Russlandskonferansen 2019: The Return of Russia – identitet og russisk utanrikspolitikk
I løpet av Putins år ved makta, har Russland gjort eit comeback som europeisk stormakt med globale ambisjonar. Kva er Kremls langtidsmål for utanrikspolitikken? Korleis påverkar det russiske sjølvbiletet denne politikken? Og kva implikasjonar kan dette ha for Russlands naboar – Noreg inkludert?
Russland og det ytre høyre
Båndene mellom Russland og ytre høyre i Europa er mer kompliserte enn man kan få inntrykk av i vestlig media, skriver Minda Holm i Dagsavisen-kronikk.
Russian Public Opinion and the Confrontation with the West
What do most Russians think about President Putin, the policies of the Kremlin and the West? Is Russia on the right track? How do Russians view the future? President Vladimir Putin has, since he was elected in 2000, scored high in public opinion polls. After the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 the polls reached new heights with support from nearly 90 % of the population. However, after the announcement of a comprehensive pension reform in summer 2018, the support decreased. In this working paper, Lev Gudkov provides an overview of how the Russians see the West, Ukraine and the politics of the Kremlin, and how the public opinion on these issues have changed over time. The working paper is based on the regular public opinion polls carried out by the Levada Centre since 2003.
Generasjon Putin: Kva er viktig for dei?
Meiningsmålingar viser at russisk ungdom skil seg frå foreldra sine når det gjeld verdiar og meiningar. Kva påverknad kan dette ha på dei politiske deltakinga og preferansane til denne generasjonen?
Russland og det ytre høyre
Båndene mellom Russland og ytre høyre i Europa er mer kompliserte enn man kan få inntrykk av i vestlig media, skriver Minda Holm i denne kronikken.
Putin's Power Revisited: How identity positions and great power interaction condition strategic cooperation in Syria
This article investigates how Russian foreign policies are shaped in a two-level interactive social game. Russian foreign policies take their cue from ingrained identity positions articulated by the state leadership and negotiated in domestic debates, but they are also informed by interaction with other states. The article explains the shift in Russian policies away from pragmatic cooperation with the West in Syria from autumn 2015 onwards. While the Russian leadership initially sought such cooperation, the prominence of anti-Western discourse in Russia following the crisis in Ukraine as well as the West's rejection of Russia in this period spurred Russia to act independently in Syria.
Framtida til Russlands våpeneksport
Kan russisk våpeneksport halde fram med å auke Russlands innverknad i verda?
Report on significant distortions in the economy of the Russian Federation for the purpose of trade defence investigations (EU-Russia trade)
Dette prosjektet vil lede ut i en omfattende studie av russisk økonomi, med fokus på regulering, lover, subsidier eller andre forhold som kan påvirke konkurransen i markedene....
Etterforskinga av Russland og Georgia etter krigen i 2008
Kva er konsekvensane av Den etterforskinga til internasjonale straffedomstolen av Russland og Georgia?
Mutual Lack of Introspection and the ‘Russia Factor’ in the Liberal West
Minda Holm makes three claims in this article: one about the representation of Russia as an external enemy and the reflex to blame Russia for unwanted domestic developments; one about the liberal Western Self’s continuous violation of the principles it judges others by; and one about the seemingly deliberate lack of critical introspection amongst Russian and Western elites. The Western Self is largely viewed as liberal by default, irrespective of the extensive illiberal actions – seen in, for example, the post-9/11 era. Whereas politics is messy and full of contradictions, Western liberal morality is often presented as somehow standing monolithically above those contradictory actions: despite torture, a secret extraordinary rendition and detention program and wide-ranging breaches of international law, the US Self under Bush Jr. remained decidedly ‘good’. Whilst the Self’s identity as liberal persists despite violating those liberal principles, states such as Russia are stigmatized for the same types of violations. That this creates frustration with those defined as standing on the outside or, better, denied access to the true inside, should not come as a surprise. But, Russia’s continuous denialism and whataboutism, and the role of academics in this negative cycle, doesn’t bode well for the future of Russia-West relations.