Brexit and the future of EU defence: a practice approach to differentiated defence integration
What consequences will Brexit have for EU defence integration? Answering this question, the article analyses the new visions for the future of EU defence that emerged in the debate after the Brexit vote. In doing so, the paper moves beyond institutionalism and argues that a practice approach to Brexit paves the way for a deeper understanding of EU integration as a social process and of the effects of Brexit. Through a study of the debates and concrete developments in EU defence since the Brexit referendum, the article shows how defence - an area already subject to differentiation - has enabled innovative visions for defence integration in post-Brexit Europe across three dimensions: the military, the political and the economic. Building on this analysis, the paper concludes on the possible consequences of Brexit for EU defence and the value of a practice approach to differentiated defence integration.
Research prize to NUPI's Henriette Ullavik Erstad
Erstad is awarded the Ording Prize 2018 for her article on Iran's mobilization of Iraqi Shi'a militias.
What does Trump’s Space Force mean for Europe?
The American President wants his own Space Force, and this could contribute to a shift in the dynamics of space that until now has been characterized by cooperation.
Walls and other boundaries to irregular migration: is the US approach that different from the European one?
At this seminar 5 June, we will take a closer look at the policies implemented in areas bordering Europe and ask how this affects the neighboring countries and migration flows.
Why Franco-German leadership on European defense is not in sight
Emmanuel Macron, already as a presidential candidate, bet heavily on Europe and the Franco-German tandem. This choice, which required a certain amount of political capital, resulted in a number of initiatives, many of them outlined in his September 2017 Sorbonne speech. It also resulted in the bilateral Aachen Treaty Macron and Angela Merkel signed in January 2019, intended to renew the 1963 Elysée Treaty. But the pomp surrounding the signing ceremony in Aachen barely hides the fact that things are not going too well in Franco-German relations. Frustration with Berlin has reached new peaks in Paris, not least due to Germany’s failure to provide an “answer” to Macron’s vision for Europe. When the Christian Democrats’ new president, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, wrote a debate article in March 2019, this was widely considered too little too late – in addition to the protocol faux pas of a party president without any government position responding to a head of state. It seems clear that Germany is not willing to embark on a great journey toward “refounding Europe” together with Macron’s France, although Paris and Berlin of course do cooperate on many issues.
Sunnism, Salafism, Sheikism: Urban Pathways of Resistance in Sidon, Lebanon
This brief analyses Salafism as an urban phenomenon, with an emphasis on the contentious period following the Syrian uprising turned civil war (2011–present). To understand Salafism’s popular appeal, it is necessary to examine the pathways of resistance in specific urban contexts. In Lebanon, Salafism expanded from its Tripoli centre to secondary towns and cities such as Sidon, where Sheikh Ahmad Assir’s neo-Salafism became a political force and can be classified as a “new social movement”. Neo-Salafism, is not built on religious credentials and authority, but combines populism with sectarianism. This also accounts for its popular appeal, especially after 2011, when the Syrian conflict stoked Sunni-Shia tensions and anti-Hizbollah rhetoric. The erosion of Sunni political pre-eminence (“Sunnism”) and the crises in the Sunni religious (Dar al-Fatwa) and political establishment (Future Movement), prompted a temporary shift from “Harirism” to “Sheikism” that transferred the moral leadership of the Sunni community from the political elite to the lay town preacher; Sheikh Ahmad al-Assir. This also involved a shift in the locus of contentious politics from the capital Beirut to secondary cities such as Sidon and a strategic shift from electoral politics to grassroots’ protests, sit-ins and rallies. Ultimately this led to an armed confrontation that crushed the Assir-movement, eroded its popular support and was followed by an electoral defeat that made political elites reassert control. HYRES – Hybrid Pathways to Resistance in the Islamic World HYRES studies the interaction between Islamist movements and the state in the cases of Iraq, Lebanon, Libya and Mali, and is designed to answer the following question: Why do some Islamist groups pursue their political and religious project within the state to which they belong – while other Islamist groups refuse to accept these borders, seeking instead to establish new polities, such as restoring the Islamic Caliphate?
To engage or not engage? Libyan Salafis and state institutions
At the beginning of the recent escalation of hostilities in Libya in April 2019, one of the key questions posed was what role, if any, quietist Salafis would play. Followers of this trend have grown significantly in influence in recent years, including in the security sphere and government institutions. As a result, their decisions, especially those regarding military engagement, have the potential to have important consequences at the national level. The fact that these “quietist” Salafis in Libya are armed already poses interesting ideological questions. Moreover, the fact that their behaviour during the recent fighting in Tripoliihas been somewhat unpredictable indicates that their ideology of obedience to the sitting ruler requires further interrogation.This research brief looks at the way in which the quietist Salafis have evolved to gain such a strong position in Libya, assessing their behaviour in four distinct periods. It contrasts this behaviour with other Salafi trends in Libya, particularly the political Salafism associated with certain former leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). It argues that Libyan Salafis have adapted and renegotiated ideologies in the changing political context after 2011. More than pure ideology, the way in which they have responded to the constraints and opportunities created by this context has been the key factor in the evolution of the different groups and ultimately their fortunes.
NATO – an alliance for the future?
NATO is currently facing new and major challenges in today’s security environment. How well is the alliance prepared and equipped to meet these challenges?
Should I stay or should I go? Security considerations for members leaving al-Shabaab in Somalia
The Somali jihadi organization al-Shabaab, yet again featured in the news internationally when they attacked a business and hotel complex in Nairobi 15 January this year. This is not the first time the group carries out largescale attacks outside the Somali boarders. Other examples are the Garissa University College attack in 2015, the mass shooting at Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi in 2013 and the Kampala attacks in 2010. However, the majority of the atrocities committed by al-Shabaab take place in South Central Somalia. The Global Terrorism Index 2018 ranked Somalia as number 6 on its list of countries most impacted by terrorism in 2017.1 Al-Shabaab was behind the deadliest terrorist attack in 2017 worldwide, when a suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden truck, killing 587 people in Mogadishu. Although al-Shabaab has had several military setbacks the last few years, the group still poses a significant threat to security and stability in the region. As the name al-Shabaab (‘the youth’) indicates, young people predominate in the group. This means that thousands of individuals spend parts of their youth in al- Shabaab. The question then arises: how to best assist the ones who want to leave the group?
Lunch seminar: Peace, war and alliances in cyberspace
What are cyberspace operations? In what ways is conflict in this “domain” different from conflict in physical domain? And how do cyberspace operations relate to information warfare, what are the similarities and differences?