Norway and Great Power Politics – Geopolitics, Technology and Climate
This research programme is structured around three meta-trends: Geopolitical developments, technological development and climate change. Changes within these trends and their effects on the overall strategic importance of the North-Atlantic area and conditions for Norwegian security are examined.
The program consists of five pillars: 1) American technology and doctrine: Implications for strategic stability; 2) Russian «Grand Strategy» in the High North; 3) the Nordic countries’ position in a new security landscape; 4) Norway and the strategic balance between the Great Powers; and 5) implications for Norwegian security-policy and the analytical tools we utilize. The project delivers pertinent in-depth analysis within the five pillars as well as analysis of their collective overall effects.
To a stronger degree then in the past the North-Atlantic area is becoming a full-fledged theater of operations. The area is connected to an Atlantic maritime theater in the West and a continental theater in the South. These developments are an important part of the foundation of the project and influences the production of analysis. In spite of geopolitics’ anchoring in lasting geography, it changes over time due to the emergence of new Great Powers, new essential resources, increased navigability caused by climate change, new technology and new means of communication. The shifts in the geopolitical power dynamics between the West and Russia which manifests themselves profoundly in the North-Atlantic area is pivotal to the project. The recent shift in dynamics between the United States and China is also key, as it will gain greater influence in the region over time. This backdrop underscores the topicality of the project and its’ relevance to Norwegian security policy.
Project Manager
Participants
Articles
Hvor mye hjelp kan Norge få i krig?
The votes that can shape European Security
Rethink territory: How Ukraine can redefine victory
The quest for a foreign policy ‘home turf’ after Brexit
The Ukraine war and the NATO responses in the Baltic and the High North regions
NUPI hosted an Experts’ roundtable on NATO’s new strategic concept
New publications
Even as war continues, NATO should open the door to defense integration with Ukraine
Ensuring Ukraine prevails on the battlefield will be imperative to securing the European continent. It is time for NATO to get smarter about its Ukraine strategy, including the messaging that articulates that strategy. At the moment, NATO and its constituent members are attempting to walk the line between reassuring Ukraine of NATO countries’ commitments to its security and seeking to avoid escalation into a nuclear confrontation with Russia. Avoiding such escalation is a legitimate concern, but it is not enough to constitute a strategy. What NATO should do instead is steadily build defense and deterrence against Russian aggression in Ukraine by integrating it into its structures step by step. This will mean some degree of Ukrainian integration with NATO, even while Russia’s invasion is ongoing, writes Karsten Friis in this op-ed.
The defence of northern Europe: new opportunities, significant challenges
With Finland and Sweden joining NATO, the Nordics will be united for the first time in a military alliance encompassing not only northern Europe but also the broader transatlantic region. It will eventually fortify northern European security, but several obstacles must be overcome first. NATO has done a formidable job since 2014 in updating its defence plans, cumulating in the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) family of plans approved in Vilnius 2023. Now Finland and Sweden need to be incorporated into these plans. A more challenging task is to implement NATO's New Force Model which is tremendously ambitious. Finland and Sweden's contributions will be important, but new investments must be made. NATO's Command Structure is yet to be fully reformed and fitted to the DDA. Joint Force Command Norfolk must urgently be staffed, without undue politicization in NATO. Nordic defence buildup can draw on regional cooperation in particular in five areas: in strengthening the area's command design through functional double-hatted headquarters; developing close air power cooperation through e.g. a Combined Joint Air Operations Centre; strengthening total defence cooperation across borders and expanding logistical infrastructure; establishing joint intelligence task forces; and joint training and exercises. The contributions of the United States and United Kingdom are indispensable when it comes to upholding the alliance's guarantee in northern Europe. The recent signing of Defense Cooperation Agreements between the US and the Nordics reinforces this—together with an increased presence of air and naval assets in the region. The same applies to the UK and the Joint Expeditionary Force which now has shifted its focus towards northern Europe. This engagement is a crucial addition to Nordic and NATO plans and activities in a period when growth in Nordic defence structures is occurring at a relatively slow pace. Only after the weaknesses and hurdles are addressed will the deterrence and defence of the region attain a fully credible level.
