Channels of Influence or How Non-Members Can Influence EU Energy Policy
External suppliers of energy interested in access to EU energy market use various instruments to influence the process of energy policy-making and promote their interests. This chapter examines how those external suppliers are present in Brussels, their interests in energy policy, the formal and informal frameworks they operate in as well as various instruments they have at their disposal to influence the process of policy-making in the EU. The focus is on the use of communicative and other instruments employed by Norway, a quasi-EU member through its EEA affiliation, and Russia, the main external supplier of energy to the EU and source of strategic concern, the two countries interested in security of demand facing EU preoccupied with security of supply and diversification of supplies and routes.
New Political Economy of Energy in Europe. Power to Project, Power to Adapt
This edited collection details and analyses the dramatic changes that the international political economy of energy has undergone in the past decade. This change began with the increasing assertiveness of Russia when the oil price rose above the $100 mark in 2008. This, combined with the rise of shale oil and gas, made the USA all but self-sufficient in terms of fossil fuels. The collapse of the oil price in 2014-15, Saudi Arabia’s new strategy of defending its market share and the increasingly tense and controversial relationship between the West and Russia all worked to further strengthen the geopolitical dimension of energy in Europe. The global result is a world in which geopolitics play a bigger part than ever before; the central question the authors of this volume grapple with is how the EU – and European small states – can deal with this.
French status seeking in a changing world. Taking on the role as the guardian of the liberal order
France has a long history as a traditional European great power. But is this still the case today? The analysis in this article shows how French exceptionalism, often referred to as ‘grandeur’ is still the guiding principle of French foreign policy, but that it is being practised differently today. President Macron may be right in arguing that ‘France is back’, but it is important to note that modern French power projection or status seeking takes place through a set of very different mechanisms. The key argument put forward in this article is that French status is increasingly based on a type of symbolic power, and to understand the mechanisms through which this power is managed, insights from social psychology and Social Identification Theory (SIT) are helpful. SIT points to three different strategies for maintaining a position within a social hierarchy that may also be valid for international politics: social mobility, social competition and social creativity. While France has adopted different types of strategies in earlier periods (social mobility in the immediate post-war years and social competition during the Cold War), the analysis in this article shows that French foreign policy practices are now increasingly being legitimised through the creation of a new narrative. Interestingly, this narrative consists of the current French political leadership’s eagerness to take on the role as ‘the guardian of the liberal order’, which fits nicely with what SIT identify as a strategy of social creativity.
How do the Russians view the confrontation with the West?
Lev Gudkov will give you an insight to the public opinion in Russia in 2018.
CANCELLED: New conservatism as national consensus in Russia?
Unfortunately, we have to cancel this seminar due to unforeseen events.
After Crimea: The future of Nordic Defence Cooperation
Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) was originally about cost-effectiveness. The Nordic states sought to work together when training and educating their soldiers, procuring new equipment, and logistically supporting their forces. Faced with a relevantly benign security situation at home, with Russia regarded in principle as a partner, operational military cooperation was primarily about expeditionary operations far from northern Europe. Even if NORDEFCO never became the beacon of Nordic cooperation that some political speeches sought to paint it as, it nonetheless provided the Nordics with a flexible and non-bureaucratic framework through which various forms of defence cooperation could be pursued.
Sceptical diplomacy: Should heads of state bother to talk climate change science with Putin?
This policy brief illustrates how the Russian top leadership discusses climate change and responds to interventions and efforts made by other countries’ leaders and high-level diplomats on the topic of climate change. The policy brief presents one data set examining the distribution of the Kremlin’s attention to the issue and one illustration of Russian participation in international science diplomacy, using the example of the IPCC. The aim is to make recommendations as to how diplomats and politicians can, in order to foster more fruitful diplomatic exchange, better utilize the flexibility of climate change discourse within Russia and Russia/Soviet Union’s longstanding contributions to international climate science.
Kvifor forhandle fred? Ein analyse av forhandlingsstart i den væpna konflikten i Colombia
(Article available in Norwegian only): The conflict in Colombia has seemed insolvable for decades. Despite several peace attempts, it has always flared up again. In this article, I explain the onset of peace negotiations in 2012 between the Government of Colombia and the FARC, the largest guerrilla group in the country. I claim the fundamental explanation for why they initiated negotiations was the military weakening of the FARC in the 2000s, which led the guerrilla group to appreciate the necessity of ending the conflict through negotiation in order to reach at least some of their goals. The second most important factor was the change in leadership in Colombia, where in 2010 the newly-elected president, Juan Manuel Santos, considered a political solution possible and more attractive than his predecessor did, and took pragmatic measures to create a sustainable process. In addition, third parties contributed to safe and secret proceedings and to trust in the peace process. Negotiations begun in 2012 are – through a structured, focused comparison – compared with the peace dialogue in Caguán (1999-2002) between the same actors, where negotiation did not start. Case studies like this one can help us understand dynamics behind the choices of armed actors to pursue political solutions to armed conflicts. The onset of negotiation, which I analyze, must not be equated with a peace agreement or the end of the conflict. It can, however, provide important answers about where armed actors’ motivation to end conflicts come from, and under what conditions this motivation can bring the parties to the negotiating table.
Ole Martin Stormoen
Ole Martin Stormoen is a doctoral research fellow associated with NUPI's Research group on security and defence and has previously been a research...
Military Power Seminar 2018: New world – new NATO?
How should we ensure credible collective defence of Europe in the Trump era? Welcome to the 20th Military Power seminar, with opening speech from the Minister of Defence, and academic and political debate.