Researcher
Karsten Friis
Contactinfo and files
Summary
Dr. Karsten Friis is a Research Professor in NUPIs Research group on security and defence.
His research area is security and defense policies in Europe, with an emphasis on NATO, the Nordic region, the Arctic, transatlantic relations, intelligence, cyber security and the Western Balkans. He has published and led several major projects on these topics. Friis is also a frequently used commentator in the public discourse - not least in relation to Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Friis is a political scientist with a PhD from the University of Groningen, a Cand. Polit from the University of Oslo and an MSc from the London School of Economics. Friis has been associated with NUPI since 2007. Before that, he was a political adviser to the OSCE Mission to Serbia (2004 to 2007), the OSCE in Montenegro (2001) and in Kosovo (1999). Friis was also part of the EU's negotiating team for the referendum on independence in Montenegro in 2006. In addition, Friis has worked for several years in the Norwegian Armed Forces and served at NATO/KFOR in Kosovo.
Expertise
Education
2018 PhD, University of Groningen
1998 Cand Polit, Political Science, University of Oslo
1995 Master, International Relations, London School of Economics
Work Experience
2007- Senior Research Fellow/Senior Advisor/Advisor, NUPI
2004-2007 Political advisor for OSCE, Serbia/Montenegro
2001-2004 Advisor, the Norwegian Armed Forces
2000-2001 Political advisor, OSCE, Montenegro
1999-2000 Analyst/E-off, NATO/KFOR HQ, Kosovo
1999 OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission
Aktivitet
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The presentation discussed various kinds of cyber risks, cyberconflict in international relations, and implications for Norway.
Debatt om ny e-lov i Menneskerettighetsuka
I regi av Menneskerettighetsuka i Oslo arrangererte Amnesty Jus Oslo en debatt om forslaget til den nye etterretningstjenesteloven.
The U.S. National Cyber Strategy and 5G
What are the challenges and priorities in the American cyberspace?
Critical communication infrastructures and Huawei
Recently, there have been growing cyber-safety concerns over telecom equipment made by the Chinese vendor Huawei. This has led many countries to ban Huawei from supplying equipment for building the next generation of mobile networks, 5G. Responses from mobile operators and the telecom community in general have been mixed. For instance, many European mobile operators have stated that these concerns are overblown and that such a ban would delay 5G rollout by two to three years in the best case. Moreover, some operators have directly questioned the ability of the other vendors to timely deliver a complete 5G network. However, these claims have mostly not been grounded in empirical data. This paper takes a multi-perspective approach to investigating this problem empirically. We start by categorizing responses from different countries to using Huawei equipment in 5G. We then analyze the importance and readiness of Huawei for supplying 5G equipment. This analysis is based on contributions to standards and patents. We also present a conceptual risk analysis framework to qualitatively evaluate the ability of a single vendor to cause considerable damage to critical communication infrastructures. This model aims at exploring a set of relevant axis. More specifically, we look at potential for harm in different political climates that is peace, crisis and war. Another axis is whether banning a particular vendor from supplying equipment for the upcoming mobile networks generation is useful without having a backward compatible ban. A third axis is the ability of a vendor to cause harm as a function of the type of supplied equipment, for example radio towers vs network management systems. Combining the analysis of readiness for supplying 5G and potential for causing harm allows us to roughly estimate the likely impact that a complete ban would have on 5G rollout in different parts of the world. We find that such a ban can possibly delay 5G by two years or more for operators with high dependence on Huawei. Consequently, we explore potential approaches that would both reduce vendor-related risk and do not significantly delay the rollout of 5G. These include heterogeneous multi-vendor deployments, equipment verification and testing, international collaboration as well as signing non-aggression treaties. Unfortunately, there is no technological solution that fully remedy this problem. Combining technical solutions with efforts to build trust between countries, enforce existing alignments or create new ones seems a promising way forward.
Revitalizing Transatlantic Maritime Security
This project will generate concrete policy proposals, particularly in the maritime domain, and look at ways for the United States and Europe, and Norway in particular, to adapt their military division...
The Nordics and the International
Why is there not more Nordic cooperation on the international arena, when Nordic politicians so often express a willingness to develop cooperation in this field further? This project aims to build new...
Why Franco-German leadership on European defense is not in sight
Emmanuel Macron, already as a presidential candidate, bet heavily on Europe and the Franco-German tandem. This choice, which required a certain amount of political capital, resulted in a number of initiatives, many of them outlined in his September 2017 Sorbonne speech. It also resulted in the bilateral Aachen Treaty Macron and Angela Merkel signed in January 2019, intended to renew the 1963 Elysée Treaty. But the pomp surrounding the signing ceremony in Aachen barely hides the fact that things are not going too well in Franco-German relations. Frustration with Berlin has reached new peaks in Paris, not least due to Germany’s failure to provide an “answer” to Macron’s vision for Europe. When the Christian Democrats’ new president, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, wrote a debate article in March 2019, this was widely considered too little too late – in addition to the protocol faux pas of a party president without any government position responding to a head of state. It seems clear that Germany is not willing to embark on a great journey toward “refounding Europe” together with Macron’s France, although Paris and Berlin of course do cooperate on many issues.
Lunch seminar: Peace, war and alliances in cyberspace
What are cyberspace operations? In what ways is conflict in this “domain” different from conflict in physical domain? And how do cyberspace operations relate to information warfare, what are the similarities and differences?
Ten Years On: Reassessing the Stoltenberg Report on Nordic Cooperation
Ten years ago, the report ‘Nordic cooperation on foreign and security policy’ was presented to the Nordic foreign ministers at an extraordinary meeting in Oslo, Norway. Penned and fronted by Norway’s former foreign minister Thorvald Stoltenberg, the report proposed thirteen ways in which Nordic cooperation in the foreign and security domain could be formalized and strengthened. Generally well-received in the Nordic capitals, today, the report is regularly referred to in assessments of Nordic foreign and security cooperation, or when Nordic heads of government meet in public to discuss past and future accomplishments.
Tre trender som utfordrer norsk utenrikspolitikk
(Available in Norwegian only): Denne policy briefen tar utgangspunkt i tre globale trender, og gir en analyse og vurderinger av hva trendene innebærer av utfordringer og muligheter for norsk utenrikspolitikk i tiden fremover: 1. Nye stormakter vokser frem. 2. Migrasjon brer om seg. 3. Utenrikspolitikk blir innenrikspolitikk.