Fred, krise og konflikt

Russiske spill i Ukraina-krigen: Innenriks- og utenrikspolitiske frontlinjer

Parade, Plebiscite, Pandemic: Legitimation Efforts in Putin’s Fourth Term

Putin’s fourth term as president (2018–2024) has involved new challenges for Russia’s hybrid regime. COVID-19 hit the Kremlin at a sensitive time, when the old institutional forces had been demounted and new arrangements, including extensive constitutional changes, had yet to become cemented. There is an emerging gulf between state rhetoric, PR events, and patriotic performances, on the one hand, and economic chaos, social disorder and dysfunctional state capacity, on the other, which is likely to reduce system legitimacy and cause increased reliance on repressive methods. This article examines Kremlin legitimation efforts across Beetham’s three dimensions: rules, beliefs, and actions. We argue that the regime’s legitimation efforts in 2020–21 have failed to reverse emerging cleavages in public opinion since 2018. Increased reliance on repression and manipulation in this period, combined with the contrast between regime promises and observable realities on the ground, speak not of strength, but of the Kremlin’s increased weakness and embattlement.

Covid-19 and the Russian Regional Response: Blame Diffusion and Attitudes to Pandemic Governance

As was the case with other federal states, Russia’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic was decentralized and devolved responsibility to regional governors. Contrary to the common highly centralized governance in Russia, this approach is thought to have helped insulate the government from criticism. Using local research and analysis based on a national representative survey carried out at the height of the pandemic during the summer of 2021, the article charts the public response to the pandemic across Russia. It examines the regionalization of the response, with an in-depth focus on two of the Russian cities with the highest infection rates but differing responses to the pandemic: St. Petersburg and Petrozavodsk. There are two main findings: at one level, the diffusion of responsibility meant little distinction was made between the different levels of government by the population; at another level, approval of the pandemic measures was tied strongly to trust levels in central and regional government.

Nomads and Warlords, Chadian Forces in African Peace Operations

Despite criticism of the United Nations (UN) as peacekeepers “hiding behind sandbags,” by the former president of Chad, the Chadian military has become a critical enabler of African-led and UN peace operations. This paper posits that the effectiveness of the Chadian forces stems from refined and modified nomad and warlord structures and attributes used during Chad’s various conflicts to build and improve its national army. This has allowed the Chadian regime to exercise and project power, thus, producing one of Africa’s most effective forces for current conflicts and challenges. Thus, Chad’s military leadership reflects a trend of states that use military prowess to project force, while maintaining international partnerships with permanent members of the unsc (the US and France), UN peacekeeping missions and African ad hoc security initiatives. Finally, the paper examines the implications of this trend for the evolving nature of African Peace and Security Architecture.

Failing through: European migration governance across the central Mediterranean

En viktig del av Europas eksterne migrasjonspolitikk i Middelhavet, både under Gaddafi og senere, har vært å eksternalisere kontroll med migrasjonsstrømmene gjennom bilaterale samarbeidsavtaler med Libya. På bakgrunn av Libyas demokratiske og institusjonelle utfordringer, de libyske sikkerhetsstyrkenes ofte dårlige beredskap og ikke minst gjentatte dokumenterte overgrep mot migranter har denne politikken vist seg å være både ineffektiv og politisk omstridt. Hvorfor har EU og europeiske medlemsland likevel opprettholdt avtaler med Libya i forsøket på å begrense irregulær migrasjon til Europa? I denne artikkelen argumenterer vi for at EU ved å holde fast ved disse avtalene har ‘failed through’ i forsøket på å håndtere migrasjonskrisen i det sentrale Middelhavet. Sammenbruddet av Libyas statsapparat, Den europeiske menneskerettighetsdomstolens kritikk av Italias ulovlige tilbakeføringer av migranter til Libya og press fra opinionen har periodevis ført til mindre endringer i EUs tilnærming. Men slike endringer har kun vært kortvarige og EUs overordnede og svært restriktive tilnærming til irregulær migrasjon gjennom samarbeid med den libyske kystvakten har ligget fast. Denne utviklingen kan forstås gjennom vårt konsept om failing through, som kombinerer failing forward mekanismen med institusjonell innsikt om stiavhengighet: På grunn av stiavhengighet og mangelen på alternative felles-europeiske løsninger har EU og medlemslandene falt tilbake på allerede eksisterende institusjonelle ordninger, til tross for deres problematiske juridiske, etiske og politiske implikasjoner.