Krig i Europa – Hva skjer med Nordens forsvars- og sikkerhetspolitikk?
Hvilken diagnose kan vi sette på Norden? Og hvordan ser bildet ut nå som Russland har invadert Ukraina? Det er temaet for denne episoden av Utenrikshospitalet, NUPIs podcast om utenrikspolitikk. Blir krigen i Ukraina et vendepunkt for sikkerhets- og forsvarspolitikken i Norden? Er det sannsynlig at Finland og Sverige vil søke seg til NATO nå?
Europeisk helsesamarbeid etter covid-19 pandemien
Covid-19 pandemien er en av de største krisene i verden etter 1945. I Europa ble nasjonale myndigheter og EU-systemet utfordret med tanke på hvordan krisen skulle håndteres. Særlig i de første fasene av pandemien var det stor variasjon i valgene av virkemidler. Landene innførte en rekke inngripende tiltak som fikk negative konsekvenser på tvers av landegrensene, blant annet for familiebesøk mellom land, arbeidsmobilitet, vareflyt, og forsyningssikkerhet. EU responderte i 2020 på krisen med å foreslå en styrking av helsesamarbeidet generelt, og beredskaps- og krisehåndteringskapasiteten spesielt. I dette notatet ser vi nærmere på EUs helsesamarbeid og mulige implikasjoner for Norge av arbeidet med å styrke dette samarbeidet i kjølvannet av pandemien.
Craig Moffat
Craig Moffat var Seniorforsker i forskningsgruppen om fred, konflikt og utvikling.
Revisiting nuclear hedging: ballistic missiles and the Iranian example
Teknologiske endringer har gjort atomvåpenarsenaler mer sårbare. I denne artikkelen hevder Henrik Stålhane Hiim at det gir særlig stater med en såkalt «garderingsstrategi» sterke grunner til å utvikle ballistiske missiler. Stater som driver med kjernefysisk «gardering» - som Iran – ønsker å opprettholde evnen til å utvikle atomvåpen, men uten å krysse den kjernefysiske terskelen. Artikkelen analyserer Irans missil- og rakettprogrammer, og demonstrerer hvordan disse programmene er en sentral del av Irans garderingsstrategi. Flere av missilene Iran kan være velegnet til bruk i et kjernevåpenprogram.
ARENDALSUKA: Folk flest blir ikkje radikalisert
Det meste av forskinga på valdeleg ekstremisme fokuserer på kvifor folk blir radikalisert. Men dei fleste blir ikkje det. Kva gjer at folk flest ikkje blir radikaliserte?
Shifting from External Dependency: Remodelling the G5 Sahel Joint Force for the Future
After a decade of battling jihadist and violent extremist groups in West Africa, France has initiated the restructuring and relocation of its largest overseas military mission in the Sahel with an announcement of the withdrawal of Operation Barkhane (the French military counterterrorism intervention) from Mali. The exit over the coming months may signify an important shift of western military operations in Mali and the Sahel. France’s deployment in the Sahel was initially triggered by the activities of Tuareg separatists in the northern part of Mali. Islamic extremists closely associated with Al-Qaeda took advantage of the situation, seizing north Mali and spreading their activities southwards in 2012. Despite French counterterrorism operations, instability worsened, and Islamists controlled vast swathes of northern and central Mali, parts of Burkina Faso, and western Niger. Over time, under the motivation of France, the G5 Sahel Joint Force (G5S-JF) was created to address the everyday challenges of terrorism and transnational organised crime among the five member states (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger). For a force supported by three United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2359 (2017), 2391 (2017) and 2480 (2019); and with a force strength of 5600 troops organised around three sectors,1 its operational successes have been a mixed bag (ten joint border operations). Operation Barkhane together with European Union Training Mission Mali (EUTM), the Capacity Building Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) and Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), has enhanced the operational readiness and capabilities of the G5 Sahel through mentoring, training, and funding of the joint-force operations. Additionally, these external operations, particularly Barkhane, have been supportive of the activities of G5S-JF by providing intelligence, supporting logistical and joint planning, providing aerial and air support, and engaging in medical evacuation. Notwithstanding, the Joint Force has been contending with weak intelligence, shortfalls in equipment, limited aerial capabilities and a lack of rapid response, which invariably hinders operational effectiveness. The Joint Force represents an essential step toward addressing the instability that affects Mali and the broader Sahel, but as of