Forskningsprosjekt
Training for Peace 2020 - 2025
Arrangementer
Training for Peace (TfP) er et internasjonalt program som bidrar med kapasitetsbygging for fredsoperasjoner i Afrika. Siden 1995 har programmet gjennom ulike sivile samfunnsinstitusjoner jobbet for å øke kapasiteten til politi og sivilt personell i fredsoperasjonene til de Forente Nasjoner (FN) og den Afrikanske Union (AU). TfP-programmet har gjennom trening, policystøtte og forskning bidratt aktivt med å fremme flere sider av fredsoperasjoners arbeid, inkludert viktige temaer som beskyttelse av sivile, kvinner, fred og sikkerhet og ungdom, fred og sikkerhet.
Programmet gikk i 2020 inn i sin sjette fase (2020-2025), hvor TfP-programmet vil styrke sitt samarbeid med AU gjennom anvendt forskning, policystøtte og kapasitetsbygging. Programmet støtter AUC og deres partnere med å forebygge, håndtere og løse konflikter og fremme stabilitet i Afrika.
TfP arbeider med følgende tematiske områder i perioden 2020-2025:
- Støtte videre utvikling av afrikansk politi og sivile aktører til AUs fredsoperasjoner;
- Støtte AUs evne til å motvirke nye globale sikkerhetstrusler i Afrika; og
- Utvikling av AUs forebyggende diplomati, stabiliseringstiltak, politisk konflikthåndtering, forsoning og fredsbygging.
NUPIs hovedansvar i programmet er forskning og støtte til policyutvikling i nært samarbeid med programmets afrikanske partnere: African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) og Institute for Security Studies (ISS). TfP-forskere på NUPI bidrar til utvikling av fredsoperasjoner og kunnskapsbygging om fredsoperasjoner i Afrika, spesielt angående politi og sivile aktører. Videre bidrar NUPI med analyse av aktive fredsoperasjoner og den afrikanske sikkerhetsarkitekturen (APSA).
NUPIs arbeid innenfor programmet vil prioritere inkludering av kjønnsperspektiv i all analyse, policy-støtte og kapasitetsbygging.
Training for Peace programmet er finansiert av Utenriksdepartementet.
For å se oversikt over publikasjoner, nyheter og arrangementer knyttet til NUPIs TfP-arbeid, se programmets overordnede side på NUPI.no. For å lære mer om programmet, besøk TfP sin eksterne hjemmeside.
Prosjektleder
Deltakere
Aktuelt
TfP and EPON Research Team visit the MNJTF in Chad
The Training for Peace (TfP) Programme attends AU Lessons Learned Conference
Meeting about the evolving conflict and security environment in Africa
Visit with Former President Chissano
Validation Workshop on the African Standby Force Guidelines for AU RECs/RMs on Standby
Workshop on the Development of an African Union Policy on Stabilisation
Discussion with South Africa´s Deputy Foreign Minister. Mr Alvin Botes
Webinar on the United Nations Mission in South Sudan 2022: Risks and opportunities in an uncertain peace process
Climate sensitive peacebuilding and Conflict-sensitive climate adaptation
Mediation in the era of big data and fake news
Specialised Advance Stabilisation Course supported by the Training for Peace project
Nye publikasjoner
Women, Peace and Security in MONUSCO: Trends, Lessons and Emerging Practices
Denne rapporten undersøker hvordan FNs fredsbevarende operasjon i Den demokratiske republikken Kongo (MONUSCO) har arbeidet med kvinner, fred og sikkerhetsagendaen i perioden 2010 til 2021. Rapporten studerer hvordan kvinner, fred og sikkerhet reflekteres i MONUSCO’s mandater i denne perioden, samt hvordan FN-operasjonen har jobbet med å implementere de delene av mandatet som omhandler kvinner, fred og sikkerhet. En vurdering av tilnærmingen til kvinner, fred og sikkerhet i mandatet, og implementering av dette, gir innsikt i hvilke muligheter og begrensninger FNs fredsbevarende styrker står ovenfor når det gjelder å fremme kvinners beskyttelse og meningsfull deltakelse i de kontekstene der de sendes ut. Rapporten bidrar med anbefalinger til FN og medlemsland for hvordan de kan jobbe for a styrke implementeringen av Kvinner, fred og sikkerhet-aspektene i i DR Kongo og andre FN-operasjoner. Den er produsert av det NUPI-ledede Nettverk for forskning på fredsoperasjoners effektivitet (EPON).
Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Fram til 2016 klarte MINUSMA å styrke stabiliteten i det nordlige Mali, reduserte antall sivile drept i konflikten, og tillot et stort antall fordrevne å vende hjem. MINUSMA bistod også fredsprosessen som kulminerte i Alger-avtalen fra 2015. Mange av disse prestasjonene står fortsatt. Siden 2016 har imidlertid MINUSMAs effektivitet når det gjelder stabilisering og beskyttelse av sivile redusert. I nord har de undertegnende partene gjort sakte fremskritt i implementeringen av Alger-avtalen og 2018-pakten for fred. I tillegg har det sentrale Mali destabilisert betydelig, ettersom jihadistiske aktiviteter har skapt en ond sirkel av interkommunal vold som har nådd enestående nivåer. MINUSMA har bare fått mandat til å hjelpe den maliske regjeringen med å håndtere situasjonen siden juni 2018. Som en av de største flerdimensjonale fredsbevarende operasjonene – for tiden inkludert nesten 13 000 soldater og 1 800 politifolk fra 57 bidragende land, og nesten 750 sivile – har MINUSMA fått betydelige ressurser og et usedvanlig ambisiøst mandat. Imidlertid befinner misjonen seg ved et veiskille. Det trenger tid for å lykkes, men dette er verdifull tid Mali ikke har. Sivile har blitt utsatt for økende angrep, og spesielt USA mister interessen for å støtte en kostbar FN-fredsoperasjon som ikke er i stand til å levere raske resultater. Denne rapporten vurderer i hvilken grad det er samsvar mellom misjonens ressurser og dets mandat. Den foretar også en vurdering av de tilgjengelige alternativene for misjonen for å øke effektiviteten i møte med ekstremt utfordrende omstendigheter.
