Den arktiske fremtiden
Den globale og raskt voksende interessen for Arktis stiller nye krav til sikkerhetspolitikken.
Ties that Bind: The Emerging Regional Security Complex in the Arctic
The security situation in the Arctic has begun to produce a 'regional security complex' (RSC) based on shared regional strategic concerns. However, the geography and politics of the region will prevent this RSC from taking on a military aspect in the near future.
Strategic cooperation against terrorism 2.0? Russia's initial positions on Syria. 1:2
This project examines the prospects for Russia-Western practical cooperation against the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and, more broadly, for a rapprochement between Russia, NATO and key NATO member states post-Crimea. The analytical point of departure is two-fold: Firstly, the project will examine how Russia’s longstanding rejection of a ‘Western’ world-order, along with various Western leaders’ increasing depiction of Russia as an ‘adversary’, shape the two parties’ room for manoeuvre with respect to practical collaboration on the ground in Syria. Secondly, and operationalizing ‘the West’ as two key ‘Atlanticist’ member states in NATO, the United States and Britain, it will examine how Russian and Western domestic debates constrain governments and political leaders’ scope for action, and their ability to adjust their commenced policy paths in Syria. When adversarial statements about ‘the other’ are voiced by state leaders in an international setting, they are often portrayed in the media as being reflective of that particular leader or government’s position alone. In this project, we suggest that the dynamics of Russia-Western relations cannot be properly understood without alsoconsidering how states’ security policies are empowered and limited by domestic security policy debates. The project will provide an up-to-date, in-depth analysis of how contemporary Russian, American and British security policies are being constituted and constrained by domestic debates. Furthermore, it will trace how domestically negotiated security policies materialize in actions on the ground in Syria. Against the backdrop of the empirical analysis, publications from this project will discuss the likelihood of these states finding common ground against IS in Syria, and the prospects for Russia-Western rapprochement more generally.
Lite fagmilitær nytenking
NUPI-forsker Ståle Ulriksen gir innspill til Forsvarssjefens fagmilitære råd i to nye publikasjoner.
Strategic cooperation against terrorism 2.0? Collaborating with adversaries. 2:2
In October 2016, international media reported that the Russia– US diplomatic dialogue over Syria had collapsed, with both sides holding the other party to blame. While the US State Department observed that ‘everybody’s patience with Russia has run out’, Russia’s Foreign Minister criticized the United States for using ‘a language of sanctions and ultimatums while continuing selective cooperation with our country’ (CNN 2016). The breakdown and the statements that ensued marked the endpoint of a turbulent diplomatic year, which had begun with a brief handshake between presidents Obama and Putin at the UN General Assembly late in September 2015. In the months following that handshake, Russia and the US-led coalition participated in talks and activities aimed at finding a negotiated solution to the civil war in Syria as well as to defeat international terrorism there.
Norsk forsvarspolitikk. Territorialforsvar og internasjonal innsats 1990-2015
Norsk forsvarspolitikk har gjennomgått store omstillinger siden den kalde krigens slutt, spesielt i perioden 1990–2005. Regjering og Storting sendte stadig flere soldater til fredsbevarende og fredsopprettende operasjoner i utlandet, mens Forsvaret selv fremdeles hadde forsvar av landet som sitt primære fokus. Forfatter Græger viser hvordan kald krig-tenkningen og etablerte praksiser i forsvaret og forsvarsmiljøer lenge bremset en politisk ønsket omstilling fra invasjonsforsvar til innsatsforsvar tilpasset internasjonale operasjoner. Boken viser hvordan norsk utenriks-, sikkerhets- og forsvarspolitikk er tett sammenvevet, og stadig utfordres av endringer i trusselbildet og i NATO, men løfter også fram de nasjonale forutsetningene for handling. Forfatteren har analysert debatter både på Stortinget og innen Forsvaret, og kombinerer dette med studier av hvordan forsvarspolitikken utformes i praksis – blant annet gjennom langtidsplanlegging, militær utdanning og profesjonsutvikling. Boken tilfører ny kunnskap om forhold av vesentlig betydning for norsk forsvars- og sikkerhetspolitikk.
Makt og avmakt i cyberspace: hvordan styre det digitale rom?
Et sikkert cyberspace er nødvendig for en fungerende samfunnsstruktur, økonomisk, politisk og sosialt. Med samfunnets økende avhengighet av cyberspace for å kunne fungere normalt, har sikringen av cyberspace blitt stadig viktigere. For å løse sikkerhetsutfordringene knyttet til utviklingen av cyberspace har stater søkt støtte fra private aktører gjennom såkalte multistakeholder-initiativer. Med slike initiativer mener man en åpen form for samarbeid mellom interessenter, basert på en idé om likeverdige partnere. Stater iverksetter slike initiativer ut fra en tanke om at et samarbeid mellom private og offentlige aktører gir den beste formen for styring og sikring av aktiviteter i cyberspace. Implementeringen foregår imidlertid uten at de nødvendige forutsetningene for at en slik styringsform skal fungere er til stede. Selv om mange i dagens akademiske debatt stiller spørsmål ved om disse initiativene fungerer, er det få som har stilt spørsmål ved hvordan cybersikkerhet kan utøves i praksis. Dette fører til at man overser det sentrale spørsmålet om hvordan maktdynamikken mellom offentlig og privat sektor fungerer med henblikk på sikkerhet i cyberspace. Denne artikkelen diskuterer hvorvidt multistakeholder-initiativene faktisk fungerer som en kontroll- og styringsmekanisme i cyberspace. Ved å se nærmere på offentlig-privat samarbeid om cybersikkerhet i Norge er hensikten å gi en bedre forståelse av årsakene til at multistakeholder-initiativer ofte ikke fungerer i praksis.
I kjølvannet av krisen
Etter Ukraina-krisen har EUs oppførsel overfor Russland endret seg, viser resultater fra NUPI-forskningsprosjekt.
Limits and possibilities for Russia-Western security collaboration in Syria (Russia-West in Syria)
This project examines the prospects for Russia-Western practical cooperation against the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and, more broadly, for a rapprochement between Russia, NATO and key NATO member sta...
Private Force and the Making of States, c. 1100-1500
This chapter shows how the distinction between the public and the private emerges with respect to the use of force in conjunction with the long rise of the state in Europe. In drawing a historical conceptual analysis of the changing organization of military power in the making of states, I show why we need to take an empirical rather than an ideological approach to the distinction between different types of force, as only then can we hope to understand why and for what purposed power was organized in specific ways, and the consequences of that organization. The chapter takes as its starting point the late eleventh century, a period when public authorities had been decimated throughout Christendom and where kings no longer held the aura of public authority, but were (private) contestants for public authority on equal footing with their competitors. Both public and private force was private, so to speak. I proceed in five sections. The first addresses the relationship between war-making and state-making, a relationship which is central to much of the literature on state formation and to our further discussion. The next three sections address the chronology of changes in the organization of force, and move from warfare as a knightly (largely) private enterprise to the wars of mercenaries, culminating in the early attempts at holding standing permanent armies around the late fifteenth century. The claim is not that this process was linear or inevitable, and, as demonstrated in the last section, the centralization of the legitimate means of warfare in the hands of public authorities did not mean the end of private enterprise in a world of states. Rather, private enterprise continued alongside public force, albeit in a different character.