Per Erik Solli

Differentiating Hybrid Threats against the High North and Baltic Sea regions

Russia’s grey-zone threats and actions are a major concern for bordering countries who are on the receiving end of such actions, both physical and cyber. This policy brief examines how such hybrid threats affect countries in the High North and Baltic Sea regions and evaluates the challenges related to response and countermeasures. NATO's policy is that the member nations are responsible for building resilience and responding to hybrid threats or attacks. To avoid invalid interpretations or paralysis in assessment and response to such complex and diverse threats, they should be differentiated and dealt with separately rather than boxed into a wide cognitive basket. This Policy Brief is part of the project ‘Norway as an in-between for Russia: Ambivalent space, hybrid measures’ financed by the Norwegian MoD.

Deterrence and (Re)assurance in the High North – Finland and Norway Compared

- Finland and Norway are both frontline states to Russia with a similar deterrence and defense strategy. - Finland’s geopolitical position as a frontline state is mainly defined by the long land border to Russia. Norway is predominantly a maritime frontline state. - Norway is both a frontline state and a rear area for staging support to military operations in the Nordic Region. - Geography is a factor influencing the different approaches in Finland and Norway to foreign military activity near Russia. Also, proximity to nuclear forces and test areas.

Climate Change and Arctic Security, Multi-Actor, Diverse and Distributed Assets and Modalities

Climate and Environmental Change (CEC) is driving highly variable operational environments for Allies and adversaries alike. While technology is often touted as the determinant for strategic advantage, this is not necessarily true in the Arctic where whoever has the most knowledge possesses more strategic options and can apply the knowledge to achieve strategic dominance short of open conflict. Rapidly acquiring precise knowledge while limiting our adversaries acquisition requires that we understand their patterns of obtaining information and comprehension. Failure to understand their patterns results in an inability to detect or mitigate adversarial activity. Futures planning attempts to do this, in part, but lacks the precision and rigor to provide concrete outputs that can be used tactically. By adding a framework that looks at multiple actors, distributed assets, and modalities, this lack can be overcome.

Experter från tre Natoländer: Därför vill vi ha Sverige som medlem

Bodø kan få Nato-ansvar

Danmark og Nederland har forpliktet seg til å levere F16-fly til Ukraina

Ukeslutt

Nordic Air Force Takes Flight

Does the idea of a Nordic Air Force sound crazy? It doesn’t to the Nordic countries.

Japan ruster opp

(This op-ed is in Norwegian): Japan kan få det tredje største forsvarsbudsjettet i verden, skriver Wrenn Yennie Lindgren og Per Erik Solli i denne DN-kronikken.