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Lars Gjesvik
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Lars Gjesvik er seniorforsker i Forskningsgruppen for sikkerhet og forsvar, og medleder for NUPIs forskningssenter for digitalisering og cybersikkerhet.
Hovedtemaene i hans forskning har vært samspillet mellom private selskaper og statlige interesser, sikkerhetspolitiske utfordringer, og maktpolitiske spørsmål rundt digitalisering og framvoksende teknologier.
Hans doktorgrad fra Universitet i Oslo (2023) ser på samspillet mellom private selskaper og statlige interesser i det digitale rom, og rollen teknologiselskaper spiller i å sette rammene for internasjonal politikk.
Publikasjoner og ekspertise dekker spørsmål om den globale overvåkningsindustrien, digital infrastruktur som undersjøiske internettkabler og skytjenester, cybersikkerhet, og teknologiavhengighet. Tidligere arbeid har adressert nasjonale tilnærminger og offentlig-privat samarbeid innenfor cybersikkerhet, og desinformasjon og påvirkningskampanjer.
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Tøm alle filtreComparing Cyber Security. Critical Infrastructure protection in Norway, the UK and Finland.
Cyber security and protecting critical infrastructures from digital harm are of increasing importance for governments around the globe. Tackling this issue is challenged by two distinct features of cyber security in Western states: Firstly, the transnational nature of digital risks and threats necessitates cooperation and engagements beyond the state, through international and regional organizations and institutions. Secondly, the considerable extent of private ownership forces states to rely on and engage with private companies, through regulation or public–private partnerships (PPP). Through comparative analysis of the approaches taken to PPP and European cooperation for energy and telecommunication in Finland, Norway and the UK, this report examines how states engage with these issues. The greatest difference is found to lie between the two Nordic states and the UK. This is not the result of divergent national perceptions and understandings, but of the more centralized and intelligence-centred approach taken by the UK in contrast to the whole-of-society trust-based approach of the Nordic states. Both approaches entail distinct benefits and drawbacks. The major concern in the Nordic states is the lack of public resources and capacity, as well as the fragmentation of responsibility and capabilities. Realizing the importance of culture, context and history in shaping how public authorities respond to cyber-security concerns is of vital importance for enabling better policies. This report concludes by presenting a set of best practices identified in the three case countries.
Ten Years On: Reassessing the Stoltenberg Report on Nordic Cooperation
Ten years ago, the report ‘Nordic cooperation on foreign and security policy’ was presented to the Nordic foreign ministers at an extraordinary meeting in Oslo, Norway. Penned and fronted by Norway’s former foreign minister Thorvald Stoltenberg, the report proposed thirteen ways in which Nordic cooperation in the foreign and security domain could be formalized and strengthened. Generally well-received in the Nordic capitals, today, the report is regularly referred to in assessments of Nordic foreign and security cooperation, or when Nordic heads of government meet in public to discuss past and future accomplishments.
Digital sovereignty and autonomy (GAIA)
NUPI in collaboration with Simula Research Lab will map global data flows and their impact on national autonomy and sovereignty....
Digitale trusler og demokrati (PRODEM)
Hvordan håndterer stater den økte risikoen for at digitale medier brukes til påvirkning og undergraving av demokratiske prosesser?...
Kritisk digital infrastruktur (KRIDI)
Hvilken rolle skal staten ha i beskyttelsen av privateid digital kritisk infrastruktur? Og hvilke nye utfordringer og problemstillinger møter man?...
China's notion of cybersecurity: The importance of strategic cultures for cyber deterrence
This paper debates the importance of different strategic cultures in cyberspace through the example of China. More than any other form of security cyber security is interpreted and acted on differently by different states. While the idea that the Internet would be a liberalizing force throughout the globe was dominant for a long time, over the last few years it has become evident that states have different interpretations and values attached to Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). These differences in valuation in turns leads to different conceptualizations of cyber security, giving the term different meanings for different actors. As states disagree over what cyber security is, they are also likely to disagree on how it is to be achieved. This paper evaluates the impact of these differences in light of a frequently used concept in security studies, namely that of deterrence.
The Chinese Cyber Sovereignty Concept (Part 1 & 2)
Cyber sovereignty is a distinct concept from the more familiar term cybersecurity, which concerns protecting the infrastructure and processes connected to the Internet. Cyber sovereignty, on the other hand, is concerned with the information and content the Internet provides. China’s cyber sovereignty concept is based on two key principles: The first is that unwanted influence in a country’s “information space” should be banned. In effect, this would allow countries to prevent their citizens from being exposed to ideas and opinions deemed harmful by the regime. The other key principle is to move the governance of the Internet from the current bodies, which includes in them academics and companies, to an international forum such as the UN. This move would also entail a transfer of power from companies and individuals to states alone.
Managing a Digital Revolution - Cyber Security Capacity Building in Myanmar
Digitalization is exposing developing countries to a growing number of risks, as well as opportunities associated with connecting to the Internet. Myanmar stands out as a critical case of both the pitfalls and the benefits Internet connection can bring. Amidst a political transition from military rule to a functioning democracy Myanmar is adding ICT to key areas like banking and e-government. Having been one of the least connected countries in the world only five years ago the country is now connecting to the Internet at an unprecedented pace, with little or no institutions in place to ensure the transition goes smoothly. Using the framework of Cyber Security Capacity Building (CCB) we examine the risks and potential benefits of Myanmar’s embracement of digital technologies.