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Roman Vakulchuk
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Roman Vakulchuk er seniorforsker ved NUPI. Han har en doktorgrad i økonomi fra Jacobs University Bremen i Tyskland. Vakulchuk har særlig kunnskap om Kazakhstan, øvrige land i Sentral-Asia og Ukraina, og forskningsfelt inkluderer økonomisk endring og integrasjon, klimaendringer, handel, infrastruktur og transport, næringlivskultur og statskapitalisme i fremvoksende markeder.
Vakulchuk har arbeidserfaring som prosjektleder og ekspert i forskningsprosjekter organisert av blant andre Verdensbanken, Asian Development Bank, Utenriksdepartementet og Norges forskningsråd. Vakulchuk har også arbeidet for Shell i Tyskland. Han snakker engelsk, russisk, ukrainsk, fransk og tysk.
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Myanmar – utfordringar og moglegheiter
FN Resident Coordinator og UNDP representant i Myanmar, Knut Østby, og forskarane Roman Vakulchuk og Kristian Stokke ser nærare på Myanmar - eit land med store politiske og økonomiske utfordringar.
Russia’s New Asian Tilt: How Much Does Economy Matter?
The economic development of Russia’s Far East has been proclaimed a policy priority, to be facilitated by an ambitious turn or ‘pivot’ to Asia. This chapter assesses Russia’s economic reorientation towards Asia, offering an overview of the Far Eastern dimension of Russia’s economic relations with its major Asian partners in 2010–16, based on analysis of the dynamics of investment, trade relations and business climate development. Since 2014, trade with Asian partners has stagnated, while foreign investment (except for Chinese) has remained negligible. Moreover, trade is still mainly oriented towards markets in European Russia. The chapter concludes that Russia’s pivot to Asia has not yet become an economic pivot—and that such a turn would be more easily attainable under a non-sanctions regime.
Myanmar: A Political Economy Analysis
Myanmar may for a long time remain in a transitional state with an uncertain future. After a series of political and economic liberalization reforms from 2011 onwards, Myanmar’s political trajectory remains open-ended, although the most plausible scenario remains a continued slow democratization process. The democratic opening has been driven largely by the interest of the military rulers in changing Myanmar’s relations with Western states and thereby gaining leverage vis-à-vis China. Continued military influence, persistent capacity problems in political parties and parliamentary politics, weak channels of political representation and limited administrative capacity give rise to critical questions about the substance of democratization and economic development in Myanmar. The country’s informal economy is one of the largest in the world and is upheld by informal elite pacts that were formed in the military era, often involving high-ranking officers and crony companies. Along with a high level of corruption and lack of redistributive mechanisms the continuing cronyism hinders inclusive growth. If these economic structures persist, social and ethnic conflicts may intensify and progress towards further democratization stall. Despite this, foreign direct investments in resource extraction and other sectors have been on the rise since 2011 and are likely to continue. Myanmar is also ranked as the world’s second-most vulnerable country to climate change. The government needs a better understanding of climate change and its effects – both its direct impacts on Myanmar and its indirect impacts via neighbouring countries such as Bangladesh. As Myanmar remains at a crossroads, smart external assistance may have greater long-term impact in Myanmar than in other recipient countries where the situation is less volatile. However, donors may also become increasingly frustrated and reduce their assistance because of the ongoing Rohingya crisis and because of the limited local capacity to absorb international assistance.
Kazakhstan: Civil Society and Natural Resource Policy in Kazakhstan
In Kazakhstan, civil society is held back and has had a limited role in the management of the petroleum sector. As this chapter notes, civil society has had little experience of promoting its own interests vis-à-vis the state, and public discussion of natural resource issues has been mainly government-driven. The fact that Kazakhstan made a notable step forward—from being a collapsing socialist economy in the 1990s to becoming a regional economic player with improved social and economic performance—has helped to legitimize non-transparent natural resource policies. As long as the socio-economic situation continues to improve or remains stable, the non-transparent management of natural resources is likely to be accepted by the population, which, like the Russian population, puts a premium on stability. The relative passivity of civil society has been compensated by Kazakhstan’s exposure to international initiatives and organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and numerous UN agencies. As in Azerbaijan, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) has provided a platform for some civil society engagement with industry and government.
Impact of Climate Change on ASEAN International Affairs: Risk and Opportunity Multiplier
This study examines the implications of climate change for international affairs in Southeast Asia and for ASEAN as a multilateral organization. Climate change and efforts to mitigate climate change give rise to major risks as well as opportunities in international affairs. It is therefore in the interest of all countries to be aware of the risks and prepare for them, and the overarching purpose of this study is to support ASEAN and its member states in this area. Given Southeast Asia’s complex geography—with numerous archipelagoes, long coastlines, intricate borders, and great-power neighbors—climate change is especially likely to affect interstate relations in the region.Climate change may impact on international affairs among the ASEAN countries at several levels. Firstly, changing climatic conditions may affect interstate relations through humanitarian crises, migration, and/or the need for greater imports of vital goods. Secondly, reducing greenhouse gas emissions requires international coordination and cooperation. Thirdly, the global energy transition driven by climate policy may lead to an altered geopolitical situation in the world, including ASEAN.
