Local Drivers of Violent Extremism in Central Mali
This policy brief examines the processes of violent extremist mobilisation and radicalisation in Mopti, Central Mali. Specifically, it looks at the strategies employed by one of the most salient radical jihadist groups in the region, the Katiba Macina. It seeks to answer the following questions: 1) Given that violent extremist mobilisation has not taken root uniformly across regions in Mali, and because it is often endogenous to local dynamics, how has Mopti as a region become an enabling environment for jihadist actors like the Katiba Macina? 2) How do groups like the Katiba Macina mobilise local support and integrate themselves among communities? 3) Why do individuals join, adhere to or accept the Katiba Macina?
Theory Seminar: A Ritual Approach to Deterrence – NATO and its Eastern Flank
In this theory seminar, Maria Mälksoo examines “the fourth wave” of deterrence studies.
The U.S. National Cyber Strategy and 5G
What are the challenges and priorities in the American cyberspace?
Cybersikkerhet
(In Norwegian only) Den teknologiske utviklingen og framveksten av digitale nettverk har ført til noen av de mest dramatiske endringene vi har sett på flere generasjoner. Dette gjelder både endringer i sosial samhandling, men også endringer i den mer generelle samfunnsmessige utviklingen. Disse framskrittene har også hatt viktige implikasjoner for sikkerhetspolitikk, internasjonal politikk og forhold mellom stormakter. I fokusspalten i dette nummeret av Internasjonal Politikk har vi invitert samfunnsvitere til å belyse hvordan cybersikkerhet bidrar til å endre forhold mellom stater og internasjonale organisasjoner samt internasjonal politikk.
Rethinking differentiated integration
Several NUPI researchers contributed to the debate about differentiated integration in the area of security and defence at the annual conference of the European International Studies Association (EISA) in Sofia, Bulgaria last week.
Critical communication infrastructures and Huawei
Recently, there have been growing cyber-safety concerns over telecom equipment made by the Chinese vendor Huawei. This has led many countries to ban Huawei from supplying equipment for building the next generation of mobile networks, 5G. Responses from mobile operators and the telecom community in general have been mixed. For instance, many European mobile operators have stated that these concerns are overblown and that such a ban would delay 5G rollout by two to three years in the best case. Moreover, some operators have directly questioned the ability of the other vendors to timely deliver a complete 5G network. However, these claims have mostly not been grounded in empirical data. This paper takes a multi-perspective approach to investigating this problem empirically. We start by categorizing responses from different countries to using Huawei equipment in 5G. We then analyze the importance and readiness of Huawei for supplying 5G equipment. This analysis is based on contributions to standards and patents. We also present a conceptual risk analysis framework to qualitatively evaluate the ability of a single vendor to cause considerable damage to critical communication infrastructures. This model aims at exploring a set of relevant axis. More specifically, we look at potential for harm in different political climates that is peace, crisis and war. Another axis is whether banning a particular vendor from supplying equipment for the upcoming mobile networks generation is useful without having a backward compatible ban. A third axis is the ability of a vendor to cause harm as a function of the type of supplied equipment, for example radio towers vs network management systems. Combining the analysis of readiness for supplying 5G and potential for causing harm allows us to roughly estimate the likely impact that a complete ban would have on 5G rollout in different parts of the world. We find that such a ban can possibly delay 5G by two years or more for operators with high dependence on Huawei. Consequently, we explore potential approaches that would both reduce vendor-related risk and do not significantly delay the rollout of 5G. These include heterogeneous multi-vendor deployments, equipment verification and testing, international collaboration as well as signing non-aggression treaties. Unfortunately, there is no technological solution that fully remedy this problem. Combining technical solutions with efforts to build trust between countries, enforce existing alignments or create new ones seems a promising way forward.
What global role for the EU after Brexit?
When the UK eventually leaves the EU, the EU's role as an actor in the world will change. In this seminar, Professor Mike Smith from the University of Warwick will present his work on the the interplay between Brexit and the EU’s international roles.
Top marks for NUPI’s EU project
Reviewers find NUPI-led research on the EU’s crisis response "exceptional"!
Theory seminar: States and Nature – The Effects of Climate Change on Security
Joshua Busby, University of Texas-Austin, will present the main argument and empirical work from his draft book manuscript.
Norge må tenke nytt i Persiabukta
(In norwegian only) I stedet for å si ja til å bidra militært i Persiabukta, er det mulig å tenke seg en mye mer proaktiv og klok norsk linje. Sommertid er glemselstid. Verden går tilsynelatende i sine vante spor. Og når vi endelig vender tilbake til kontorpulten, synes beste måte å takle jobbens utfordringer på å gjøre som vi pleier. Det bør ikke gjelde for norsk utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk. For der står vi ved et veiskille, og i løpet av sommeren har det dukket opp en ny prøvestein for Norge.