Command and Control in Northern Europe: Challenges and Potential Solutions
Command and control (C2) is a fundamental requirement for military action. Despite the regional tensions currently faced in Northern Europe, however, deficiencies remain in NATO’s current system. As such, this policy brief examines NATO’s ability to perform C2 amid the region’s evolving security landscape, and how this might be strengthened going forward. The brief concludes that the newly established Joint Forces Command (JFC) Norfolk should assume responsibility for Allied C2 in regional crisis management and conflict. •NATO enlargement, coupled with technological and political changes – including the rise of China and Russian aggression in Ukraine and other parts of Europe – has placed new demands on Allied C2 arrangements. •More specifically, the entry of Finland and (soon) Sweden into NATO has spurred debate over the future C2 architecture for NATO forces in the Nordic–Baltic region. •Following the end of the Cold War, NATO chose to abolish its existing C2 architecture, which was designed to counter the Soviet threat in Europe and the North Atlantic, and instead focus on out-of-area operations. •Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, and especially its invasion of Ukraine in 2014, have led to changes in NATO’s military organisation, notably the establishment of a new JFC in Norfolk, Virginia.
How the UK’s post-Brexit foreign policy came home
After leaving the EU, the UK needed to rethink its place in the world. Kristin Haugevik and Øyvind Svendsen examine the aspirations and meanings underpinning the “Global Britain” narrative and argue that its scope and ambitions have changed significantly in the years following the Brexit referendum.
Climate Change and Arctic Security, Multi-Actor, Diverse and Distributed Assets and Modalities
Climate and Environmental Change (CEC) is driving highly variable operational environments for Allies and adversaries alike. While technology is often touted as the determinant for strategic advantage, this is not necessarily true in the Arctic where whoever has the most knowledge possesses more strategic options and can apply the knowledge to achieve strategic dominance short of open conflict. Rapidly acquiring precise knowledge while limiting our adversaries acquisition requires that we understand their patterns of obtaining information and comprehension. Failure to understand their patterns results in an inability to detect or mitigate adversarial activity. Futures planning attempts to do this, in part, but lacks the precision and rigor to provide concrete outputs that can be used tactically. By adding a framework that looks at multiple actors, distributed assets, and modalities, this lack can be overcome.
On safer ground? The emergence and evolution of ‘Global Britain’
Why did Theresa May’s government introduce the narrative about ‘Global Britain’, and how did this narrative evolve and manifest itself in UK foreign policy discourse in the ensuing years? We make the case that Brexit distressed the United Kingdom’s foreign policy identity, and that the ‘Global Britain’ narrative emerged as a means to consolidate that identity—at a time marked by uncertainty and political turmoil. Scholarship on ontological security has theorized how states employ narratives to restore and stabilize their identities when they become ontologically insecure. It has not sufficiently addressed how these narratives evolve, and the conditions under which they come to resonate with key audiences. We suggest that identity consolidating narratives are more effective when they are anchored in familiar spaces and contexts—what we here call ‘home turfs’. We show how filling ‘Global Britain’ with content constituted a process of moving from existential anxiety about the country’s future role, to anchoring UK foreign policy in and around such ‘home turfs’. Tracing the emergence and evolution of the ‘Global Britain’ narrative in official UK discourse, we find that ‘Global Britain’ gradually homed in on two secure narrative bases: first, security and defence; and second, the Anglosphere and Euro-Atlantic.