yet, the G5S-JF has been unable to fully demonstrate its effectiveness as a force despite significant support from donor countries such as France. Moreover, it is uncertain how Mali´s withdrawal from the Joint Force will impact on the overall strategy of the G5S-JF and its sustainability going forward, especially given Mali’s recent announcement of withdrawing from the G5 Sahel. The departure of Barkhane, together with Takuba and other European arrangements from Mali, raises many unanswered questions about the funding, operational capacity and political cooperation between the other member states of the Joint Force. Even though France has reiterated that it will continue to support peacekeepers serving under MINUSMA; and Malian troops continuing to battle Islamic violent extremism after the Barkhane withdrawal, the response time to jihadist attacks and activities inside Malian territory will not be the same. Without Barkhane, the G5S-JF will struggle to protect civilians, evacuate soldiers in need of medical attention, and support effective joint planning and coordination of G5S-JF and intelligence sharing —which has been instrumental in the fight against jihadist. To address emerging challenges, enhance the ability of the G5S-JF and sustain its support, this report proposes four possible options that could fill the gap resulting from the current security vacuum being created following the possible withdrawal of some of the external military forces from Mali, and Mali itself from the G5S-JF. In arriving at these proposed options, emphasis is placed on regional perspectives, which draws on African frameworks and the use of African resources, experience, capabilities and understanding. The report argues that this would allow better ownership and closer proximity to the issues, ensuring that international partners are not dictating how the region and African Union (AU) Member States (MS) should solve challenges. The evaluation considered the full spectrum of options to include: • A reconfigured and scaled-up G5 Sahel Joint Force (Plus); • A reconfigured G5 Sahel Joint Force and revised MISAHEL through the AU, ECOWAS, ECCAS and CENSAD; • An integrated ECOWAS (deployment of the African Standby Force) utilising the G5 Sahel force; and • Elevating the G5 Sahel force to an AU (Peace Enforcement mission) with UN support. The proposed options focus on military and hybrid solutions that can tackle existing challenges in the Sahel and West Africa as a whole. However, defeating jihadism and violent extremism is essentially a job that should include intelligence and police authorities to win the hearts and minds of the population, but this cannot be done solely with hard stabilisation efforts. Tackling the vast challenges in the Sahel requires a careful mix of adaptive, agile and sustained efforts that cut across social, economic, political, developmental, humanitarian and recovery instruments and support. Thus, the report suggests additional stabilisation efforts to support the Sahel focused on local, national, regional and international initiatives that can connect to the ground and tackle internal challenges comprehensively. These initiatives, it will be argued, can plug into existing structures but also help to support structures not fully recognised. Efforts to resolve the problems in the Sahel stand a much greater chance of success if fully supported with buy-in from the AU, together with ECOWAS and support from the UN, EU and donors that can draw on the full spectrum of available instruments which have a demonstrable desire to work with like-minded partners. The authors of this report believe that a scaled-up and reconfigured G5 Sahel Joint Force (G5 Sahel Plus) option (discussed below) would have been the optimal model. However, following the recent withdrawal of Mali from the G5S-JF and the deteriorating political landscape in the region and between states, the authors’ reassessment calls for an AU Peace Enforcement mission as the most appropriate, given the current situation. It is important to note, the recommendations provided in this report hinge on the ability of the current and former G5S-JF states to address and resolve the deteriorating political situation, which is fluid in nature and continuously evolving. This will require all states (current and former G5S-JF) to recognise that they need each other to address these challenges, and that any reconfiguration (the models provided in this report) depends on the political situation being fully addressed. There is a need, as the models indicate, to have more joint efforts between the AU and ECOWAS to assist in resolving the current impasses in the region.
