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Niels Nagelhus Schia
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Sammendrag
Niels Nagelhus Schia (PhD fra Universitetet i Oslo) er forsker 1 ved NUPI, hvor han over flere år har fordypet seg i spørsmål som omhandler global styring, internasjonale organisasjoner, og statsbygging.
Schia er leder for Forskningsgruppen for sikkerhet og forsvar. Han er også medleder i NUPIs forskningssenter for digitalisering og cybersikkerhet og jobber med forskningsprosjekter som omhandler politiske og samfunnsmessige aspekter ved cybersikkerhet. Mer konkret handler disse prosjektene om globale utfordringer når det gjelder styring av cyberspace, kapasitetsbygging i utviklingsland, samt internasjonalt samarbeid mellom stater og private aktører knyttet til det digitale rom. I forskningsprosjekt GAIA ser han på koblinger mellom digitale verdikjeder, nasjonal autonomi og internasjonal politikk. Prosjektet er finansiert av Forskningsrådets IKTPLUSS-program og er et samarbeidsprosjekt mellom SIMULA og NUPI, samt en rekke andre internasjonale universiteter og institutter.
Schia har lang erfaring i å planlegge og utføre forskningsoppdrag. Disse oppdragene har gjerne handlet om internasjonale organisasjoners rolle i fredsbyggingsprosesser, global governance, samarbeidsprosesser i internasjonalpolitikk, diplomacy og transnasjonale prosesser relatert til post-konflikt situasjoner. Schia er utdannet sosialantropolog med en doktorgrad fra Universitetet i Oslo og har bred feltarbeidserfaring fra internasjonale organisasjoner og Afrika. Et hovedfokus i hans forskning er fokuset på globale koblinger til mer lokale, nasjonale og regionale spørsmål og prosesser. Dette er også tema i boken Franchised States and the Bureaucracy of Peace (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), samt i kapittelet Horseshoe and Catwalk: Power, Complexity and Consensus-Making in the United Nations Security Council i boken Palaces of Hope: The Anthropology of Global Organizations (Cambridge University Press, 2017) og i artikkelen The Cyber Frontier and Digital Pitfalls in the Global South (Third World Quarterly, 2018).
I tilknytning til sin forskning har Schia organisert en rekke seminarer og konferanser internasjonalt og nasjonalt. I dette arbeidet har han hatt utstrakt kontakt med akademiske miljøer samt fagmiljøer og er vant til å jobbe i skjæringspunktet mellom akademisk og anvendt forskning.
Schia har publisert sin forskning i internasjonale og nasjonale tidsskrifter som Third World Quarterly, European Journal of International Relations, International Peacekeeping, Journal of International Relations and Development og Political and Legal Anthropology. Han har mottatt ulike forskningsstipend blant annet fra Fulbright og Norges forskningsråd.
Fra og med januar 2017 er han medredaktør for Internasjonal Politikk, det ledende skandinaviskspråklige fagtidsskriftet innenfor internasjonale studier, sammen med Pernille Rieker og Minda Holm.
Ekspertise
Utdanning
2015 Doktorgrad, sosialantropologi, Universitetet i Oslo
2004 Cand.polit., Universitetet i Oslo, Sosialantropologi
Arbeidserfaring
2022- Leder, Forskningsgruppen for sikkerhet og forsvar
2017- Redaktør for Internasjonal Politikk - Skandinavisk Tidsskrift for Internasjonale Studier.
2015- Leder, NUPIs Forskningssenter på cybersikkehet.
2010 Gjesteforsker ved The New School for Social Research, New York, Leiv Eirikson mobilitetsprogram (Norges forskningsråd), og Fulbright scholar.
2009 Rådgiver, Civil Affairs, Policy Best Practices Services (PBPS), UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, New York.
2003- Forsker 1 / Seniorforsker / Forsker / Vit. ass., NUPI.
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2012-2016 Styremedlem Fulbright Alumni Association of Norway.
