Publikasjoner
Security debates and partnership choices in the Nordic states: From differentiation to alignment
Sammendrag: Hvilke sikkerhetsutfordringer vektlegger de nordiske landene i møte med en endret sikkerhetspolitisk kontekst? Hvilke institusjoner, nettverk og enkeltstater søker de mot, og hva slags rolle ønsker de for det norsk sikkerhets- og forsvarssamarbeid fremover? Denne rapporten kartlegger og analyserer sikkerhets- og forsvarsdebattene i Danmark, Finland, Norge og Sverige i 2020 og 2021. Et hovedfunn er at forståelsen og omtalen av den sikkerhetspolitiske situasjonen og av nøkkelpartnere er blitt likere det siste tiåret.
The European Maritime Security and Defence Policy Architecture: Implications for Norway
Maritim sikkerhet står høyt på den internasjonale og europeiske sikkerhetsagendaen, og derfor har en rekke nye initiativer og handlinger utviklet seg innenfor EU, NATO og gjennom bilaterale/minilaterale avtaler. For å øke Europas felles kapasitet og sikre mer målrettede reaksjoner, er det behov for bedre koordinering mellom ulike organisasjoner og fora. NATOs 2022 strategiske konsept og EUs parallelle strategiske kompass tilbyr en mulighet til å gjøre dette. Bilaterale og minilaterale forsvarsgrupperinger kan styrke europeisk maritim sikkerhet ved å akselerere kapasitetsutvikling og fremme forbedrede nivåer av interoperabilitet. Norge bør videreutvikle sin politiske dialog og praktiske samarbeid med EU, og sikre deltakelse i store forsvarsinitiativer som EDF og PESCO, ulike programmer og samarbeidsordninger med EUsForsvarsbyråe (EDA). Norge bør forfølge ytterligere lederroller i NATO for å styrke både nasjonale interesser og transatlantisk sikkerhet innenfor det maritime sikkerhetsdomenet. Norge bør aktivt fremme forsterket EUNATO-samarbeid om maritime sikkerhetsspørsmål, inkludert nærmere samordning av strategisk tenkning, politikk og investeringer hos de to organisasjonene. Minilaterale’ strukturer kan tillate Norge å slå seg sammen med likesinnede nasjoner for å handle raskt i maritime spørsmål av felles betydning.
The European Maritime Security and Defence Policy Architecture: Implications for Norway
Maritim sikkerhet står høyt på den internasjonale og europeiske sikkerhetsagendaen, og derfor har en rekke nye initiativer og handlinger utviklet seg innenfor EU, NATO og gjennom bilaterale/minilaterale avtaler. For å øke Europas felles kapasitet og sikre mer målrettede reaksjoner, er det behov for bedre koordinering mellom ulike organisasjoner og fora. NATOs 2022 strategiske konsept og EUs parallelle strategiske kompass tilbyr en mulighet til å gjøre dette. Bilaterale og minilaterale forsvarsgrupperinger kan styrke europeisk maritim sikkerhet ved å akselerere kapasitetsutvikling og fremme forbedrede nivåer av interoperabilitet. Norge bør videreutvikle sin politiske dialog og praktiske samarbeid med EU, og sikre deltakelse i store forsvarsinitiativer som EDF og PESCO, ulike programmer og samarbeidsordninger med EUsForsvarsbyråe (EDA). Norge bør forfølge ytterligere lederroller i NATO for å styrke både nasjonale interesser og transatlantisk sikkerhet innenfor det maritime sikkerhetsdomenet. Norge bør aktivt fremme forsterket EUNATO-samarbeid om maritime sikkerhetsspørsmål, inkludert nærmere samordning av strategisk tenkning, politikk og investeringer hos de to organisasjonene. Minilaterale’ strukturer kan tillate Norge å slå seg sammen med likesinnede nasjoner for å handle raskt i maritime spørsmål av felles betydning.
UN-ICC Cooperation: Walking A Tightrope.
Dette forskningsnotatet diskuterer under hvilke forhold FNs fredsbevarende styrker bistår Den internasjonale straffedomstolen (ICC) i dens innsats for å straffeforfølge krigsforbrytere i konfliktsoner. Den argumenterer for at FN er i en unik posisjon til å hjelpe ICC; at samarbeid kan bidra til å forbedre synergien i internasjonale konfliktintervensjoner; og at ICCs innsats kan ligge til grunn for FNs innsats for å fremme forsoning og bærekraftig fred. Imidlertid kan FNs bistand til ICC også undergrave fredsoperasjoners sentrale prinsipper om samtykke, upartiskhet og begrenset bruk av makt; skape noen dilemmaer rundt fred og rettferdighet, samt politisere rettferdighet.
Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Mission to South Sudan (UNMISS)
Ahead of the March 2022 renewal of the mandate for the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON) conducted an assessment focused on two core mandate areas: protection of civilians (PoC) and support for the peace process. Based on the assessment to follow, the report lays out several strategic considerations for the new UNMISS mandate: Contingency planning and preparedness: The Mission has made significant progress in building contingency plans and preparedness for a future rise in violence. Given the uncertainty around the peace process, continuing to augment the Mission’s early warn- ing and action capacities will be important. The benefits and limitations of mobility: The Mission has developed a robust capacity to deploy quick reaction forces and temporary operating bases (TOBs) across much of South Sudan, which has enabled it to play an important role in mitigating violence in some situations. Useful, small, nimble constellations of forces are very unlikely to ade- quately address the kinds of violence sporadically committed by local militia groups or large-scale mobilisation of forces, as witnessed in 2013 and 2016. Nevertheless, main- taining the current troop levels may be important in allowing the Mission to position itself for a potential rise in tensions over 2022-23. A risk-based approach to the city and surrounding areas of Malakal: The redesig- nation process has gone well so far, with no major incidents of violence related to the handover of the sites. The eventual redesignation of the PoC site at Malakal may prove the most difficult, given the elevated tension in the broader Malakal area. The Mission’s current decision not to proceed with redesignation is helpful in this regard, and future discussions should be guided by a broad-based understanding of the risks in Upper Nile State. Subnational conflict resolution: Some of UNMISS’ most effective engagements have been in addressing subnational conflict. The 2016 relapse into civil war demonstrated that localised forms of violence can spread quickly, contributing to much larger-scale fighting. Identifying ways to rapidly bolster the civilian presence in hotspot areas – potentially developing and resourcing temporary presences that allow for greater civilian accommodation – could have a beneficial impact. A resource and personnel increase around elections: UNMISS is already positioned to support the national elections and could use the process to amplify its broader role in the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS). This will likely require an increase in resources and personnel in the 2022-23 period. In the lead up to the new mandate in 2022, the Security Council should be guided by the continuing assessment of the Mission leadership on the levels and kind of support that might be needed, including at national and subnational levels. A constitutional opening: The R-ARCSS envisages a new constitution in place prior to elections. A new constitution could be a major step forward, opening the door to much-needed power-sharing arrangements, a framework to address national-level rec- onciliation, and a centre-periphery relationship that allows for a much more equitable distribution of wealth. This could be a real opportunity for the UN to play a construc- tive role (especially given the deep knowledge of constitutional processes of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Nicholas Haysom). Responsibility for inclusiveness: The success or failure of the constitutional and elec- toral processes will hinge largely on the extent to which the South Sudanese population views them as legitimate. Here, UNMISS’ work at the subnational level can play a vital role in increasing support for the peace process, including for governors’ forums and other local processes to facilitate ground-up engagement with the R-ARCSS. It would be useful for the Council to highlight this work and accompany it with a clear message to the R-ARCSS parties that they bear responsibility for implementing an inclusive approach to the constitution and elections. A return to state-building? While no one is seriously considering a complete return to a state-building mandate as in 2011, there may be a push by some Member States to include more capacity-building and support to state institutions in the upcoming man- date. The EPON report recommends caution in such deliberations: despite progress on the peace agreement, the South Sudanese Government is viewed with strong suspicion by many communities, especially those that were targeted during the war. Any capac- ity-building mandate should be careful to avoid being seen as “putting a finger on the scales” of a delicate inter-ethnic balance. Order from regional chaos: It is very unlikely that the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) will play a robust or well-organised role in driving the peace process. Indeed, if current trends continue, the organisation may have even less capacity or focus on the R-ARCSS, further orphaning South Sudan at a time when political and operational progress is sorely needed. The African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council may need to revisit the roles and responsibilities allocated to the key players in this context, possibly identifying new areas for more direct support by the AU and UN. The constitutional and electoral processes offer an opening for such a discussion, and for a re-evaluation of how the broader international commu- nity may need to step into the gaps that exist among the regional players. Climate security: South Sudan is deeply affected by climate change, from the desertifi- cation that has driven herding communities further south over recent decades to increas- ingly erratic rainfall patterns that have led to the flooding of major rivers across the country. The 2021 UNMISS mandate recognises the role of climate change in driving risks. Far more resources and attention will be needed, if the UN is to play a meaningful role in meeting the climate security challenges. Humanitarian risks: The risks to humanitarian actors in South Sudan are worth men- tioning as an area of concern for the Security Council. There are reports of increased intimidation and even violence against humanitarian actors, risks which could increase in the lead up to elections. Given UNMISS’ mandate to facilitate humanitarian delivery, calls for the Mission to protect humanitarian actors may well grow. Women and youth: Continuing threats to women and children will require UNMISS to maintain and expand its protection work in these areas. Preliminary research also indi- cates a persistent threat of sexual violence against women, girls and boys, while young men are frequent targets of recruitment into violent groups. Greater consideration could be given to these dynamics in the upcoming Council deliberations, especially given UNMISS’ role in promoting more inclusive approaches to the peace process. Space for innovation and flexibility: One of the key lessons from the 2018 EPON report and today is that UNMISS is capable of significant innovation and flexibility within the mandates given to it thus far. A recurrent message from Mission leadership and experts consulted was not to impede UNMISS with overly prescriptive mandate language. Particularly at a potentially volatile period with uncertainty over the election process, allowing the Mission space to move resources where they are most needed will be very important.