Assessing the Effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
Denne rapporten vurderer i hvilken grad den afrikanske unions fredsoperasjon i Somalia (AMISOM) har oppnådd sine nåværende strategiske mål og hvilken innvirkning, om noen, misjonen har hatt på en bredere politisk og sikkerhetsmessig dynamikk i Somalia.
Assessing the Effectiveness of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
Rapporten fokuserer på den siste perioden av UNMISS' mandat (2014-18), med sikte på å gi et "øyeblikksbilde" av misjonens arbeid på tvers av dets fire hovedmandatområder: beskyttelse av sivile, tilrettelegging for humanitær levering, promotering menneskerettigheter og støtte til fredsprosessen. Som en stor, flerdimensjonal fredsbevarende operasjon – med 17 000 soldater, 2 000 politi og 2 000 sivile – har UNMISS fått betydelige ressurser og et usedvanlig ambisiøst mandat. Å vurdere samsvaret mellom ressurser og mandat, og måten misjonen har tilpasset sine tilnærminger for å være effektive under ekstremt utfordrende omstendigheter er et hovedmål med denne rapporten. Gjennom hele sin eksistens har UNMISS vært en del av en mye bredere regional og internasjonal konstellasjon av aktører som arbeider for å stabilisere landet og oppmuntre konfliktparter til å gå inn i en meningsfull fredsprosess. I mange tilfeller har UNMISS spilt en begrenset støttende, koordinerende eller på annen måte indirekte rolle i landets overordnede bane; i andre er det en sentral aktør i øynene til befolkningen i Sør-Sudan. Dette utgjør en utfordring for enhver vurdering av oppdraget fordi UNMISS på det meste kan betraktes som en bidragsyter blant mange som jobber sammen for å avslutte borgerkrigen og legge grunnlaget for varig fred. Årsakssammenheng i disse settingene er vanskelig å fastslå. Ikke desto mindre, ved å trekke på de betydelige dataene og analysene som er tilgjengelige, og intervjuer med mer enn 260 mennesker i Sør-Sudan og regionen over flere uker, presenterer denne studien et sett med evidensbaserte funn om virkningen av oppdraget og faktorene som har muliggjort og hindret oppfyllelsen av sitt mandat.
Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Integrated Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)
Den sentralafrikanske republikk dukker opp fra en lang historie med slaveangrep og handel, fransk konsesjonær kolonialisme og autoritært politisk styre. I desember 2012 eskalerte spenningen til borgerkrig preget av seksuell og kjønnsbasert vold og nesten folkemord. FNs sikkerhetsråd ga FNs flerdimensjonale integrerte stabiliseringsmisjon i Den sentralafrikanske republikk (MINUSCA) fullmakt til å deployere i september 2014, under kapittel VII i FN-pakten. Oppdraget har det mest komplekse av alle nåværende fredsbevarende mandater. Av de tre hovedoppgavene i MINUSCAs opprinnelige mandat: (1) å beskytte sivile, (2) føre tilsyn med en politisk overgang, og (3) utvide statlig myndighet, har operasjonen oppfylt den andre oppgaven, og jobber effektivt mot å oppnå den første og tredje . Oppdraget har bidratt til å avverge omfattende drap og mulig folkemord, dempe seksuell vold, overvåke menneskerettigheter, beskytte viktig humanitær bistand, muliggjøre utvikling av kvinnelig deltakelse og lederskap, bygge statlig kapasitet (spesielt innen politi og rettsvesen) og muliggjøre demokratiske valg. I en kreativ, «bottom-up» tilnærming til fred, har de 15 000 medlemmene av MINUSCA bidratt til å etablere dusinvis av lokale freds- og forsoningskomiteer. Regionale makter og MINUSCA har supplert denne tilnærmingen med en "top-down", fredsprosess på høyt nivå som resulterte i den landemerke fredsavtalen fra februar 2019. Flere grupper fortsetter imidlertid å ødelegge freden. Væpnede grupper kontrollerer 75–80 % av dette frodige, ressursrike og landlåste landet. Den politiske økonomien i konflikten har en tendens til å styrke væpnede grupper og spoilere. MINUSCA er fortsatt upopulær blant mange sentralafrikanere. Des- og feilinformasjon om det kommende valget i 2020-21 og COVID-19 fortsetter å undergrave fremgangen. MINUSCA hjelper til med å stabilisere – gir en viktig tjeneste til landet, regionen og verden – men det vil være vanskelig å fullt ut implementere sitt mandat og forlate et fredelig og velstående Sentral-Afrika når som helst snart.
Terrorismo e instabilità, i governi locali cercano «soluzioni africane a problemi africani»
Dr Andrew E. Yaw Tchie is interviewed to discuss the increase in violence and the vicious circle created by the coups d´état in Africa and emphasises that African Problems must be solved by African solutions.
Enhancing the African Union’s function in supporting transitional governments in Africa
In 2010, the African Union (AU) committed to establishing the African Governance Architecture (AGA) as a Pan-African platform to promote good governance, democracy and respect for human rights. The AGA was devised to support the implementation of objectives outlined in the legal and policy pronouncements in the AU’s shared values. However, over the past few years, despite the efforts of this pillar, there has been a noticeable decline in democracy, governance and human rights values in some AU member states. The emergence of coups and constitutional changes has coincided with a trend in the use of transitional agreements/ governments across Africa. Many of these transitional agreements are stagnant, fail to deal with the root causes of grievances (they neglect the challenges that transitional governments must navigate), and often delay steps towards democratic consolidation. Instead they produce forms of military government that entrench authoritarian rule led by military actors who use the transitional agreements to eventually deliver electoral authoritarianism. This paper explores the rise, implementation and effectiveness (processes) of transitional agreements in six African states. It contends that the recent launch of the AU’s Africa Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions in conjunction with the United Nations Development Programme is a worthy effort for supporting transitions in Africa. However, it argues that the AU needs to strengthen the AGA pillar and put in place better provisions to support transition mechanisms. It must develop context-specific adaptive stabilisation strategies to support the different forms of transitional government(s), systems, mechanisms and institutions underpinning these transitions to avoid the emergence of an array of transitional governments that do not deliver for the affected communities. Finally, steps must be taken to deal with the root causes of coups etc., which initially receive widespread support, but might indicate that civilian support may be linked to temporarily seeking solutions to the challenges (e.g., economic underdevelopment, centre-rural challenges, political isolation, insecurity etc.) that the government of the day has neglected to deal with.