UNITAMS Mandate Renewal Study: Fostering a Process of Trust and Inclusivity
The United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) was established on 3 June 2020 under UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2524 to support Sudan during its transition to democratic rule and it was renewed the following year through SC 2579(2021). UNITAMS was conceived of and designed to respond to new and long-standing issues in Sudan: the political transition process that began with the December 2018 revolution and the legacy of armed conflicts. The Mission’s mandate explicitly recognises the adverse effects of climate change on the stability of Sudan and stresses the need for appropriate risk assessment and risk management strategies. Yet, since the adoption of the Mission’s mandate in June 2020 and its renewal in June 2021, Sudan’s political, security and economic situation has deteriorated significantly. An attempted military coup in September 2021, followed by a successful coup d’état on 25 October 2021, has further worsened Sudan’s political crisis, increasing insecurity, undermining the economy, and resulting in the interruption of bilateral and international funding—all amidst the continuing global pandemic. This fast-changing political, security and economic context has placed UNITAMS in a very delicate position in relation to the host government. It has required UNITAMS to focus a significant portion of its attention on good offices and diplomacy so that, together with the African Union (AU), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and other international partners and Sudanese stakeholders, it can support a process aimed at bringing Sudan’s transition back on track. While the UNITAMS mandate remains relevant and adequate, the Mission must continue to be allowed the flexibility to adapt its focus to the fast-changing dynamics on the ground. UNITAMS’ good offices’ role should remain at the centre of the Mission’s efforts during the next mandated period, helping Sudanese to find an inclusive political settlement that can secure a transition to democratic rule in the medium to long term. At the same time, the Mission should continue its work in support of its other objectives and priorities, including the protection of civilians, the implementation of the peace agreement, and advisory and capacity building, particularly related to the rule-of-law sector. The Mission should strengthen its focus on and ability to integrate climate-related security risks into its analytical work, especially as it relates to supporting local conflict prevention, mitigation and reconciliation efforts to prevent inter-communal violence. While there has been significant progress in strengthening collaboration among the UN, AU and IGAD, maintaining and sustaining the partnership must remain a key priority in the Mission’s work to promote regional stability.
Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet: Afghanistan
Afghanistan er svært sårbart for virkningene av klimaendringer: stigende temperaturer, skiftende nedbørsmønstre og stadig hyppigere ekstremvær. For øyeblikket opplever Afghanistan sin verste tørke på 27 år, som, sammen med COVID-19 og den økonomiske nedgangen som fulgte Talibans overtakelse i august 2021, har betydelig økt levebrød-og matusikkerhet og bidratt til en voksende humanitær nødsituasjon. • Klimaendringene forverrer allerede svekkede forholdene for landbruksbaserte levebrød og matusikkerhet. • Konflikt og effekter av klimaendringer har økt intern forflytning og endret migrasjonsmønster. Høye nivåer av fordrivelse forsterker mat- og levebrødsusikkerhet og øker sårbarheten til marginaliserte grupper, inkludert kvinner. • Effektene av klimaendringer kan øke risikoen for hyppigere og mer intense lokale konflikter om land og vann og øke spenningen rundt grenseoverskridende ressurser. • Konflikt har erodert motstandsdyktigheten til lokalsamfunn og lokale myndigheters evner til å tilpasse seg klimaendringer og håndtere den nåværende humanitære krisen. Dette skaper muligheter for eliter til å manipulere og tjene på land- og vanntvister, med økt risiko for marginaliserte grupper.
Central Asia is a missing link in analyses of critical materials for the global clean energy transition
The energy transition is causing a surge in demand for minerals for clean energy technologies, giving rise to concerns about the sources and security of supplies of critical materials. Although Central Asia was one of the Soviet Union's main sources of metals and industrial minerals, it has been forgotten in contemporary global critical materials analyses. Here we review the Central Asian mineral resource base and assess its current and potential contributions to global supply chains. We find that the importance of Central Asia lies mainly in the diversity of its mineral base, which includes mineable reserves of most critical materials for clean energy applications. This renders the region important in mineral economics, security of supply, and geopolitical perspectives alike. In sum, Central Asia is likely to become a new hotspot for mineral extraction and a major global supplier of selected critical materials for clean energy technologies.
Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Mission to South Sudan (UNMISS)
Ahead of the March 2022 renewal of the mandate for the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON) conducted an assessment focused on two core mandate areas: protection of civilians (PoC) and support for the peace process. Based on the assessment to follow, the report lays out several strategic considerations for the new UNMISS mandate: Contingency planning and preparedness: The Mission has made significant progress in building contingency plans and preparedness for a future rise in violence. Given the uncertainty around the peace process, continuing to augment the Mission’s early warn- ing and action capacities will be important. The benefits and limitations of mobility: The Mission has developed a robust capacity to deploy quick reaction forces and temporary operating bases (TOBs) across much of South Sudan, which has enabled it to play an important role in mitigating violence in some situations. Useful, small, nimble constellations of forces are very unlikely to ade- quately address the kinds of violence sporadically committed by local militia groups or large-scale mobilisation of forces, as witnessed in 2013 and 2016. Nevertheless, main- taining the current troop levels may be important in allowing the Mission to position itself for a potential rise in tensions over 2022-23. A risk-based approach to the city and surrounding areas of Malakal: The redesig- nation process has gone well so far, with no major incidents of violence related to the handover of the sites. The eventual redesignation of the PoC site at Malakal may prove the most difficult, given the elevated tension in the broader Malakal area. The Mission’s current decision not to proceed with redesignation is helpful in this regard, and future discussions should be guided by a broad-based understanding of the risks in Upper Nile State. Subnational conflict resolution: Some of UNMISS’ most effective engagements have been in addressing subnational conflict. The 2016 relapse into civil war demonstrated that localised forms of violence can spread quickly, contributing to much larger-scale fighting. Identifying ways to rapidly bolster the civilian presence in hotspot areas – potentially developing and resourcing temporary presences that allow for greater civilian accommodation – could have a beneficial impact. A resource and personnel increase around elections: UNMISS is already positioned to support the national elections and could use the process to amplify its broader role in the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS). This will likely require an increase in resources and personnel in the 2022-23 period. In the lead up to the new mandate in 2022, the Security Council should be guided by the continuing assessment of the Mission leadership on the levels and kind of support that might be needed, including at national and subnational levels. A constitutional opening: The R-ARCSS envisages a new constitution in place prior to elections. A new constitution could be a major step forward, opening the door to much-needed power-sharing arrangements, a framework to address national-level rec- onciliation, and a centre-periphery relationship that allows for a much more equitable distribution of wealth. This could be a real opportunity for the UN to play a construc- tive role (especially given the deep knowledge of constitutional processes of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Nicholas Haysom). Responsibility for inclusiveness: The success or failure of the constitutional and elec- toral processes will hinge largely on the extent to which the South Sudanese population views them as legitimate. Here, UNMISS’ work at the subnational level can play a vital role in increasing support for the peace process, including for governors’ forums and other local processes to facilitate ground-up engagement with the R-ARCSS. It would be useful for the Council to highlight this work and accompany it with a clear message to the R-ARCSS parties that they bear responsibility for implementing an inclusive approach to the constitution and elections. A return to state-building? While no one is seriously considering a complete return to a state-building mandate as in 2011, there may be a push by some Member States to include more capacity-building and support to state institutions in the upcoming man- date. The EPON report recommends caution in such deliberations: despite progress on the peace agreement, the South Sudanese Government is viewed with strong suspicion by many communities, especially those that were targeted during the war. Any capac- ity-building mandate should be careful to avoid being seen as “putting a finger on the scales” of a delicate inter-ethnic balance. Order from regional chaos: It is very unlikely that the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) will play a robust or well-organised role in driving the peace process. Indeed, if current trends continue, the organisation may have even less capacity or focus on the R-ARCSS, further orphaning South Sudan at a time when political and operational progress is sorely needed. The African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council may need to revisit the roles and responsibilities allocated to the key players in this context, possibly identifying new areas for more direct support by the AU and UN. The constitutional and electoral processes offer an opening for such a discussion, and for a re-evaluation of how the broader international commu- nity may need to step into the gaps that exist among the regional players. Climate security: South Sudan is deeply affected by climate change, from the desertifi- cation that has driven herding communities further south over recent decades to increas- ingly erratic rainfall patterns that have led to the flooding of major rivers across the country. The 2021 UNMISS mandate recognises the role of climate change in driving risks. Far more resources and attention will be needed, if the UN is to play a meaningful role in meeting the climate security challenges. Humanitarian risks: The risks to humanitarian actors in South Sudan are worth men- tioning as an area of concern for the Security Council. There are reports of increased intimidation and even violence against humanitarian actors, risks which could increase in the lead up to elections. Given UNMISS’ mandate to facilitate humanitarian delivery, calls for the Mission to protect humanitarian actors may well grow. Women and youth: Continuing threats to women and children will require UNMISS to maintain and expand its protection work in these areas. Preliminary research also indi- cates a persistent threat of sexual violence against women, girls and boys, while young men are frequent targets of recruitment into violent groups. Greater consideration could be given to these dynamics in the upcoming Council deliberations, especially given UNMISS’ role in promoting more inclusive approaches to the peace process. Space for innovation and flexibility: One of the key lessons from the 2018 EPON report and today is that UNMISS is capable of significant innovation and flexibility within the mandates given to it thus far. A recurrent message from Mission leadership and experts consulted was not to impede UNMISS with overly prescriptive mandate language. Particularly at a potentially volatile period with uncertainty over the election process, allowing the Mission space to move resources where they are most needed will be very important.