Varsel om opprustning
Urovekkende nye missilforsvarsplaner fra USA, skriver Henrik Hiim i en kronikk i Klassekampen.
Å gjøre ingenting er uansvarlig
Regjeringen la i høst frem et forslag til ny lov for Etterretningstjenesten ut på høring. Det viktigste i lovforslaget er det som tidligere har vært omtalt som et «digitalt grenseforsvar», men som i lovforslaget har fått den langt mer presise beskrivelsen «tilrettelagt tilgang til grenseoverskridende elektronisk kommunikasjon». Det handler kort fortalt om at Etterretningstjenesten skal få større tilgang til det digitale rom. Primært vil dette handle om å gjøre forhåndsgodkjente søk i datatrafikken som krysser landets grenser – for å kunne fange opp avanserte dataangrep eller terrorplanlegging. Nupi har nylig sendt inn en høringsuttalelse basert på vår forskning på cybersikkerhet og internasjonal sikkerhetspolitikk.
Frukostseminar: Kan blokkjeder redde journalistikken?
Journalistikken er under press verda over. Walid Al-Saqaf meiner at den underliggjande teknologien til Bitcoin kan vere ei løysing på problemet.
Podkast: Kva kan skje dersom vi gir kinesiske tech-gigantar inngang til Europa?
Kinesiske tech-gigantar vinn stadig terreng i Europa. Er vi klare for alt det innber?
Plugging the capability-expectations gap: towards effective, comprehensive and conflict-sensitive EU crisis response?
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the European Union (EU) has spent considerable time and energy on defining and refining its comprehensive approach to external conflicts. The knock-on effects of new and protracted crises, from the war in Ukraine to the multi-faceted armed conflicts in the Sahel and the wider Middle East, have made the improvement of external crisis-response capacities a top priority. But has the EU managed to plug the capability–expectations gap, and develop an effective, comprehensive and conflict sensitive crisis-response capability? Drawing on institutional theory and an approach developed by March and Olsen, this article analyses whether the EU has the administrative capacities needed in order to be an effective actor in this area and implement a policy in line with the established goals and objectives identified in its comprehensive approach.
Varsel om opprustning
Urovekkende nye missilforsvarsplaner fra USA, skriver Henrik Hiim i kronikk.
Digitalt grenseforsvar: Å gjøre ingenting er uansvarlig
Norge kan i verste fall bli et svakt ledd i Vesten, skriver NUPI-forsker Karsten Friis i DN-kronikk.
EU-NATO inter-organizational relations in counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa
The track record of military rapid response mechanisms, troops on standby, ready to be deployed to a crisis within a short time frame by intergovernmental organizations, remains disappointing. Yet, many of the obstacles to multinational actors launching a rapid and effective military response in times of crisis are largely similar. This book is the first comprehensive and comparative contribution to explore and identify the key factors that hamper and enable the development and deployment of multinational rapid response mechanisms. Examining lessons from deployments by the AU, the EU, NATO, and the UN in the Central African Republic, Mali, Somalia and counter-piracy in the Horn of Africa, the contributors focus upon the following questions: Was there a rapid response to the crises? By whom? If not, what were the major obstacles to rapid response? Did inter-organizational competition hinder responsiveness? Or did cooperation facilitate responsiveness? Bringing together leading scholars working in this area offers a unique opportunity to analyze and develop lessons for policy-makers and for theorists of inter-organizational relations. This work will be of interest to scholars and students of peacebuilding, peacekeeping, legitimacy and international relations.
Desinformasjon virker
Omfanget av desinformasjon er større enn mange tror. Spørsmålet er hvordan vi kan beskytte oss, skriver Ulf Sverdrup.
Military Offensive Cyber-Capabilities: Small-State Perspectives
This Policy Brief provides an overview of the military cyber-defence strategies and capabilities of Norway and of the Netherlands. Comparison of the two different approaches offers insights into their differing tactics and future policy directions. The Brief contributes with a small-state perspective on this malleable and constantly changing field, nuancing the hitherto US-centred debate on the utility and need for deterrence and defence in cyberspace.