2013-2016 Leder, vitenskapelig komité for Fulbrights årlige forskningspris.
Aktivitet
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Tøm alle filtreCritical communication infrastructures and Huawei
Recently, there have been growing cyber-safety concerns over telecom equipment made by the Chinese vendor Huawei. This has led many countries to ban Huawei from supplying equipment for building the next generation of mobile networks, 5G. Responses from mobile operators and the telecom community in general have been mixed. For instance, many European mobile operators have stated that these concerns are overblown and that such a ban would delay 5G rollout by two to three years in the best case. Moreover, some operators have directly questioned the ability of the other vendors to timely deliver a complete 5G network. However, these claims have mostly not been grounded in empirical data. This paper takes a multi-perspective approach to investigating this problem empirically. We start by categorizing responses from different countries to using Huawei equipment in 5G. We then analyze the importance and readiness of Huawei for supplying 5G equipment. This analysis is based on contributions to standards and patents. We also present a conceptual risk analysis framework to qualitatively evaluate the ability of a single vendor to cause considerable damage to critical communication infrastructures. This model aims at exploring a set of relevant axis. More specifically, we look at potential for harm in different political climates that is peace, crisis and war. Another axis is whether banning a particular vendor from supplying equipment for the upcoming mobile networks generation is useful without having a backward compatible ban. A third axis is the ability of a vendor to cause harm as a function of the type of supplied equipment, for example radio towers vs network management systems. Combining the analysis of readiness for supplying 5G and potential for causing harm allows us to roughly estimate the likely impact that a complete ban would have on 5G rollout in different parts of the world. We find that such a ban can possibly delay 5G by two years or more for operators with high dependence on Huawei. Consequently, we explore potential approaches that would both reduce vendor-related risk and do not significantly delay the rollout of 5G. These include heterogeneous multi-vendor deployments, equipment verification and testing, international collaboration as well as signing non-aggression treaties. Unfortunately, there is no technological solution that fully remedy this problem. Combining technical solutions with efforts to build trust between countries, enforce existing alignments or create new ones seems a promising way forward.
Neumann hedres av Internasjonal Politikk
Iver B. Neumanns bidrag som fagbygger og debattant er sjelden vare.
The Politics of Stability: Cement and Change in Cyber Affairs
In November 2018, the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, inaugurated one year earlier ‘to develop proposals for norms and policies to enhance international security and stability and guide responsible state and non-state behavior in cyberspace’, launched six norms pointing ‘the way to new opportunities for increasing the stability of cyberspace’. However, the Commission has not examined or explained the very concept it was established to explore. Quite the contrary, the Commission argues that its proposed norms will be used to define what cyber stability actually is. Focusing on the interrelationship between international peace and stability, and ways of achieving both in the context of ICTs, the authors will offer a model of stability of cyberspace. They begin by examining the concepts of ‘stability’ and ‘strategic stability’ as understood with regard to international security. This conceptual analysis is followed by a presentation of the political claims of stability expressed in national and international cyber-and information-security discourses. Drawing on the conceptual approaches and the political claims, the report then model the stability of cyberspace in three interlinked and reinforcing dimensions: 1) equal and inclusive international relations; 2) prevention of war: the minimal peace, with emphasis on averting a devastating nuclear war between the superpowers; and 3) the functionality of global and national technical systems and services. After discussing how international law, preventive diplomacy, confidence-building measures, and norms of responsible state behaviour can support cyberspace stability, this report concludes with recommendations for action aimed at helping to create and maintain a stable - resilient and adaptive - cyberspace.
Forebygging av krig og konflikt i cyberdomenet
Cyberdomenet representerer kanskje en av vår tids største trusler mot internasjonal fred og sikkerhet men er viet lite oppmerksomhet hva gjelder forebygging av krig og konflikt. Det er behov for internasjonale forpliktende kjøreregler som hever blikket over IKT-forvaltning, digitalisering og cybersikkerhetstiltak og fokuserer på fredelige relasjoner mellom stater i cyberdomenet. Skal en slik diskusjon ha effekt må den tas i FNs Sikkerhetsråd.