Convenience or complementarity: the African Union’s partnership with the United Nations in Sudan and South Sudan
Over the past 20 years, the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) have developed a unique partnership rooted in complementarity, respect and African ownership. To reaffirm this partnership, the United Nations Secretary-General and Chairperson of the African Union (UN) Commission signed a Joint UN-AU framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security in 2017. Nevertheless, despite previous lessons learned, gaps in collaboration and strategic thinking, and oversight exist on the ground between the AU and the UN. Drawing on the case(s) of Sudan and South Sudan to further understand the AU’s partnership with the UN through the lens of complementarity and convenience, the paper arrives at a novel conceptualisation of the AU and UN partnership through their political missions. The paper finds that the AU-UN framework is sporadically implemented, and the AU’s role in the partnership on the ground is one of convenience, whereas, in contrast, the UN’s role is one of complementarity aimed at achieving legitimacy. The paper concludes that both organisations in-country were constrained by the lack of collaboration and synergy, which led to a misalignment of joint priorities, impacting the effectiveness of the partnership.
USA tråkker i Ecowas’ bed
I dag samles vestafrikanske land for et krisemøte om Niger. USAs parallelle forhandlinger med juntaen kan undergrave regionale forsøk på å finne en løsning, mener forsker.
Generation three and a half peacekeeping: Understanding the evolutionary character of African-led Peace Support Operations
African-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs) were established to support the African peace and security architecture by developing integrated capacities for deployment in crises. However, since the deployment of the first African-led PSOs, there has also been the emergence of new types of African-led PSOs, such as the African Union Mission in Somalia; the Lake Chad Basin Commission Multinational Joint Task Force; the Joint Force for the Group of Five for the Sahel; the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique; and the East African Community Force in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. The paper examines why African-led PSOs have emerged, arguing that these operations have allowed for increased African agency and shaped the African peace and security space. The paper finds that African-led PSO reflects a more regional and local-specific response in a declining era of new United Nations peacekeeping operations but has also resulted in an overreliance on force to solve the continent’s peace and security issues. Consequently, the paper arrives at a novel conceptualisation of African-led PSOs, positing that they represent generation three and a half of peacekeeping which focus on the effectiveness of force and the morality of using force to deal with insecurity and multifaceted crisis.
How might the Sudan conflict destabilise the wider region?
The UN says the war in Sudan is spiralling out of control and threatens to destabilize the whole region. Nearly a million people have fled the country, and 4,000 have been killed during fighting between the armed forces and the RSF paramilitary. Andrew E Yaw Tchie from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs has more. Dr Andrew E. Yaw Tchie explains the warning by the UN on Sudan´s conflict destabilising the region.
African Union's Peace and Security Council meets to deliberate on Niger Coup
Despite the crisis caused by the coup in Niger, the US says that it will be sending a new ambassador to the country as planned. Washington has clarified that her arrival this week doesn't mean acceptance of the military takeover and that diplomatic efforts to reverse the coup will continue. Dr Andrew E. Yaw Tchie discusses the outcome of and the most problematic considerations faced by the African Union.
Coping with Complexity: Toward Epistemological Pluralism in Climate–Conflict Scholarship
Dei siste tjue åra har klimatryggleik blitt stadig viktigare på den politiske dagsordenen i internasjonale forum. Trass omfattande forsking er det likevel uvisse om koplingane mellom klimaendringar og konflikt. Denne artikkelen argumenterer for at uvisse rundt koplinga mellom klima og konflikt bør forståast som karakteristisk for komplekse sosio-økologiske system, heller enn eit problem som kan løysast til fulle. Heller enn å streve etter å eliminere uvisse, foreslår forfattarane at forskarar må lære seg å takle dette. Derfor fremjar artikkelen eit sett av prinsipp som kan guide akademisk praktisk når ein utforskar eit komplekst fenomen: å anerkjenne epistemologisk uvisse, å omfamne epistemologisk mangfald, og dessutan praktisere audmjukskap og dialog på tvers av forskjellar. Forskarane kallar dette etoset epistemologisk pluralisme. Artikkelen konkluderer med fem praktiske tilrådingar for korleis akademikarar kan bidra til å realisere epistemologisk pluralisme i praksis.
How Not to Do UN Peacekeeping: Avoid the Stabilization Dilemma with Principled and Adaptive Mandating and Leadership
Looking back over the past seventy-five years of UN peacekeeping, the most enduring question has been: Is peacekeeping effective? Historically, most peacekeeping operations have been. However, peacekeeping is currently suffering from a significant trust deficit. One important factor that differentiates contemporary peacekeeping operations with a stabilization mandate from the historic record is the absence of a viable political or peace process. When security is not directed to serve a peace process, it produces a stabilization dilemma: the more effectively a peace operation protects and achieves stability, the less incentive there is for ruling political elites to find long-term political solutions. This dilemma generates several perverse effects, including prolonging the conflict, trapping operations in place with no exit options, increasing the resilience of armed groups, and embedding peacekeeping in the local political economy. The article identifies five factors that help prevent the stabilization dilemma and influence the effectiveness of peace operations.
Adaptive Peacebuilding: A New Approach to Sustaining Peace in the 21st Century
Denne boken svarer på det store behovet for å forbedre forebygging og løsninger på konflikter. Den introduserer adaptiv fredsbygging gjennom forskning fra åtte case-studier fra Afrika, Asia, Midtøsten og Latin-Amerika. Boken vurderer hvordan Kina og Japan ser på, og praktiserer, fredsbygging. Den fokuserer også på hvordan fredsbyggere designer, implementerer og evaluerer programmer for å opprettholde fred, hvordan interaksjoner mellom eksterne og lokale aktører har lagt til rette for - eller hindret - fredsskaping, og hvordan tilpasning til kompleksitet og usikkerhet gikk for seg i case-studiene. Hele boken kan lastes ned gratis via lenken under.