Political economy analyses
I dette prosjektet analyserer vi politisk økonomi for elleve land som er sentrale i Norges utviklingssamarbeid...
EUs strategi for Sentral-Asia: Partnarskap for berekraftig utvikling
Korleis kan EU bidra til at landa i Sentral-Asia held fram med å utvikle seg i rett retning?
Den ukrainske energimarknaden er i endring: korleis lykkast i ein ny geopolitisk setting?
NUPI og NUCC inviterer leiande ekspertar til å dele sitt syn på den siste utviklinga på den ukrainske energimarknaden.
Russia’s Reorientation to the East: How Much Does Economy Matter?
This policy brief assesses Russian involvement in the growing Asia-Pacific economies, and offers an overview of the Far Eastern dimension of Russia’s economic relations with its major Asian partners, 2010–2016. It discusses the dynamics of investment and trade relations, and reflects on Russia’s changing economic priorities before and after the conflict with Ukraine and introduction of international sanctions, with a focus on implications for Russia–Asia relations in the Russian Far East.
Myanmars Attractiveness for Investment in the Energy Sector: A Comparative International Perspective
This report examines the strengths and weaknesses of Myanmar’s business climate in the petroleum and renewable energy sectors: how it compares with other countries, especially in ASEAN; what matters to foreign investors; and how this situation can be improved. Not resting on one’s (new) laurels: The recent international interest in Myanmar may prove counterproductive for the country’s investment climate, if this upsurge in interest induces the government to slow down in its reform efforts. When the novelty of Myanmar wears off, that may become a problem. Indeed, possible signs of such a slowdown can be observed already. According to official data, FDI in Myanmar decreased significantly in the first four months of 2016 compared to the same period in 2015. Investors were increasingly cautious and worried about the slow pace of reform, delays in establishing a panel to approve new investment projects and the lack of clarity on the country’s new economic development strategy (DVB, 2016). This highlights the importance of working constantly to improve the investment climate and staying in close contact with investors, keeping them informed about developments. Challenges common to the petroleum and renewables sectors: Lack of data and information for market entry; fragmented institutional and regulatory framework; low levels of electricity access and digitalization; low international oil prices. Challenges in the petroleum sector: Limited supply-industry infrastructure and lack of local engineers; MOGE petroleum sector monopolization and conflicts of interest; limited geological data; complicated taxation; weak government–business communication; challenges in finding local partners; time-consuming licensing procedures; paper-based communication and lack of e-government; production-sharing agreements biased towards participation of large oil companies, excluding smaller ones; frequent changes in legislation; closed downstream market. Challenges in the renewable energy sector: No national target or legislation on renewable energy; no dedicated public agency regulating the sector; lack of business associations; subsidies for grid electricity generated from fossil fuels disadvantage off-grid renewables; access to suitable land; complex mountainous terrain and protected areas as well as political instability in these areas; underdeveloped grid system for large-scale production; lack of data on the renewable-energy resource potential; limited infrastructure for technical support and maintenance; high cost of installing solar panels and wind turbines; disintegrated biofuel production and supply markets; lack of local specialists; no taxation system for renewables; security risks in conflict-prone Kachin, Rakhine and Shan states. Opportunities in the petroleum and renewable energy sectors: Government commitment to reform; advantageous location as part of the Greater Mekong Subregion and ASEAN, close to the Chinese and Indian markets; significant resource base, especially natural gas, hydropower and bioenergy; rapidly rising energy demand in Myanmar and neighbouring countries; high demand for investment in refineries, oil terminals, oil barges and petrol stations; opportunities in retail business; new petroleum and renewable energy laws are underway; abundant semi-skilled labour, and low cost of unskilled labour; low levels of corruption and criminality. Initially, companies may perceive the business climate as unpredictable, but, having entered the market, and having learned and adapted to local conditions, companies experience greater predictability. Opportunities in the petroleum sector: Relatively transparent tender system; equal treatment of investors; government experience and capacity; market maturity. Myanmar’s strategic location, with rapidly rising energy demand among hundreds of millions of people in the neighbouring countries and low transportation costs (especially for gas delivery to China, India and Thailand), represents an opportunity to foreign investors. Opportunities in the renewable energy sector: Latecomer advantage; low level of electrification increases cost advantage of off-grid electrification; support from international donors; strong civil society actors are promoting renewable energy development.