposed options focus on military and hybrid solutions that can tackle existing challenges in the Sahel and West Africa as a whole. However, defeating jihadism and violent extremism is essentially a job that should include intelligence and police authorities to win the hearts and minds of the population, but this cannot be done solely with hard stabilisation efforts. Tackling the vast challenges in the Sahel requires a careful mix of adaptive, agile and sustained efforts that cut across social, economic, political, developmental, humanitarian and recovery instruments and support. Thus, the report suggests additional stabilisation efforts to support the Sahel focused on local, national, regional and international initiatives that can connect to the ground and tackle internal challenges comprehensively. These initiatives, it will be argued, can plug into existing structures but also help to support structures not fully recognised. Efforts to resolve the problems in the Sahel stand a much greater chance of success if fully supported with buy-in from the AU, together with ECOWAS and support from the UN, EU and donors that can draw on the full spectrum of available instruments which have a demonstrable desire to work with like-minded partners. The authors of this report believe that a scaled-up and reconfigured G5 Sahel Joint Force (G5 Sahel Plus) option (discussed below) would have been the optimal model. However, following the recent withdrawal of Mali from the G5S-JF and the deteriorating political landscape in the region and between states, the authors’ reassessment calls for an AU Peace Enforcement mission as the most appropriate, given the current situation. It is important to note, the recommendations provided in this report hinge on the ability of the current and former G5S-JF states to address and resolve the deteriorating political situation, which is fluid in nature and continuously evolving. This will require all states (current and former G5S-JF) to recognise that they need each other to address these challenges, and that any reconfiguration (the models provided in this report) depends on the political situation being fully addressed. There is a need, as the models indicate, to have more joint efforts between the AU and ECOWAS to assist in resolving the current impasses in the region.
UNITAMS Mandate Renewal Study: Fostering a Process of Trust and Inclusivity
The United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) was established on 3 June 2020 under UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2524 to support Sudan during its transition to democratic rule and it was renewed the following year through SC 2579(2021). UNITAMS was conceived of and designed to respond to new and long-standing issues in Sudan: the political transition process that began with the December 2018 revolution and the legacy of armed conflicts. The Mission’s mandate explicitly recognises the adverse effects of climate change on the stability of Sudan and stresses the need for appropriate risk assessment and risk management strategies. Yet, since the adoption of the Mission’s mandate in June 2020 and its renewal in June 2021, Sudan’s political, security and economic situation has deteriorated significantly. An attempted military coup in September 2021, followed by a successful coup d’état on 25 October 2021, has further worsened Sudan’s political crisis, increasing insecurity, undermining the economy, and resulting in the interruption of bilateral and international funding—all amidst the continuing global pandemic. This fast-changing political, security and economic context has placed UNITAMS in a very delicate position in relation to the host government. It has required UNITAMS to focus a significant portion of its attention on good offices and diplomacy so that, together with the African Union (AU), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and other international partners and Sudanese stakeholders, it can support a process aimed at bringing Sudan’s transition back on track. While the UNITAMS mandate remains relevant and adequate, the Mission must continue to be allowed the flexibility to adapt its focus to the fast-changing dynamics on the ground. UNITAMS’ good offices’ role should remain at the centre of the Mission’s efforts during the next mandated period, helping Sudanese to find an inclusive political settlement that can secure a transition to democratic rule in the medium to long term. At the same time, the Mission should continue its work in support of its other objectives and priorities, including the protection of civilians, the implementation of the peace agreement, and advisory and capacity building, particularly related to the rule-of-law sector. The Mission should strengthen its focus on and ability to integrate climate-related security risks into its analytical work, especially as it relates to supporting local conflict prevention, mitigation and reconciliation efforts to prevent inter-communal violence. While there has been significant progress in strengthening collaboration among the UN, AU and IGAD, maintaining and sustaining the partnership must remain a key priority in the Mission’s work to promote regional stability.
Who could replace Sudan’s PM Abdalla Hamdok?
Andrew E Yaw Tchie from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs discusses the resignation of Sudan's Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and how the country can move forward.