Adapting the African Standby Force to Africa’s Evolving Security Landscape
Over the last decade Africa has experienced a resurgence of what used to be called rebels. In response a number of new types of operations have evolved.
Ad-hoc initiatives are shaking up African security
The growing threat of violent extremist groups and how these groups operate across borders has stimulated the emergence of a new type of security arrangement in Africa. These Ad-hoc arrangements are providing greater accountability and flexibility than more established security agreements, write Cedric de Coning and Andrew E. Yaw Tchie.
Assessing the Effectiveness of the Multinational Joint Task Force
The overall assessment is that the MNJTF is, to a degree, effectively attaining its mandate priorities. As a result of the efforts of the MNJTF there is a decline in the number of terrorist attacks and fatalities in the region.
Special Issue on the Evolving Nature of African-Led Peace Support Operations and African Armies
Key Questions • How has the evolution of African-led PSOs on the continent shaped Africa’s security response to insecurity? • How has African-led PSO influenced the identity of African armies and their responses to insecurity in Africa over the last two decades? • Does the experience of African-led PSOs drive military actors' decision-making during times of crisis? What impact (if any) does African-led PSO have on African military professionalism?
A quest to win the hearts and minds: Assessing the Effectiveness of the Multinational Joint Task Force
In January 2015, the African Union (AU) authorised the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) as a regional security arrangement of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) to deal with the threat of Boko Haram (BH) in the Lake Chad region. Its mandate includes the responsibility of ensuring a safe and secure environment in the areas affected by the BH insurgency, reducing violent attacks against civilians, facilitating stabilisation programmes in the Lake Chad region, facilitating humanitarian operations and the provision of assistance to affected populations. To achieve its mandate, the MNJTF undertakes both kinetic and non-kinetic operations. Its mandate has been renewed yearly since 2015, and in December 2022, the AU renewed its mandate for another 12 months. This report assesses the effectiveness of the MNJTF in delivering on its three mandate priorities to generate recommendations for the enhancement of the MNJTF´s overall effectiveness.
Africa in 2022
Dr Andrew E. Yaw Tchie shares his assessment on what have been the most significant issues shaping Africa in 2022.
Focus on Africa: Security in West Africa
Dr Andrew E. Yaw Tchie discusses recent peace and security developments in West Africa (from min. 32:08).
Waging Peace, towards an Africa Union Stabilisation Strategy for Somalia
Over the last few years, successful military operations across Somalia have helped to unshackle towns south of Mogadishu from al Shabaab, demonstrating the capacity of the African Union Mission to Somalia (amisom) to achieve parts of its mandate. However, friction between the Federal Government of Somalia and the Federal Member States have heightened tensions and rifts over elections, state management and overall security, despite significant international support. Despite amisom s efforts, the legacies of the 1990s civil war have remained unresolved, and state restoration has been disrupted by political, clannish, environmental and structural challenges. In contrast, al Shabaab remains adaptable, resilient and exploits grievances, local dynamics, and competition over resources. This paper argues, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council needs to re-mandate and reinforce amisom in conjunction with an AU stabilisation strategy for Somalia which exploits experiences from the AU’s Regional Stabilisation Strategy for the Lake Chad Basin.
No clear exit for SAMIM in Mozambique
The SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) has been extended multiple times, and violence continues to affect the northern regions of the country in spite of the presence of thousands of troops, with no clear exit for SAMIM in sight. These were some of the findings of a recent seminar entitled Examining the Effectiveness of a New Generation of African Peace Operations, hosted by the Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa (SIGLA), the Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON) and the Training for Peace (TfP) Programme.
Ad-hoc Security Initiatives, an African response to insecurity
Cedric de Coning, Andrew Yaw Tchie og Anab Ovidie Grand skriver at ad-hoc sikkerhetsinitiativene (ASI-ene) i Sahel og rundt Tsjadsjøen representerer en ny form for kollektiv sikkerhet i Afrika. G5 Sahel Force og Multi-National Joint Task Force dukket opp fordi en håndfull afrikanske stater hadde behov for å sammen reagere på felles grenseoverskridende sikkerhetstrusler. Det eksisterende afrikanske sikkerhetssamarbeidet APSA var ikke tilpasset truslene. Til tross for at Den afrikanske union (AU) og partnere har investert betydelige beløp i African Standby Force, har ikke denne fredsbevarende beredskapsstyrken vært tilpasningsdyktig nok til å løse sikkerhetsutfordringene i Sahel-regionen. De Coning, Tchie og Grand sporer fremveksten av en ny type ASI, undersøker hvordan den tetter sikkerhetshullet og analyserer hvorfor African Standy Force ikke var i stand til å møte utfordringene i Sahel. De vurderer hva utviklingen har å si for APSAs fremtid, samt hvordan APSA kan samarbeide tettere med ASI-er i fremtiden.
Standby security arrangements and deployment setbacks: The case of the African Standby Force
The African Standby Force (ASF) is a key mechanism for advancing African agency in addressing the continent’s peace and security threats. The African Union (AU), regional economic communities (RECs) and regional mechanisms (RMs) have previously deployed stabilisation missions and ad hoc security initiatives (ASIs). Yet these deployments don’t strictly reflect the principles envisaged in the original ASF make-up and authorisation processes. In this report, the authors argue that the future of the ASF future should be seen as an opportunity for the AU and RECs/RMs to standardise the quest for African agency and adopt an agile approach that aims for better partnerships between the RECs, ASIs and member states.
States of Disorder, Ecosystems of Governance: Complexity Theory Applied to UN Statebuilding in the DRC and South Sudan
Dr Andrew Tchie reviews the book "States of Disorder, Ecosystems of Governance: Complexity Theory Applied to UN Statebuilding in the DRCand SOuth Sudan" by Dr Adam Day.
UK new Prime Minister and her focus on Africa
Dr Andrew Tchie, on BBC World News, touches on what the relationship between the new UK Prime Minister Liz Truss and Africa will be moving forward.
Understanding Africa’s Adaptability to Peace and Security Challenges
Dr Andrew Tchie reviews the book "African Peacekeeping Training Centres: Socialisation as a Tool for Peace?"
Can a ceasefire bring peace to Chad?
