Teoriseminar: Applying Old Rules to New Cases: International Law in the Cyber Domain
Cyberangrep og hacking skaper nye utfordringar for internasjonal politikk. Fastlagde og etablerte normer og mekanismar må oppdaterast og kontekstualiserast. NUPI har gleda av å invitere til seminar med Mark Raymond, som vil snakke om utforming av internasjonal politikk på cyber-domenet.
Stable nuclear zero : the vision and its implications for disarmament policy
This volume examines the conditions necessary for a stable nuclear-weapons-free world and the implications for nuclear disarmament policy. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a road map to nuclear zero, but it is a rudimentary one and it says nothing about the kind of zero to aim for. Preferably, this would be a world where the inhibitions against reversal are strong enough to make it stably non-nuclear. What then are the requirements of stable zero? The literature on nuclear disarmament has paid little attention to this question. By and large, the focus has been on the next steps, and discussions tend to stop where the NPT stops: with the elimination of the weapons. This book seeks to fill a lacuna by examining the requirements of stable zero and their implications for the road map to that goal, starting from the vision to the present day. The volume highlights that a clear conception of the goal not only is important in itself, but can shed light on what kind of disarmament process to promote. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, global governance, security studies and IR.
Trusselen fra cyberspace
Cyberangrep øker i omfang verden over. Norge er et av verdens mest digitaliserte land og dermed spesielt utsatt, men dette blir i stor grad oversett av politikere og næringslivsledere.
ARRANGEMENTET ER UTSETT: Gratispassasjerar, svake ledd og giftige medlemmer: Kvifor English Defence League feila
Kva kan forklare den raske framveksten og det bratte fallet til English Defence League?
Et skifte i verdensordenen
Russland har gitt opp samarbeidet med USA i Syria. Nå er det duket for en ikke-vestlig storkoalisjon, ifølge Julie Wilhelmsens Klassekampen-kronikk.
Lausriving frå valdeleg ekstremisme: kjensler og desillusjon
Konsortiet for forsking om terrorisme og internasjonal kriminalitet arrangerer seminar med Peter Simi, University of Nebraska in Omaha.
Legitimering gjennom (selektiv) felles fortid: russisk bruk av historie i Ukraina-konflikten
How has Russia used history to justify its actions in the conflict in Ukraine? Through an analysis of official statements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as speeches and remarks by Putin, this article argues that history has played an important but varying role in official rhetoric. With Crimea, the emphasis was on the ‘sanctity’ of the territory for Russian Orthodox identity, drawing on history dating back to the baptism of Prince Vladimir in 10th century AC. The shared past of the two states has not been as central in official Russian policy justification regarding Ukraine outside Crimea: the ‘brotherhood’ of the two nations has been noted repeatedly, but usually secondary to arguments pertaining to economic and political interests. The two world wars have been used as a cautionary tale, with Russia effectively seeking to delegitimize the new Ukrainian government by evoking carefully selected elements of its past. Finally, the author looks at the use of international precedence as a form of justification, turning the history of Western – US in particular – actions back on Russia’s critics. The official usage of history is placed within broader strategies of legitimation, as it is not enough to study propaganda and manipulation strategies as part of information warfare to explain how the Kremlin achieves support for its policies. The ‘thick’ historical narratives of Crimea play on elements linked to issues of national identity, making it difficult to dispute using the type of counter-propaganda and rebuttal of disinformation proposed by some.
A Pivot to What? Asia-Pacific Foreign Policy under Trump
Despite the difficulty in making predictions about an incoming American administration even before the inaugural process has been completed, the first two months since the US elections in November 2016 have already generated a great deal of debate and concern, about uncharted new directions in US foreign policy under president elect Donald Trump. Certainly the new president faces a host of international challenges,including Middle East security and chaotic relations with Russia, but arguably the most critical tests for the incoming government will be found in the Asia-Pacific region. As within other areas of foreign policy, Trump as a candidate oscillated,at times wildly, between interventionism and isolationism in his approach to Pacific Rim affairs, and as the year came to a close there was much watching and waiting in policy circles to see which of these would dominate. In addition, Trump assumes the presidency with the dubious distinction of possessing the lowest amount of foreign policy background in the history of American politics, so there is also the question of his administration’s ‘learning’ curve in crucial areas including the Asia-Pacific, with China relations at the forefront.
How to Deal with North Korea: Lessons from the Iran Agreement
The current and oft repeated pattern of responses to North Korean nuclear and missile provocations has failed to produce results. With the stakes becoming increasingly high it is time that a new approach is explored. The success to date of the deal to cap Iran’s nuclear program offers clues to a different approach with North Korea. North Korea’s position now is stronger than ever before it has more bargaining chips. Conversely the threats posed by North Korea have never been greater. A negotiated settlement is the only acceptable outcome. The key will be to have a broad enough agenda for negotiations to ensure all parties see benefit: addressing the nuclear and missile issues, economic issues (removal of sanctions) and security issues (a Korean peace treaty to replace the armistice). The alternatives to negotiations are war or another nuclear weapon state with a de facto nuclear deterrent capability. Neither prospect will make any nation in the region more secure.