The EU and the governance of the Maritime Global Space

This article investigates the extent to which the European Union (EU) contributes to the governance of Global Spaces by exploring its policies towards the maritime domain. In a more competitive and uncertain geopolitical setting, are the EU’s policies changing and becoming more strategic? Or does the EU continue to promote multilateral cooperation and regulation of the maritime Global Space, and if so, what type of governance regimes does it promote? Developing and applying three analytical models of Global Space policies, the article finds that the EU has been consistent in its approach, which reflects a combination of its strong interest in free navigation and an attempt to achieve sustainable growth through climate regulation. Despite more geopolitical conflict in these areas and in international relations more broadly, the EU’s approach to the maritime Global Space is to promote international governance regimes.

EUs respons på krigen i Ukraina

A more strategic European Union in a more contested space

Space is becoming an increasingly important domain for societies and politics alike, also from a geopolitical and hence security and defence perspective. The EU is a key actor in space, but its approach to space is changing in a more uncertain and contested geopolitical environment. While still focused largely on the civilian aspects of space, the EU has developed a more strategic approach towards space, increasingly using the domain also for security and defence, including military, purposes. As the EU develops quickly in a more challenging and uncertain environment, Norway needs to understand EU developments and their implications at an early stage, and work to secure participation where interests align.

Collective defence in Europe: What place for the EU?

Collective defence is the cornerstone of Europe’s security architecture, anchored in NATO’s Article 5 stating that an attack against one ally is an attack against all. With the deteriorating security environment in Europe, questions have been asked about whether, and if so how, the EU’s clause on mutual defence – article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union – could be operationalized and perhaps be a supplement to NATO’s article 5 as a guarantor of collective defence in Europe. The debate is driven by perceived limits in NATO’s ability to deal with hybrid threats, the broader implications of Russia’s war on Ukraine, and the necessity for European states to take more responsibility for their security. For EU member states to succeed with its collective defence obligations within the union, political will, legal interoperability with NATO and capability development should be addressed further.

Adapting to turbulent waters: EU maritime security and implications for Norway

Maritime security has become a top priority for the EU, as evident in its Strategic Compass for security and defence (2022) where it was identified as a strategic domain. The intensification of geopolitical tensions has further extended strategic competition to the seas. At the same time, a proliferation of threats has emerged at sea, including the security of migration routes, human rights at sea, implications of climate change and global warming, and the pressing challenges posed by organised crime and marine terrorism. The attacks on the Nord Stream pipelines have heightened the urgency for safeguarding critical infrastructure at sea, for surveillance, and coastal and offshore patrolling. Governance of the high seas invites further challenges. They are considered part of the Global Commons that, as with outer space, the atmosphere and the poles, are largely beyond the jurisdiction of nation states. Against the backdrop of escalating tensions and decline in international cooperation, enhancing the EU’s maritime presence has been recognised not only as a paramount security imperative, but also as an economic interest of the Member States: The EU has the largest maritime territory in the world (counting exclusive economic zones), is home to 329 key seaports and most goods to and from Europe travel via the sea (90% of trade exports). In addition, up to 99% of global dataflows travel via subsea cables, and the EU’s energy dependence on oil and gas, which largely travels to the EU via the sea, remains high. Maritime security is thus among the fastest-growing EU policy areas. In addition to the threats listed above, Russia and China's increasing assertiveness at sea has intensified longer term processes towards an increasingly robust and multifaceted EU maritime foreign and security policy.

How the UK’s post-Brexit foreign policy came home

After leaving the EU, the UK needed to rethink its place in the world. Kristin Haugevik and Øyvind Svendsen examine the aspirations and meanings underpinning the “Global Britain” narrative and argue that its scope and ambitions have changed significantly in the years following the Brexit referendum.

Command and Control in Northern Europe: Challenges and Potential Solutions

Command and control (C2) is a fundamental requirement for military action. Despite the regional tensions currently faced in Northern Europe, however, deficiencies remain in NATO’s current system. As such, this policy brief examines NATO’s ability to perform C2 amid the region’s evolving security landscape, and how this might be strengthened going forward. The brief concludes that the newly established Joint Forces Command (JFC) Norfolk should assume responsibility for Allied C2 in regional crisis management and conflict. •NATO enlargement, coupled with technological and political changes – including the rise of China and Russian aggression in Ukraine and other parts of Europe – has placed new demands on Allied C2 arrangements. •More specifically, the entry of Finland and (soon) Sweden into NATO has spurred debate over the future C2 architecture for NATO forces in the Nordic–Baltic region. •Following the end of the Cold War, NATO chose to abolish its existing C2 architecture, which was designed to counter the Soviet threat in Europe and the North Atlantic, and instead focus on out-of-area operations. •Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, and especially its invasion of Ukraine in 2014, have led to changes in NATO’s military organisation, notably the establishment of a new JFC in Norfolk, Virginia.