Chad's military council signed a ceasefire agreement with dozens of opposition factions. But does it mean anything since the country’s largest rebel group refused to sign on? We look at how the Doha deal can affect peace talks in the country later this month, and a promised presidential election. Dr Andrew E. Yaw Tchie reflects on whether the deal will lead to successful talks in August.
Should UN peacekeepers remain in Africa?
Afrika har hatt flere fredsbevarende FN-oppdrag enn noen annen region i verden. I dag er mer enn femti tusen soldater utplassert med FN-operasjoner på kontinentet. Til tross for dette fortsetter volden fortsatt i flere områder og noen steder uttrykker folk sinne over FNs fortsatte tilstedeværelse. Bare forrige måned brøt det ut anti-FN-protester i Goma og Butembo, øst i Den demokratiske republikken Kongo, da innbyggerne anklaget FN for ikke å begrense vold fra væpnede grupper. Mens de var i Mali, ble FNs tropperotasjoner suspendert i en måned etter at regjeringen arresterte 49 soldater fra Elfenbenskysten, og sa at de hadde ankommet landet uten tillatelse. Elfenbenskysten sa at soldatene var en del av FNs fredsbevarende oppdrag i Mali. Så, hva er fremtiden for FNs fredsbevaring i Afrika? Vert: Alan Kasujja (@kasujja) Gjester: Dr. Cedric de Coning, forskningsprofessor ved Norsk utenrikspolitisk institutt og seniorrådgiver ved African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes og Dr. Yvan Yenda Ilunga, assisterende professor i politisk Vitenskap og internasjonale relasjoner ved Salve Regina University.
Tshisekedi hopeful that the Luanda summit will lead to a de-escalation of violence
Following the talks in Luanda, Democratic Republic of Congo's President Felix Tshisekedi expressed hope that the summit would lead to a de-escalation of violence, between his country and Rwanda. Preventive Terrorism Consultant and President of the Africa Security Forum Temitope Olodo, and Senior Researcher at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Dr Andrew E. Yaw Tchie, weigh in on the development.
Will Chad's latest peace agreement hold?
Chad's Transitional Military Council has signed a peace deal aimed at ending decades of conflict. The agreement is the first step towards democratic elections and a new constitution. Although many political factions signed the deal, Chad's largest armed group Front for Change and Concord (FACT) walked out of negotiations when its demands were not met. The question then becomes whether the much-anticipated national dialogue will go ahead on August 20. So, how far off is stability and democracy in the Central African nation? Dr Andrew E. Yaw Tchie discusses the implications of the recent events for peace and security in neighbouring countries in the region.
The African Union’s Civilian Strategic Support Group
Since 2006, the African Union has played an active role in strengthening civilian engagement across its Peace Support Operations (PSOs) through the development of the Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force in 2006 and the subsequent formation of the Civilian Strategic Support Group (CSSG) in 2015. This policy brief examines the development of the CSSG and its efforts to date, and offers an overview on how and why the civilian component should be further enhanced within future AU PSOs.
Shifting from External Dependency: Remodelling the G5 Sahel Joint Force for the Future
After a decade of battling jihadist and violent extremist groups in West Africa, France has initiated the restructuring and relocation of its largest overseas military mission in the Sahel with an announcement of the withdrawal of Operation Barkhane (the French military counterterrorism intervention) from Mali. The exit over the coming months may signify an important shift of western military operations in Mali and the Sahel. France’s deployment in the Sahel was initially triggered by the activities of Tuareg separatists in the northern part of Mali. Islamic extremists closely associated with Al-Qaeda took advantage of the situation, seizing north Mali and spreading their activities southwards in 2012. Despite French counterterrorism operations, instability worsened, and Islamists controlled vast swathes of northern and central Mali, parts of Burkina Faso, and western Niger. Over time, under the motivation of France, the G5 Sahel Joint Force (G5S-JF) was created to address the everyday challenges of terrorism and transnational organised crime among the five member states (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger). For a force supported by three United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2359 (2017), 2391 (2017) and 2480 (2019); and with a force strength of 5600 troops organised around three sectors,1 its operational successes have been a mixed bag (ten joint border operations). Operation Barkhane together with European Union Training Mission Mali (EUTM), the Capacity Building Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) and Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), has enhanced the operational readiness and capabilities of the G5 Sahel through mentoring, training, and funding of the joint-force operations. Additionally, these external operations, particularly Barkhane, have been supportive of the activities of G5S-JF by providing intelligence, supporting logistical and joint planning, providing aerial and air support, and engaging in medical evacuation. Notwithstanding, the Joint Force has been contending with weak intelligence, shortfalls in equipment, limited aerial capabilities and a lack of rapid response, which invariably hinders operational effectiveness. The Joint Force represents an essential step toward addressing the instability that affects Mali and the broader Sahel, but as of yet, the G5S-JF has been unable to fully demonstrate its effectiveness as a force despite significant support from donor countries such as France. Moreover, it is uncertain how Mali´s withdrawal from the Joint Force will impact on the overall strategy of the G5S-JF and its sustainability going forward, especially given Mali’s recent announcement of withdrawing from the G5 Sahel. The departure of Barkhane, together with Takuba and other European arrangements from Mali, raises many unanswered questions about the funding, operational capacity and political cooperation between the other member states of the Joint Force. Even though France has reiterated that it will continue to support peacekeepers serving under MINUSMA; and Malian troops continuing to battle Islamic violent extremism after the Barkhane withdrawal, the response time to jihadist attacks and activities inside Malian territory will not be the same. Without Barkhane, the G5S-JF will struggle to protect civilians, evacuate soldiers in need of medical attention, and support effective joint planning and coordination of G5S-JF and intelligence sharing —which has been instrumental in the fight against jihadist. To address emerging challenges, enhance the ability of the G5S-JF and sustain its support, this report proposes four possible options that could fill the gap resulting from the current security vacuum being created following the possible withdrawal of some of the external military forces from Mali, and Mali itself from the G5S-JF. In arriving at these proposed options, emphasis is placed on regional perspectives, which draws on African frameworks and the use of African resources, experience, capabilities and understanding. The report argues that this would allow better ownership and closer proximity to the issues, ensuring that international partners are not dictating how the region and African Union (AU) Member States (MS) should solve challenges. The evaluation considered the full spectrum of options to include: • A reconfigured and scaled-up G5 Sahel Joint Force (Plus); • A reconfigured G5 Sahel Joint Force and revised MISAHEL through the AU, ECOWAS, ECCAS and CENSAD; • An integrated ECOWAS (deployment of the African Standby Force) utilising the G5 Sahel force; and • Elevating the G5 Sahel force to an AU (Peace Enforcement mission) with