Researcher
Eskil Jakobsen
Contactinfo and files
Summary
Eskil Jakobsen is an Adviser at the NUPI Research Group for Security and Defence. He holds an MA in Political Science from the University of Tromsø. His primary research interests include Security and Defence policy, Military Technology, the Arctic and Cybersecurity.
Expertise
Education
2021 Master, Political Science, Department of Social Sciences, UiT The Arctic University of Norway
2019 Bachelor, Political Science, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo
Work Experience
2021- Junior Research Fellow, NUPI
2018-2019 Translator, OsloMet
2015-2017 Trainee, Human Rights Academy
2010-2013 Research assistant, Volda University College
2019-2011 Substitute teacher, Eiksmarka elementary school
Aktivitet
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Clear all filtersGerman-Norwegian Maritime Security Cooperation is strengthened
The Maritime Zeitenwende: Germany in the Northern Waters
In this report the authors study recent developments in German maritime defence policy and practice with a particular view on German-Norwegian relations. These relations are crucial, as the current security landscape challenges old geographical domains, particularly a stark division between operations in the Baltic Sea and North Sea. These areas are now being re-defined in and through military activity and technological advancements to address the security situation – including the increasing importance of protecting critical infrastructure – which will further contribute to policy development in the short and longer term.
The Evolution of US Military Presence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Reassuring Allies, Deterring Russia, and Managing Escalation
Concurrent with increasing Russian revanchism and aggression from 2014, the US approach to military presence on NATO’s Eastern flank has evolved. Overall, the development could be perceived as change in rationale from reassurance of allies to deterrence of Russia by punishment and, in recent years, deterrence by denial. This has resulted in altered structures for presence, resulting in changes of dispositions on the ground that has contributed to increasing the credibility of NATO’s deterrence doctrine. The rhetorical offensiveness of U.S. strategic communication has also become more powerful and exercise activity scaled up. This indicates a change in US perception of escalating activity. There is persistent bipartisan agreement on the continuation of US deep-engagement in Europe, with similar perceptions in the US military-leadership. This underpins the theory of an “institutionalized practice” of military presence and Great Power Persistence. The enhanced credibility of US-NATO deterrence on the Eastern flank lowers the likelihood of fait accompli-scenarios. This has security implications for countries located elsewhere that Russia may wish to challenge, both conventionally and through Hybrid means.
Stuxnet - et paradigmeskifte?
More than a decade after Stuxnet was made publicly known, it remains the most vigorous example of a cyber attack causing both serious kinetic damage and as means to assert political pressure. Based on an analysis of the operation and its aftermath, this chapter argues that Stuxnet represents a paradigm shift. In view of advancements made to develop offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, particularly in the US, Israel and Iran, the shift refers to how states understand and use cyber capabilities during times of conflict. We illustrate how cyber operations can in certain contexts function as a supplement between diplomacy and the use of military means, but also in some cases as a substitute for conventional military force. The article is in Norwegian.
Living up to expectations? German political ambitions and military role in the Baltic Sea and North Atlantic
This project will contribute with knowledge and competence building about Germany’s evolving role as a military actor in the Baltic Sea and North Atlantic...
Heimevernet og forsvaret av Norge: Skjerpet trusselbilde, uforløst potensial
I forsvaret av Norge er Heimevernet (HV) en vital del av grunnmuren. Styrken er Forsvarets største, geografisk mest spredte, og har samtidig ansvaret for det bredeste spekteret av oppgaver – i fred, krise og væpnet konflikt. HV leverer mye effekt – og har et uutnyttet potensial til å levere enda mer – for en relativt sett billig penge. Likevel har styrkens andel av Forsvarssektorens samlede driftsbudsjett falt, fra 3,8 % i 2015, til 3,1 % i budsjettet for 2024 – en mulig indikasjon på at styrken ikke er høyt prioritert når det norske forsvarsbudsjettet økes. Dette forskningsnotatet gir en kort beskrivelse HVs ansvar og oppgaver, og peker på utviklingstrekk som vil kunne påvirke disse i nær fremtid. Notatet illustrerer gapet mellom oppgavene, de vedtatte ambisjonene om videreutvikling, og ressursene som blir stilt til rådighet. I forlengelsen av dette svekkes hele samfunnets motstandsdyktighet i en tid hvor usikkerheten er større enn på lenge. Rapporten peker på fire konkrete tiltak som ved hjelp av en relativt moderat budsjettøkning vil kunne utnytte det latente utviklingspotensialet i HV-strukturen og gi betydelig og umiddelbar effekt på Forsvarets samlede evne til å levere beredskap og sikkerhet overalt, alltid – i fred, krise og i krig.
Czech and Norwegian Perspectives on New Security Threats in relation to Russian War on Ukraine (CZECHNORSEC)
This project will examine how the war in Ukraine is about to change security perceptions in the Czech Republic and Norway....
Germany’s Zeitenwende in foreign and security policy: Domestic developments and alliance dynamics after one year
Days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, German Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a Zeitenwende, a historical turning point to which Germany would respond by reforming its foreign and security policies. In a speech in the Federal Parliament (Bundestag) on 27 February 2022, Chancellor Scholz listed five points for the reform agenda: supporting Ukraine (also militarily), sanctioning Russia, increased German contribution to NATO’s eastern flank, investment in more capable armed forces, and decoupling from Russian energy. The third point included a €100 billion special investment fund, so-called Sondervermögen, that would be used to boost Germany’s military capabilities and especially alleviate the most urgent material shortcomings of the armed forces. Given that Germany had been considered a laggard in European defence due to its restrictive approach on military capability – partly because of the historical legacy of guilt for World War II and partly a condition of Germany’s reunification after the Cold War – the announcement of a turning point raised expectations in Euro-Atlantic defence circles.
The Strategic Direction of the United States in an Era of Competition
Since President Joe Biden’s entry in the Oval Office in January 2021, his Administration has issued several national strategies. These documents are important for understanding the strategic direction of the United States. In the realm of security and defense, two stand out: the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS). Also the National Strategy for the Arctic Region (NSAR) has a strong security dimension. Security considerations of smaller states like Norway are far from detached from the strategic approaches of major powers. Understanding US strategy and doctrine is thus vital for policy makers crafting Norwegian security policy. This Policy Brief reviews US thinking on strategic competition, with a particular focus on technology, the Arctic, and implications for Norway.
Transatlantic Security – Challenges and Opportunities
In this project NUPI analyzes developments in transatlantic security policy together with researchers from CSIS in the United States and RUSI in the United Kingdom. The aim of the project is to contri...