After the Coup: Regional Strategies for Sudan
The civilian leadership that is currently coordinating the civil protest can start talks with the military to hand over power in exchange for immunity. The international community; and particularly the US and its allies in Europe could help those talks through imposing timely targeted sanctions on Al-Burhan and his allies until an agreement is reached and implemented. After a settlement is reached, the civilian leadership needs to coordinate with the FFC, the armed movements, the hold out armed groups that have held out and the new military commanders through an appointed legislative council. The council should be tasked and mandated to set out a comprehensive vision for the transitional period through appointing the remaining institutions of the government and developing a clear and doable road map to the post-transition elections. And, through the legislative council, all three actors need to agree on implementing a series of programmes and deadlines to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate combatants of the armed groups and RSF into the SAF; and depoliticise the SAF which will require technical expertise and support from regional bodies such as the African Union and IGAD. Thus, it is crucial for the AU and IGAD —with support only from the Trokia states only—to consider a coherent stabilisation strategy for Sudan as a part of a broader regional stabilisation strategy anchored on AU principles that take into consideration the fluidity of the context on the ground and puts in place sustained security guarantees, economic, political and technical support with a variety of measures that help to stabilise the country and its future.
Development Assistance and Root Causes of Migration: A Risky Road to Unsustainable Solutions
I kjølvannet av migrasjonshåndteringskrisen i 2015 erklærte både EU og flere europeiske stater at de ville bruke utviklingsbistand mer strategisk for å håndtere de grunnleggende årsakene til migrasjon. Sluttrapporten fra MiDeShare-prosjektet, et felles toårig forskningsprosjekt av Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) og Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt (NUPI), tar opp to sentrale spørsmål: For det første, kan bistand adressere de grunnleggende årsakene til migrasjon, og for det andre, har EU og europeiske land som Norge og Polen endret retningen på bistand siden 2015? Ved å gjennomgå forskningen som allerede er publisert i vårt fellesprosjekt, vil vi oppsummere både det vi vet og på hvilke områder det trengs ny forskningsbasert kunnskap.
Working Paper on enabling environments, drivers, and occurrence/nonoccurrence of violent extremism
Based on extensive desk research and fieldwork, the present paper aims to analyze the various drivers of violent extremism (VE) in the contemporary Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, the Republic of North Macedonia, and Serbia) and the elaboration of a refined, nuanced and context-sensitive understanding of the concept of ‘enabling environment’, i.e., the cluster or combination of various factors in a given society that renders the emergence of violent extremism likely. When approaching the varying impact of ideological radicalization and hate speech, we seek to make a distinction between contexts, where radicalization morphs into violence (“occurrence”), and contexts, where it does not (“non-occurrence”). Thus, the paper seeks to provide an analytical explanation of the central question of why some communities tend to be more resilient to violent extremist ideologies than others, despite identical “enabling” conditions. Given the geopolitical significance of the Western Balkan region, an approach that prioritizes non-occurrence of violence may respond more adequately to the strategic need for strengthening resilience to radicalization, extremism and terrorism there.
Working Paper on enabling environments, drivers, and occurrence/nonoccurrence of violent extremism
Why does violent extremism not occur in enabling environments? Based on recent field work in the Sahel and the Maghreb region this is the main question we seek to understand in this working paper. To understand non-occurrence and thereby the foundations of social and individual resilience, we also need to understand the drivers of violent extremism and why they gain traction among some populations while others show much higher degrees of resilience. To achieve this, we will zoom in on cases in Mali, Niger, Tunisia and Morocco, showcasing different trajectories of occurrence and non-occurrence.
Policy brief summarizing lessons learnt on the EU’s measures to prevent violent extremism in the region
How do EU initiatives that are geared to help prevent and counter violent extremism in North Africa and the Sahel match the underlying drivers of radicalisation? This PREVEX Policy Brief offers a reading of EU strategies in the backlight of our findings, which stem from fieldwork that was conducted in cases of both occurrence and non-occurrence of violent extremist escalation across North Africa and the Sahel. As scholarly literature lays emphasis on how phenomena such as violent extremism are highly context-dependent, it is crucial to understand regional and local dynamics of social change and intermediation. This brief therefore provides an overall assessment of EU P/CVE policies and projects in North Africa and the Sahel, focusing on key contextual policy issues: democratic governance, rule of law, education, gender, reintegration. It argues that EU’s emphasis on rule of law is particularly appropriate, while there is room for greater engagement in the fields of education and reintegration – provided that conflict-sensitive lenses are carefully applied. In the fields of democratic governance and gender, instead, a mismatch between general strategies and on-the-ground implementation can be observed. Targeted research in these critical areas of intervention and assistance is highly needed. Overall, our analysis invites to consider radicalisation processes not as social pathology but as ongoing social phenomena that take place in a space where several actors rival for material and ideational resources, and therefore require careful assessment and multi-scalar prioritisation, including at the regional and transnational level.