The Evolution of US Military Presence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Reassuring Allies, Deterring Russia, and Managing Escalation
Concurrent with increasing Russian revanchism and aggression from 2014, the US approach to military presence on NATO’s Eastern flank has evolved. Overall, the development could be perceived as change in rationale from reassurance of allies to deterrence of Russia by punishment and, in recent years, deterrence by denial. This has resulted in altered structures for presence, resulting in changes of dispositions on the ground that has contributed to increasing the credibility of NATO’s deterrence doctrine. The rhetorical offensiveness of U.S. strategic communication has also become more powerful and exercise activity scaled up. This indicates a change in US perception of escalating activity. There is persistent bipartisan agreement on the continuation of US deep-engagement in Europe, with similar perceptions in the US military-leadership. This underpins the theory of an “institutionalized practice” of military presence and Great Power Persistence. The enhanced credibility of US-NATO deterrence on the Eastern flank lowers the likelihood of fait accompli-scenarios. This has security implications for countries located elsewhere that Russia may wish to challenge, both conventionally and through Hybrid means.
Militærmaktens plass etter Ukraina
(This op-ed is in Norwegian only): Et nytt Europa som formes etter Ukrainas seier, krever politisk mot og vilje hos europeiske ledere – samt betydelig militærmakt, skriver Karsten Friis.
NATO: A historical moment in the Nordic-Baltic region
Finland’s membership in NATO on April 4th 2023 represent a watershed moment in Baltic and Nordic history. By entering into a formal military alliance with its neighbours, Finland will be part of a united front of deterrence against Russia, reaching from the High North to the Black Sea. The Baltic countries, which always have felt vulnerable and exposed given their geopolitical location, now have a new and capable ally next door. But what are the concrete implications for Nordic-Baltic security and defence? This is the key question discussed in this article.
NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept – Change, Continuity and Implications
• In the 2022 Strategic Concept, NATO reaffirms its founding purpose by returning to the pre-2010 tradition of presenting collective defense as the key responsibility of the Alliance. The three core tasks set out for NATO are deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has led to a far stronger focus on conventional military forces on the strategic level. This change is well-harmonized with the significant boost to force posture announced at the Madrid Summit. • Russia has gone from being described as a potential “strategic partner” in 2010 to being defined as an aggressive adversary. As a clear message to Russia and Ukraine, the Concept underscores that a strong, independent Ukraine is vital for the stability of the Euro- Atlantic area. The balancing act of both communicating firm condemnation of Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine and presenting a vision for a more resolved relationship in the future is a key challenge for NATO. • The new Concept represents a significant shift in NATO’s official perception of China. The rhetoric on Chinese expansion of power, weaponized interdependence and threats to rules-based international order is firm and direct, but it is combined with an aspiration of constructive engagement. • The Concept includes resolute affirmation of NATO’s view of the EU as a vital strategic partner. At the same time, key countries in Europe continue to disagree about the division of labor between the two organizations. • The Concept has positive implications for Norway and Norwegian security interests. The transatlantic connection and the High North are presented as important, and freedom-of-navigation an essential part of NATO priorities. In addition, the Concept presents a balanced approach to nuclear weapons, both recognizing its vital role in deterrence and the noble goals of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.
Evolving Japan–NATO Relations in the Leadup to the Madrid Summit
In response to growing security concerns in East Asia, Japan has increased its engagement with NATO at both the organisational and individual member-state level.
Finland og Sverige inn i NATO? Veien dit og konsekvenser.
In mid-May, a number of clarifications will take place in both of our neighboring countries that could lead to a joint announcement of the desired NATO membership. If Finland and Sweden submit a formal NATO application, it will trigger a two-part process. The security guarantee in Article V of the NATO Treaty is not valid until all 30 member states have ratified the application, and measures to protect Finland and Sweden in the interim phase have been discussed with NATO, the United States and European powers. Finnish and Swedish membership will be a historic strengthening of NATO, both politically and militarily. Including Finland and Sweden in NATO will lead to extensive changes in Norwegian defense planning and total defense concept.
Finland and Sweden’s Path Towards NATO
The failure of deterrence and the outbreak of war in Ukraine should be a wakeup call to the Nordic governments to create a more robust and coherent deterrence and defence posture across the region. To ensure security and stability, all the states on Russia’s northwest flank must further advance the regional agenda from intertwined tactical and operational defence cooperation towards more a compelling deterrence strategy, write Per Erik Solli and Øystein Solvang.