Navigating High-Profile and Low Availability: Norway and the Emerging US Maritime-Strategic Approach
Summary: Despite a resurgence of Russian naval power, and subsequent increase in US maritime-strategic interest in the Northern Flank and Norway, the grand return of US naval forces to this region is unlikely. Rather, a combination of four separate but interconnected developments form the basis of a new, albeit unarticulated, US maritime-strategic approach to NATO’s Northern Flank. This policy brief looks at these approaches and give the following recommendations: Strengthen the Norwegian defence and naval budgets. Continue and increase European defence integration and cooperation efforts such as Joint Expeditionary Force. European operational planning should reflect the likelihood of limited US naval assistance in the initial phases of a conflict. Work towards European cooperation on maritime out-of-area operations. Explore the potential of replacing Marine Corps presence in Norway with that of the US Army.
Navigating High-Profile and Low Availability: Norway and the Emerging US Maritime-Strategic Approach
The European Maritime Security and Defence Policy Architecture: Implications for Norway
Maritime security is high on the international and European security agenda, hence a number of new initiatives and actions have developed within the EU, NATO and through bilateral/minilateral agreements. To increase the common capabilities of Europe and secure more targeted responses, there is a need for better coordination between different organizations and forums. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept and the EU’s parallel Strategic Compass offer an opportunity to do this. Bilateral and minilateral defence groupings can strengthen European maritime security by accelerating capability development and fostering improved levels of interoperability. Norway should further develop its political dialogue and practical cooperation with the EU, and secure participation in major defence initiatives like the EDF and PESCO, various programmes, and cooperative arrangements with the European Defence Agency (EDA). Norway should pursue further leadership roles within NATO to bolster both its national interests and transatlantic security within the maritime security domain. Norway should actively promote enhanced EUNATO cooperation on maritime security issues, including closer alignment of strategic thinking, policies and investments of the two organisations. Mini-lateral’ structures can allow Norway to join forces with like-minded nations to act rapidly on maritime issues of common importance.
Eskil Jakobsen
Eskil Jakobsen is an Adviser at the NUPI Research Group for Security and Defence. He holds an MA in Political Science from the University of Troms...
Claudia Emilie Aanonsen
Claudia Emilie Aanonsen is a Doctoral Fellow at NUPI and part of the research group on Security and Defence. She was previously a Junior Research...
European defence beyond institutional boundaries: Improved European defence through flexibility, differentiation and coordination
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