UN support. The proposed options focus on military and hybrid solutions that can tackle existing challenges in the Sahel and West Africa as a whole. However, defeating jihadism and violent extremism is essentially a job that should include intelligence and police authorities to win the hearts and minds of the population, but this cannot be done solely with hard stabilisation efforts. Tackling the vast challenges in the Sahel requires a careful mix of adaptive, agile and sustained efforts that cut across social, economic, political, developmental, humanitarian and recovery instruments and support. Thus, the report suggests additional stabilisation efforts to support the Sahel focused on local, national, regional and international initiatives that can connect to the ground and tackle internal challenges comprehensively. These initiatives, it will be argued, can plug into existing structures but also help to support structures not fully recognised. Efforts to resolve the problems in the Sahel stand a much greater chance of success if fully supported with buy-in from the AU, together with ECOWAS and support from the UN, EU and donors that can draw on the full spectrum of available instruments which have a demonstrable desire to work with like-minded partners. The authors of this report believe that a scaled-up and reconfigured G5 Sahel Joint Force (G5 Sahel Plus) option (discussed below) would have been the optimal model. However, following the recent withdrawal of Mali from the G5S-JF and the deteriorating political landscape in the region and between states, the authors’ reassessment calls for an AU Peace Enforcement mission as the most appropriate, given the current situation. It is important to note, the recommendations provided in this report hinge on the ability of the current and former G5S-JF states to address and resolve the deteriorating political situation, which is fluid in nature and continuously evolving. This will require all states (current and former G5S-JF) to recognise that they need each other to address these challenges, and that any reconfiguration (the models provided in this report) depends on the political situation being fully addressed. There is a need, as the models indicate, to have more joint efforts between the AU and ECOWAS to assist in resolving the current impasses in the region.
UNITAMS Mandate Renewal Study: Fostering a Process of Trust and Inclusivity
The United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) was established on 3 June 2020 under UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2524 to support Sudan during its transition to democratic rule and it was renewed the following year through SC 2579(2021). UNITAMS was conceived of and designed to respond to new and long-standing issues in Sudan: the political transition process that began with the December 2018 revolution and the legacy of armed conflicts. The Mission’s mandate explicitly recognises the adverse effects of climate change on the stability of Sudan and stresses the need for appropriate risk assessment and risk management strategies. Yet, since the adoption of the Mission’s mandate in June 2020 and its renewal in June 2021, Sudan’s political, security and economic situation has deteriorated significantly. An attempted military coup in September 2021, followed by a successful coup d’état on 25 October 2021, has further worsened Sudan’s political crisis, increasing insecurity, undermining the economy, and resulting in the interruption of bilateral and international funding—all amidst the continuing global pandemic. This fast-changing political, security and economic context has placed UNITAMS in a very delicate position in relation to the host government. It has required UNITAMS to focus a significant portion of its attention on good offices and diplomacy so that, together with the African Union (AU), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and other international partners and Sudanese stakeholders, it can support a process aimed at bringing Sudan’s transition back on track. While the UNITAMS mandate remains relevant and adequate, the Mission must continue to be allowed the flexibility to adapt its focus to the fast-changing dynamics on the ground. UNITAMS’ good offices’ role should remain at the centre of the Mission’s efforts during the next mandated period, helping Sudanese to find an inclusive political settlement that can secure a transition to democratic rule in the medium to long term. At the same time, the Mission should continue its work in support of its other objectives and priorities, including the protection of civilians, the implementation of the peace agreement, and advisory and capacity building, particularly related to the rule-of-law sector. The Mission should strengthen its focus on and ability to integrate climate-related security risks into its analytical work, especially as it relates to supporting local conflict prevention, mitigation and reconciliation efforts to prevent inter-communal violence. While there has been significant progress in strengthening collaboration among the UN, AU and IGAD, maintaining and sustaining the partnership must remain a key priority in the Mission’s work to promote regional stability.
Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Mission to South Sudan (UNMISS)
Ahead of the March 2022 renewal of the mandate for the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON) conducted an assessment focused on two core mandate areas: protection of civilians (PoC) and support for the peace process. Based on the assessment to follow, the report lays out several strategic considerations for the new UNMISS mandate: Contingency planning and preparedness: The Mission has made significant progress in building contingency plans and preparedness for a future rise in violence. Given the uncertainty around the peace process, continuing to augment the Mission’s early warn- ing and action capacities will be important. The benefits and limitations of mobility: The Mission has developed a robust capacity to deploy quick reaction forces and temporary operating bases (TOBs) across much of South Sudan, which has enabled it to play an important role in mitigating violence in some situations. Useful, small, nimble constellations of forces are very unlikely to ade- quately address the kinds of violence sporadically committed by local militia groups or large-scale mobilisation of forces, as witnessed in 2013 and 2016. Nevertheless, main- taining the current troop levels may be important in allowing the Mission to position itself for a potential rise in tensions over 2022-23. A risk-based approach to the city and surrounding areas of Malakal: The redesig- nation process has gone well so far, with no major incidents of violence related to the handover of the sites. The eventual redesignation of the PoC site at Malakal may prove the most difficult, given the elevated tension in the broader Malakal area. The Mission’s current decision not to proceed with redesignation is helpful in this regard, and future discussions should be guided by a broad-based understanding of the risks in Upper Nile State. Subnational conflict resolution: Some of UNMISS’ most effective engagements have been in addressing subnational conflict. The 2016 relapse into civil war demonstrated that localised forms of violence can spread quickly, contributing to much larger-scale fighting. Identifying ways to rapidly bolster the civilian presence in hotspot areas – potentially developing and resourcing temporary presences that allow for greater civilian accommodation – could have a beneficial impact. A resource and personnel increase around elections: UNMISS is already positioned to support the national elections and could use the process to amplify its broader role in the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS). This will likely require an increase in resources and personnel in the 2022-23 period. In the lead up to the new mandate in 2022, the Security Council should be guided by the continuing assessment of the Mission leadership on the levels