Finding a European response to Huawei’s 5G ambitions
This policy brief suggests that European countries should institute national reviewing boards overseen by intelligence agencies to vet Huawei equipment. If that is not feasible due to a lack of resources or capabilities especially among smaller countries, European governments should consider pooling resources and create a common reviewing board. This would also prevent duplication of efforts on national levels. European authorities should also demand from Huawei to clearly separate its international from its domestic business operations in order to further reduce the risk to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of European mobile networks.
Parabasis: Cyber-diplomacy in Stalemate
Governments and industry around the world are working together to bring the next billion users online,1 but their synergies fade when it comes to how to keep online populations safe and secure. Further, the third and fourth billion of Internet users will enter a terrain very different from that available to their predecessors. Vulnerabilities in ICTs as well as de facto exploitation of these vulnerabilities by state and non-state actors has been acknowledged and problematized. Evidence of malicious and hostile operations involving ICTs and the Internet abounds. Uncertain about the true potential of ICTs, governments and users have focused on rules and responsibilities for protecting against cyberattacks, espionage and data manipulation. But where is there an understanding of how to remedy and improve the situation? The first part of this report analyzes and contextualizes the UN First Committee process. The second part offers the authors’ extensions to the theme, analyzing the relative successes and failures of the leading cyberpowers in promoting the world order of their liking. In particular, we analyze how Russia, as the initiator of the First Committee process, has created momentum and gathered support for its calls for specific international regulation and institutionalization of the process on the one hand, and stronger governmental control of the development and use of ICTs and the flow of information on the other. In conclusion, we offer some recommendations for governments wishing to pursue the goal of free and open cyberspace—indeed a rule-based world order. The full text can be read here: http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2569401
International Cybersecurity: Orchestral Manoeuvres in the Dark
Tikk and Kerttunen inform new entrants and nonparticipating governments of the discussions and outcomes of the UN First Committee Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and discuss prospects for the 2019/2020 GGE. They explain why the Group will not able to provide answers to practical cybersecurity issues facing the majority of states. The authors call states to critically review their reasons for and expectations towards the UN First Committee dialogue on international cybersecurity.
The Chinese Cyber Sovereignty Concept (Part 1 & 2)
Cyber sovereignty is a distinct concept from the more familiar term cybersecurity, which concerns protecting the infrastructure and processes connected to the Internet. Cyber sovereignty, on the other hand, is concerned with the information and content the Internet provides. China’s cyber sovereignty concept is based on two key principles: The first is that unwanted influence in a country’s “information space” should be banned. In effect, this would allow countries to prevent their citizens from being exposed to ideas and opinions deemed harmful by the regime. The other key principle is to move the governance of the Internet from the current bodies, which includes in them academics and companies, to an international forum such as the UN. This move would also entail a transfer of power from companies and individuals to states alone.
Managing a Digital Revolution - Cyber Security Capacity Building in Myanmar
Digitalization is exposing developing countries to a growing number of risks, as well as opportunities associated with connecting to the Internet. Myanmar stands out as a critical case of both the pitfalls and the benefits Internet connection can bring. Amidst a political transition from military rule to a functioning democracy Myanmar is adding ICT to key areas like banking and e-government. Having been one of the least connected countries in the world only five years ago the country is now connecting to the Internet at an unprecedented pace, with little or no institutions in place to ensure the transition goes smoothly. Using the framework of Cyber Security Capacity Building (CCB) we examine the risks and potential benefits of Myanmar’s embracement of digital technologies.
3 grunner til at Norge bør med i FNs sikkerhetsråd
Norge kan gjøre Sikkerhetsrådet enda bedre og enda mer relevant, skriver Niels Nagelhus Schia.