Norges debatt om kinesiske investeringer: Fra velvillig til varsom
The debate in Norway regarding security concerns related to Chinese investments has seen a notable change in character over a short period of time. From a situation where there was little discernible debate at all, and where negative coverage of Chinese investment flows were mainly concerned with working environment issues, Chinese capital flows to Norway have now also become part of the debate on national security. Two particularities make the case of Norway especially interesting with regards to the broader Nordic debates over the issues discussed in this Fokus section. The Norwegian economy has been particularly well placed to benefit from the extraordinary Chinese economic growth, but Norway has also been in a particularly problematic political position towards China over the last decade. The contrast between these two factors has been a structuring trait of the Norwegian China debate. Nevertheless, the Norwegian public debate on China has been relatively positive over a long period of time. This has been given impetus by the positive experiences reported from the Norwegian enterprises that have been the target of Chinese acquisitions. However, lately, the public debate has increasingly come to regard the issue also through a political and security-related lens. This changing character is not due to specific events concerning Chinese activities in Norway, as much as being a reflection of broader regional and global trends. The question of Huawei’s role in the coming construction of the 5G network has been a particularly important driver in this regard, as well as conductive link to the international change in opinion.
Covid-19, global handel og medisinsk beredskap
During the second quarter of 2020, Covid-19 led to the second largest setback for world trade after the second world war. But the value of trade soon recovered, to a normal level at the end of the year. The pandemic hit sectors unevenly, with a strong decline for oil, industrial and investment goods, while trade in food and drugs was maintained and trade with protective and medical equipment exploded. Via the oil price, Covid-19 hit Norwegian exports harder than imports, and erased the trade surplus. During the 2020 crisis, China delivered the increase for protective medical equipment while Western Europe delivered the drugs. Western Europe has 3/4 of world exports of drugs, and for Norway, trade with Europe is an important aspect of preparedness. During the 2020 crisis, Norway benefited from European cooperation through open borders for trade; common approval of medicines; and access to vaccines. Several countries introduced export restrictions for medical goods; India also for drugs, with resulting supply problems in Norway for some items. Global vaccine distribution will be a new test for world trade, and Norway contributes financially. Globalisation of the value chains for off-patent drugs (generics) has in recent year led to frequent supply shortages, independently from the Covid-19 crisis.
Strengthening Fragile States through Taxation (FRAGTAX)
How is the political authority to tax established, exercised and maintained over time? State-building requires predictable income. Without a domestic revenue base, even core activities states are expe...
Scandinavia as an arena for Chinese economic statecraft
China's utilisation of economic statecraft as a foreign policy tool challenges the accustomed distinction between Norwegian business policies, and Norwegian security policy. This opens for a nove...
Understanding and Strenthening EU Foreign & Security Policy in a Complex and Contested World (JOINT)
The JOINT project analyses these dynamics while addressing the question of how the EU and its member states can make their foreign and security policy structures more joined-up and sustainable....
A new European security and defence architecture in the making: What does it look like and what are the implications for Norway? (EURODEFENCE)
This project will study the implications of the new European defence initiatives for Norway particularly, as an allied and closely associated non-member of the EU. Despite the incremental nature of th...
Cyber security, knowledge and practices (CYKNOW)
CYKNOW will promote better understanding of cyber security, as well as develop novel theoretical and methodological tools for cybersecurity research in particular....
Public–Private Development Interfaces in Ethiopia (DEVINT)
Private actors are increasingly operating in the name of development and in partnership with international development actors. This project (DEVINT) will explore the nexus of private actors and public...
The Rankings Game: A Relational Approach to Country Performance Indicators
As the number of international rankings has risen dramatically since the 1990s, a large body of scholarship has emerged to examine and understand them. The aim of this article is to provide an overview of this body of work and to chart out fruitful directions for future research. In short, prior scholarship has been surprisingly quiet on the relations among multiple actors and their economic dimensions at the core of country performance indicator (CPI) activities. To foreground crucial socioeconomic relations, we develop a relational heuristic based upon a sports analogy: the actors involved in the creation and maintenance of CPIs can fruitfully be approached as a complex of players, referees, coaches, and audiences. Such an account helps us better understand how CPIs emerge and are sustained, even when they rely on dodgy data and their effects are perverse. We use nation brand rankings—overlooked in international relations research—as empirical illustration.
Russia's Neighborhood Policy and Its Eurasian Client States: No Autocracy Export
Do authoritarian regimes engage in active export of their political systems? Or are they primarily concerned about their geopolitical interests? This article explores these questions by examining Russia's policy towards Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria. In all three de facto states, Moscow is fully able to dictate election outcomes should it desire to, but, we argue, has increasingly refrained from doing so. These client states are unlikely to attempt to escape from Russia’s tutelage; and with its geopolitical interests fully ensured, Russia appears willing to grant them latitude. We then ask whether these findings can be extrapolated to serve as a template for understanding Russia's policy towards its client states more generally, discussing Moscow's reactions to attempted regime change in Armenia and Belarus.