and kind of support that might be needed, including at national and subnational levels. A constitutional opening: The R-ARCSS envisages a new constitution in place prior to elections. A new constitution could be a major step forward, opening the door to much-needed power-sharing arrangements, a framework to address national-level rec- onciliation, and a centre-periphery relationship that allows for a much more equitable distribution of wealth. This could be a real opportunity for the UN to play a construc- tive role (especially given the deep knowledge of constitutional processes of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Nicholas Haysom). Responsibility for inclusiveness: The success or failure of the constitutional and elec- toral processes will hinge largely on the extent to which the South Sudanese population views them as legitimate. Here, UNMISS’ work at the subnational level can play a vital role in increasing support for the peace process, including for governors’ forums and other local processes to facilitate ground-up engagement with the R-ARCSS. It would be useful for the Council to highlight this work and accompany it with a clear message to the R-ARCSS parties that they bear responsibility for implementing an inclusive approach to the constitution and elections. A return to state-building? While no one is seriously considering a complete return to a state-building mandate as in 2011, there may be a push by some Member States to include more capacity-building and support to state institutions in the upcoming man- date. The EPON report recommends caution in such deliberations: despite progress on the peace agreement, the South Sudanese Government is viewed with strong suspicion by many communities, especially those that were targeted during the war. Any capac- ity-building mandate should be careful to avoid being seen as “putting a finger on the scales” of a delicate inter-ethnic balance. Order from regional chaos: It is very unlikely that the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) will play a robust or well-organised role in driving the peace process. Indeed, if current trends continue, the organisation may have even less capacity or focus on the R-ARCSS, further orphaning South Sudan at a time when political and operational progress is sorely needed. The African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council may need to revisit the roles and responsibilities allocated to the key players in this context, possibly identifying new areas for more direct support by the AU and UN. The constitutional and electoral processes offer an opening for such a discussion, and for a re-evaluation of how the broader international commu- nity may need to step into the gaps that exist among the regional players. Climate security: South Sudan is deeply affected by climate change, from the desertifi- cation that has driven herding communities further south over recent decades to increas- ingly erratic rainfall patterns that have led to the flooding of major rivers across the country. The 2021 UNMISS mandate recognises the role of climate change in driving risks. Far more resources and attention will be needed, if the UN is to play a meaningful role in meeting the climate security challenges. Humanitarian risks: The risks to humanitarian actors in South Sudan are worth men- tioning as an area of concern for the Security Council. There are reports of increased intimidation and even violence against humanitarian actors, risks which could increase in the lead up to elections. Given UNMISS’ mandate to facilitate humanitarian delivery, calls for the Mission to protect humanitarian actors may well grow. Women and youth: Continuing threats to women and children will require UNMISS to maintain and expand its protection work in these areas. Preliminary research also indi- cates a persistent threat of sexual violence against women, girls and boys, while young men are frequent targets of recruitment into violent groups. Greater consideration could be given to these dynamics in the upcoming Council deliberations, especially given UNMISS’ role in promoting more inclusive approaches to the peace process. Space for innovation and flexibility: One of the key lessons from the 2018 EPON report and today is that UNMISS is capable of significant innovation and flexibility within the mandates given to it thus far. A recurrent message from Mission leadership and experts consulted was not to impede UNMISS with overly prescriptive mandate language. Particularly at a potentially volatile period with uncertainty over the election process, allowing the Mission space to move resources where they are most needed will be very important.
ECOWAS leaders hold an emergency summit in Ghana after a series of coups on the continent
At an emergency summit in Ghana, West African regional group ECOWAS held off on ramping up penalties on Burkina Faso over its military coup. Last month, it followed Mali and Guinea, to become the third member of the block to undergo a putsch in less than two years. All three have been suspended from ECOWAS, but Burkina Faso, so far, has not faced the crippling trade and economic sanctions. The Burkina Faso Junta have shown willingness to return to constitutional order. However, there remains a wider concern over the number of coups seen in the region in the last couple of years remains. Dr Andrew E. Yaw Tchie discusses ECOWAS´ condemnations and sanctions over the coups and whether this concern is merited.
After the Coup: Regional Strategies for Sudan
The civilian leadership that is currently coordinating the civil protest can start talks with the military to hand over power in exchange for immunity. The international community; and particularly the US and its allies in Europe could help those talks through imposing timely targeted sanctions on Al-Burhan and his allies until an agreement is reached and implemented. After a settlement is reached, the civilian leadership needs to coordinate with the FFC, the armed movements, the hold out armed groups that have held out and the new military commanders through an appointed legislative council. The council should be tasked and mandated to set out a comprehensive vision for the transitional period through appointing the remaining institutions of the government and developing a clear and doable road map to the post-transition elections. And, through the legislative council, all three actors need to agree on implementing a series of programmes and deadlines to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate combatants of the armed groups and RSF into the SAF; and depoliticise the SAF which will require technical expertise and support from regional bodies such as the African Union and IGAD. Thus, it is crucial for the AU and IGAD —with support only from the Trokia states only—to consider a coherent stabilisation strategy for Sudan as a part of a broader regional stabilisation strategy anchored on AU principles that take into consideration the fluidity of the context on the ground and puts in place sustained security guarantees, economic, political and technical support with a variety of measures that help to stabilise the country and its future.
Sudan´s Power Struggle
Sudans statsminister Abdalla Hamdok har gått av. Dr Andrew Yaw Tchie fra NUPI diskuterer komponentene som har hindret landet i bevege seg framover.
Understanding Ad-Hoc Security Intitiatives in Africa
Denne policy brief-en undersøker fremveksten av ‘ad-hoc security initatives’ (ASIs) som en etablert mekanisme for kollektiv sikkerhet. ASIs’ formål er å eliminere trusler fra ikke-statlige væpnede grupper, og fungere på tvers av grensene til de deltakende landene for å muliggjøre oppsporing av slike grupper. ASIs har vokst frem fordi de eksisterende mekanismene i den afrikanske freds- og sikkerhetsarkitekturen (African Peace and Security Architecture/APSA) ikke var spesifikke eller responsive nok til å møte dette behovet. Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army, Multinational Joint Task Force, og G5 Sahel kan alle kategoriseres som ASIs.
