Publikasjoner
Transition Management
«Challenges to Collective Security» Working Papers from NUPI’s UN Programme: The emerging consensus on the need to establish more effective United Nations mechanisms for managing the transition from conflict to peace, and on the importance of addressing the nexus between development and security, is not sufficiently reflected in the organisational structure or logic of UN operations. This report argues that tailored policy responses should be introduced or strengthened at the institutional, intergovernmental and regional levels, to deal effectively with the challenges of peacekeeping, peace-building and transition management. The debate about the need for more improved transition management and better coordination mirrors the larger debate about the role of the organisation and UN system integration.
Nuclear Weapons and Materials into the 21st Century: Threats, Challenges, and Options for Change
«Challenges to Collective Security» Working Papers from NUPI’s UN Programme: In three sections, this working paper briefly outlines i) present-day nuclear threats, ii) associated challenges of multinational mechanisms to stem nuclear proliferation to state and non-state actors – and most importantly, iii) possible ways to advance sound nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament practices.
International Policing and the Rule of Law in Transitions from War to Peace
«Challenges to Collective Security» Working Papers from NUPI’s UN Programme: In transitions from war to peace there are few challenges more in need of urgent attention and careful planning than the issues of policing and establishment of rule of law.1 Development efforts are futile in situations marred by violence and recurrent conflict. The nature of the institutions of law and order is central to the relationship between state and society. In order to achieve a sustainable political settlement after conflict, these institutions need to be trustworthy, effective and legitimate. Neither is sufficient on its own: a technically effective police force may be used in a way seen as illegitimate by much of the population. Likewise, a high human rights standard may not in itself ensure that the police, the judiciary and the penal system manage to reduce crime and violence to levels compatible with societal and economic progress. It is thus equally important to have institutions established that are both effective and legitimate. However, this can be a very difficult and challenging endeavour since the deliberate misuse of, or the absence of, institutions of law and order often may have contributed to the fostering of conflict in the first place. Both institutional and cultural transformation is needed to achieve lasting peace. The international community has over the last decade become increasingly aware of the need for a more integrated approach to security-sector reform. That being said, there is still a long way to go in terms of developing functional holistic approaches to such reform processes. Attempts at shortcutting the need for local ownership through «executive missions» have not proven particularly successful. Any system of law and order not rooted in society itself runs the risk of being superficial (allowing informal systems to function underneath) or temporary (as it is dependent on the continued presence of scarce foreign personnel). While situations may arise that require full-fledged international executive responsibility, the best approach lies in a careful integration of security-sector reform efforts aimed at achieving a sustainable, locally rooted rule of law. There is no alternative to a sector-wide approach in this field, and the inherently political nature of any undertaking of this sort should be recognised from the outset.
How We Talk about the "War on Terrorism" : Comparative Research on Japan, Russia, and the United States
This paper focuses on how leaders in Western countries talk about the “war on terrorism.” The paper discusses the difficulties of defining “terrorism,” because, unlike Marxism or capitalism, “terrorism” is not an ideology. Instead the term may be used to designate actions that are used by members of non-governmental organizations against civilian targets. In the case of the “war on terrorism,” the signifier, “terrorism,” is used widely. However, the signified, the perpetrators and what they do, are quite different. Because the designation of the signified depends upon the speaker, the concept of terrorism seems to be subjective and fluid. The signified switches radically both by context and over time, while the only aspect that is stable is the signifier, “terrorism.” The paper goes on to analyze the “war on terrorism” as an ontological metaphor. The paper concludes by arguing that although figures of speech contribute to the cognitive dimension of meaning by helping us to recognize the equivalence to which we are committed and suggesting new equivalences, metaphors like the “war on terrorism” raise problems and do little to increase our understanding. Considering different cultural codes and world views, this type of metaphor is highly counterproductive for communication on the global level.
Who Buys Whom in International Oligopolies with FDI and Technology Transfer?
Under what conditions will a technology leader from a small country acquire a laggard from a large country, and vice versa? We answer this question with a two-firm two-country Cournot model, where firms enter new markets via greenfield FDI or acquisition. The model takes into account both technological and market size asymmetries, and allows for M&A transaction costs, like corporate finance and legal fees. We show that to be the acquirer, a firm from a small country needs not only a strong technological lead but also the ability to exploit it on a global scale, which requires low international technology transfer costs. Moreover, we find that a multilateral greenfield investment liberalization may actually increase the incentives for foreign acquisitions. The effect of such liberalization on the nationality of the acquirer depends largely on the extent of the technology gap.
The EU as a Security Actor: The development of political and administrative capabilities
[Abstract] With its special character in relation to both institutional design and policy content, the EU is often classified as a ‘post-modern’ security actor. What does this actually mean? What kind of capabilities does a post-modern actor have? This article focuses on the development of political and administrative capabilities in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. If it is true that the EU is becoming an increasingly important security actor, we should expect an increase in these kinds of capabilities as well. According to March & Olsen (1995) little can be accomplished without capabilities such as rights and authorities, resources, competencies and organizational skills. This should also be true of a presumably ‘post-modern’ actor like the EU. This paper examines the extent to which the EU has established these kinds of capabilities in relation to its security policy, how they can be characterized and whether they have increased over time.
Globalisation and Diplomacy
Globalisation is shorthand for changes in space, time and the relationship between them. This paper, which will be forthcoming as a chapter in a book edited by Andrew Cooper and published by the United Nations University Press, argues that changes in deterritorialisation will not have thoroughgoing effects for diplomacy. A change in time, notably the change to zero lag-time in information flows, is, on the other hand, of key importance. So is the increase in the sheer mass and density of communication. If transcending boundaries is the essence of globalisation, then it stands to reason that state diplomats must sooner or later take cognizance of the other kinds of polities that exist within the system.
Basra Crude : The Great Game of Iraq's "Southern" Oil
Concepts like “Shiite oil” and “Kurdish oil” obfuscate the debate about Iraq’s energy resources. This paper starts from the proposition that it would be better to call a thing by its name: in terms of the size of reserves, Iraqi oil is first and foremost Basra oil. Accounting for one of the world’s greatest concentrations of petroleum wealth, almost all of Iraq’s supergiant oil fields can be found near Basra or in one of its two neighbouring governorates. The other six Shiite-majority governorates of Iraq have little or no oil, and even the most optimistic estimates of new discoveries in Kurdistan pale in comparison with the reserves of Basra and the far south. This paper examines the political implications of these geopolitical realities - with an emphasis on developments after the Samarra bombing of February 2006, intra-Shiite tensions generally, and the questions of implementing federalism south of Baghdad and adopting a new Iraqi oil law in particular.