Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions (RE-ENGAGE)
RE-ENGAGEs skal hjelpe EU med å styrke sin utenrikspolitiske verktøykasse, inkludert utvidelses- og naboskapspolitikken. Dette vil styrke unionens geopolitiske innflytelse og gi den bedre verktøy for ...
European Actorness in a Shifting Geopolitical Order. European Strategic Autonomy Through Differentiated Integration
This is an open access book. Over the past decade, the global geopolitical context has changed significantly, with a geopolitical power shift and a more assertive Russia and China. With the unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine, European security has been put on high alert. The implications of the Russian military invasion are many and difficult to grasp in full. But the need for greater European strategic autonomy appears increasingly evident. But how can this be achieved in the short run? The answer to this question is often that it is impossible and that this can only be achieved in the long run. The aim of this book is to present a different perspective. It aims at showing that it should be possible to make the most out of the current European system if we adjust our understanding of how it works. The book argues that strategic autonomy may be reached—also in the short run—if differentiated integration is seen as an asset rather than a challenge. While the EU remains the core in such a system (together with NATO in the military domain), there is a multitude of other (bilateral and minilateral) regional and sub-regional integration processes that need to be taken into account to get the full idea of how European strategic autonomy can be achieved. This book starts by presenting a theoretical framework for how to study European actorness beyond the EU, then this framework will be applied both to the development towards the EU as a foreign policy actor through the mechanisms of enlargement.
The EU and the governance of the Maritime Global Space
This article investigates the extent to which the European Union (EU) contributes to the governance of Global Spaces by exploring its policies towards the maritime domain. In a more competitive and uncertain geopolitical setting, are the EU’s policies changing and becoming more strategic? Or does the EU continue to promote multilateral cooperation and regulation of the maritime Global Space, and if so, what type of governance regimes does it promote? Developing and applying three analytical models of Global Space policies, the article finds that the EU has been consistent in its approach, which reflects a combination of its strong interest in free navigation and an attempt to achieve sustainable growth through climate regulation. Despite more geopolitical conflict in these areas and in international relations more broadly, the EU’s approach to the maritime Global Space is to promote international governance regimes.
A more strategic European Union in a more contested space
Space is becoming an increasingly important domain for societies and politics alike, also from a geopolitical and hence security and defence perspective. The EU is a key actor in space, but its approach to space is changing in a more uncertain and contested geopolitical environment. While still focused largely on the civilian aspects of space, the EU has developed a more strategic approach towards space, increasingly using the domain also for security and defence, including military, purposes. As the EU develops quickly in a more challenging and uncertain environment, Norway needs to understand EU developments and their implications at an early stage, and work to secure participation where interests align.
Collective defence in Europe: What place for the EU?
Collective defence is the cornerstone of Europe’s security architecture, anchored in NATO’s Article 5 stating that an attack against one ally is an attack against all. With the deteriorating security environment in Europe, questions have been asked about whether, and if so how, the EU’s clause on mutual defence – article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union – could be operationalized and perhaps be a supplement to NATO’s article 5 as a guarantor of collective defence in Europe. The debate is driven by perceived limits in NATO’s ability to deal with hybrid threats, the broader implications of Russia’s war on Ukraine, and the necessity for European states to take more responsibility for their security. For EU member states to succeed with its collective defence obligations within the union, political will, legal interoperability with NATO and capability development should be addressed further.
Adapting to turbulent waters: EU maritime security and implications for Norway
Maritime security has become a top priority for the EU, as evident in its Strategic Compass for security and defence (2022) where it was identified as a strategic domain. The intensification of geopolitical tensions has further extended strategic competition to the seas. At the same time, a proliferation of threats has emerged at sea, including the security of migration routes, human rights at sea, implications of climate change and global warming, and the pressing challenges posed by organised crime and marine terrorism. The attacks on the Nord Stream pipelines have heightened the urgency for safeguarding critical infrastructure at sea, for surveillance, and coastal and offshore patrolling. Governance of the high seas invites further challenges. They are considered part of the Global Commons that, as with outer space, the atmosphere and the poles, are largely beyond the jurisdiction of nation states. Against the backdrop of escalating tensions and decline in international cooperation, enhancing the EU’s maritime presence has been recognised not only as a paramount security imperative, but also as an economic interest of the Member States: The EU has the largest maritime territory in the world (counting exclusive economic zones), is home to 329 key seaports and most goods to and from Europe travel via the sea (90% of trade exports). In addition, up to 99% of global dataflows travel via subsea cables, and the EU’s energy dependence on oil and gas, which largely travels to the EU via the sea, remains high. Maritime security is thus among the fastest-growing EU policy areas. In addition to the threats listed above, Russia and China's increasing assertiveness at sea has intensified longer term processes towards an increasingly robust and multifaceted EU maritime foreign and security policy.
PODKAST: Europa rustar opp
Digitalisering og internasjonal politikk
Hvilke sikkerhetspolitiske valg og dilemmaer representerer den nye digitale hverdagen for Norge og resten av verden? Kampen for å påvirke hvordan internett skal fungere er godt i gang. Utbyggingen av 5G-nettverk har blitt en global dragkamp der land presser hverandre til å velge bort bestemte leverandører, og private selskaper i den digitale sektoren får stadig større økonomisk og politisk makt. Internasjonale aktører som FN og NATO strever med å finne sin plass i det nye landskapet. I FN pågår det en intens strid om hvilke internasjonale normer som skal gjelde i det digitale rom, og NATO har definert cyber som et eget domene på linje med land, luft og sjø. Alt dette tilsier at digitalisering vil være med på å definere internasjonale konfliktlinjer i lang tid fremover. Men hvordan? I denne boken samler Håkon Bergsjø og Karsten Friis ulike perspektiver fra ledende fagmiljøer på hvordan digitalisering påvirker internasjonal politikk og konfliktdynamikk.
Working paper on EU’s policies and instruments for PVE
This working paper maps and analyses the toolbox of the EU and a handful of European countries by providing a comprehensive overview of existing measures aimed at preventing violent extremism (PVE) within and outside the EU. It lists the institutional set-up, the decisionmaking processes and coordinating practices at both the EU and state levels. In addition to an analysis of counter-terrorism and PVE strategies at the level of EU institutions, the toolbox of four EU member states (Germany, France, Ireland, Spain) and one former member state (UK) is analysed because of their particular experiences with and competences in the area of prevention of violent extremism.