The impact of climate change on Africa’s peace and security
Den gradvise økningen i globale temperaturer, uregelmessig nedbør og flom har indirekte, komplekse og sammenhengende implikasjoner for fred og sikkerhet. Den 9. Mars 2021 møttes Den afrikanske unions (AU) freds og sikkerhetsråd på statsnivå for å diskutere disse utfordringene. Fred og sikkerhetsrådet presenterte forskjellige anbefalinger som omhandlet klima og sikkerhet. Denne kronikken tar utgangspunkt i kommunikeet publisert i etterkant av møtet og presenterer muligheter for hvordan Den afrikanske union, sammen med sub-regionale organisasjoner, medlemsland og andre kan arbeide for å styrke arbeid rundt klima og sikkerhetsutfordringer».
COVID-19 and the Resilience of Africa’s Peace and Security Networks
Many commentators predicted that the impact of COVID-19 on Africa, with its high levels of under-development and weak public health systems, will be particularly catastrophic. The effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on the health and economic sectors have exposed and compounded preexisting social, political, and environmental vulnerabilities, especially in conflict-affected countries and regions, and have severely stress-tested their social cohesion and resilience. Global and local peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts in Africa have also been significantly disrupted. More than 1 year into the COVID-19 pandemic in Africa, however, the emerging pattern is one of resilience rather than insecurity and chaos. This article assesses the disruption caused by COVID-19 to Africa’s peace and security networks and considers how a complexity informed Adaptive Peacebuilding approach can assist in strengthening community resilience and stimulating self-organized adaptive capacity. The spread of the virus is still increasing steadily, and the situation is likely to get worse before it gets better. The question is what can African civil society, governments and multilateral organizations do to further strengthen and support the pattern of resilience that has emerged over the first 1 year of the COVID-19 crises in Africa? The author would like to recognize the invaluable research assistance of Neyma Mahomed Ali and the contribution of ACCORD’s COVID-19 Conflict and Resilience Monitor. The engagement with colleagues and contributors stimulated much of the analysis contained in this article.
The Impact of COVID-19 on Peace Operations
A few weeks ago, peace operations across the world began swiftly adapting to prevent the spread of the COVID-19 disease. Missions have been forced to take unprecedented steps to cope with the coronavirus pandemic. These efforts may be just the beginning, and much more significant reductions and changes in the way these operations function may be needed over the coming months.
COVID-19 and the African Union
Africa represents the third wave of the spread of COVID-19, but its impact may significantly undermine the reform, programmes and operations of the African Union.
As the AU tries to contain COVID-19, the virus constrains the AU
The AU cannot simply wait out the coronavirus pandemic: it must adapt and urgently develop new ways of working.
Predict and prevent: overcoming early warning implementation challenges in UN peace operations
The UN has made progress in the adoption of new technologies to predict and prevent local violence. To maintain the momentum, it needs to continue to innovate to be able to serve people in need faster, better, and more efficiently. The UN will need to find a way to analyse the enormous amount of data it produces every day. Machine learning to detect patterns in these data and produce early warnings holds great promise in this regard. However, the use of new technologies is not without risk. Collected data can fall into the wrong hands. With budget cuts missions have been forced to reduce their footprint in the field, increasing the reliance on technology. New technology also requires new types of specialist expertise to manage data, and better understanding among all staff of how data should be managed, vetted and put to use. Some have expressed concerns about the use of technologies being at the expense of face-to-face engagements, ultimately resulting in peacekeeping efforts that are divorced from realities on the ground. From a practical point of view, the UN will also have to resolve an uneasy tension between enabling access to these data in order to conduct data-driven early warning analyses on the one hand and the need to prevent any data breaches on the other hand.
COVID-19 will change the way the UN conducts peacekeeping operations in the future
The COVID-19 pandemic has significantly disrupted UN peacekeeping operations. In the short-term, activities have been reduced to the most critical, rotations have been frozen, and most staff are working remotely. Most of the missions have adapted remarkably well, but even more extreme changes are likely in the medium term, as the global economic recession that will follow in the wake of the virus may force UN peace operations to drastically contract in size and scope.
COVID-19 and the African Union. Challenges, prospects and side-effects
Den afrikanske union koordinerer innsatsen for å bremse spredningen av COVID-19 i Afrika, men de innførte tiltakene vil også forstyrre reformer, programmer og driften av AU.
How Do Ad-Hoc Security Initiatives Fit in Africa’s Evolving Security Landscape?
Over the last two decades, places like the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, Somalia, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Northern Mozambique have experienced a rise (and in some cases, a resurgence) of groups that use violence to challenge the state. Often termed “rebel groups,” some, like the M23 in eastern DRC, fit the rebel model. But many others take the form of violent extremist insurgencies that mix insurgent tactics with criminal activities, such as banditry and the illicit trading of goods, drugs, money, and natural resources. What both have in common is the use of violence to pursue political and economic objectives related to long-standing center-periphery grievances, and economic and political marginalization.
Nomads and Warlords, Chadian Forces in African Peace Operations
Despite criticism of the United Nations (UN) as peacekeepers “hiding behind sandbags,” by the former president of Chad, the Chadian military has become a critical enabler of African-led and UN peace operations. This paper posits that the effectiveness of the Chadian forces stems from refined and modified nomad and warlord structures and attributes used during Chad’s various conflicts to build and improve its national army. This has allowed the Chadian regime to exercise and project power, thus, producing one of Africa’s most effective forces for current conflicts and challenges. Thus, Chad’s military leadership reflects a trend of states that use military prowess to project force, while maintaining international partnerships with permanent members of the unsc (the US and France), UN peacekeeping missions and African ad hoc security initiatives. Finally, the paper examines the implications of this trend for the evolving nature of African Peace and Security Architecture.
Criticism of the UK’s Rwanda Policy Misrepresents African Agency
While much of the controversy around the UK–Rwanda partnership is understandable, African perspectives are too often missing from the debate.