Researcher
Arne Melchior
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Summary
Arne Melchior’s research areas include international trade and global development; trade policy and international economic institutions; international inequality; geographical economics and regional development; Asia, India and China. Ph.D. (Dr. Polit., 1997) in economics from the University of Oslo, on international economic integration.
He has been head of the international economics group at NUPI for extended periods, and Assistant Director (3 years). Before research career: Experience from international trade negotiations as government official; including multilateral trade negotiations, and bilateral negotiations with several Asian countries. Experience from managing a large number of research projects.
Expertise
Education
1997 Dr. polit., University of Oslo, Dept. of Economics. Dissertation: On the Economics of Market Access and International Economic Integration.
1990 Cand. polit, economics, University of Bergen, Norway, specialisation in economics, thesis: On the impact of quotas on low-cost imports of clothing
1981 Certificate of Advanced European Studies, Bruges, Belgium. Specialisation: International economics.
Work Experience
1989- Research Fellow/Senior Research Fellow/Head of Department/Assistant Director at NUPI
1981-1987 Senior Executive Officer/Head of Division, Ministry of Trade and Shipping, Norway
Aktivitet
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Clear all filtersAnnex to the report 'Norway’s strategic dependencies in global supply chain networks'
This annex is connected to the NUPI Report 'Norway’s strategic dependencies in global supply chain networks' found here: https://www.nupi.no/en/publications/cristin-pub/norway-s-strategic-dependencies-in-global-supply-chain-networks
Norway’s strategic dependencies in global supply chain networks
Economic interdependence and global supply chains are being investigated anew. For a long time, a belief in the ability of growing economic ties to foster cooperation, dampen conflict, and enhance prosperity was predominant in academic and political thinking alike. However, these assumptions have recently proven to be half-truths at best. Rather than dampen conflict, the asymmetries of global supply chains have turned them into coercive tools for the powerful to wield against the powerless. Through sanctions and export controls, states controlling vital chokepoints in global economic networks can cause harm in targeted states, and through controlling the nodes of information highways, intelligence agencies can gain access to sensitive information by leveraging the key position of their domestic companies. For states with small, open economies, this development poses a thorny problem: the toolbox for realigning global supply chains is limited, but reliance on supply chains beyond national control is extensive. The problem is not limited to being in a position of dependence, however. For smaller states, being in control over global assets, or being a key provider of a product or resource others depend on can be a double-edged sword. As economic coercion becomes more widely deployed, the impetus for protecting and securing assets increases, and the risk that they might drag smaller states into geopolitical contests grows. Addressing these concerns, it is vital to develop tools, frameworks, and methodologies for assessing supply chains from a national perspective, with a focus on how economic interdependence might introduce geopolitical risks. Against this background, this report builds on recent theoretical and methodological developments for analyzing global supply chains in light of their potential for geopolitical weaponization. More precisely, it will study Norway’s position in global value chains by combining recent methodological developments on the network analysis of supply chains and recent analysis of country-level aggregated analysis of supply dependencies. This allows for a study of supply chains as networks of economic relations, in which the position of different national economies contains both strategic capacities, or assets, by being central suppliers on which other countries depend, and vulnerabilities, by depending heavily on other countries. The report thus uses network analysis to identify Norway’s positions and their related strategic vulnerabilities and assets. Link to the Annex for this report: https://www.nupi.no/en/publications/cristin-pub/annex-to-the-report-norway-s-strategic-dependencies-in-global-supply-chain-networks
EEA at 30
This report is in Norwegian only. During 30 years, Norway has participated in the EU internal market via the EEA (European Economic Area) agreement. According to available research, this has led to a strong increase in trade and a real income gain of about 2-6%. On top of this, there are other gains, for example administrative cost savings due to common rules in the EEA, and welfare gains due to common environmental standards in Europa. The EEA agreement is unique by having an extensive set of common rules that are continuously updated. Thousands of EEA rules are part of national laws and practice that people and firms meet every day without necessarily knowing that they are due to the EEA. The eastern enlargement from 2004 extended the EEA into an integrated and growing market with more than 500 million inhabitants and has led to economic and social convergence in Europe since the new members have trebled their incomes. Migrants from the new member Norway have high work participation rates and currently represent about ¼ of immigrants in Norway. The EU is still clearly Norway’s largest partner with about 60% for trade as well as investment. Within the EEA, trade with and between the new member states has grown fastest. For trade in goods, the EEA has led to a seamless common market for the sectors that are included. Also for services, the EEA has led to stronger integration but differences between national regulations still impede trade. Completion of the internal market for services is important for small and medium-sized enterprises, and important to create efficient value chains in Norway and Europe. During the EEA period, Norway had a sizeable terms-of-trade gain due to stronger price growth for exports than for imports. Trade within as well as beyond the EEA contributed to this. During recent years, the EU has modified the rulebook on state aid, partly motivated by the green transition and subsidies in China and the USA. This leads to a new industrial policy, with new forms of cooperation where EFTA may participate, however with some challenges. Digitalisation has created new global challenges where the EU plays a leading role as regulator, with impact also for the EEA. In particular, common regulations in telecommunication have led to considerable gains and contributed to competitive digital services. In the new trade policy climate, the borderline between what is inside and outside the EEA becomes more blurred. An example is climate policy, where Norway through the EEA participates in the EU emission quota trading system but it is not yet clear whether Norway should introduce EUs carbon tax on imports from third countries (CBAM). Cooperation with the EU increasingly affects trade policy viz. third countries, where EFTA traditionally had autonomy. The new geopolitics also create trade policy challenges not covered by the EEA, where the EU introduces new measures while EFTA does not have a clear response. In some areas, for example export restrictions and sanctions, Norway has an ever-closer cooperation with the EU.
On the political impact of sanctions in Russia
A key motivation behind economic sanctions has traditionally been to promote political change, either by pressure on regimes or by supporting political opposition. To what extent have sanctions succeeded in this endeavour?
The Russia Conference 2022: The Russian economy, energy sector and climate change: What now?
At this year's Russia conference, we will take a closer look at the implications of the war in Ukraine for Russia's economy and energy sector.
Covid-19, global handel og medisinsk beredskap
During the second quarter of 2020, Covid-19 led to the second largest setback for world trade after the second world war. But the value of trade soon recovered, to a normal level at the end of the year. The pandemic hit sectors unevenly, with a strong decline for oil, industrial and investment goods, while trade in food and drugs was maintained and trade with protective and medical equipment exploded. Via the oil price, Covid-19 hit Norwegian exports harder than imports, and erased the trade surplus. During the 2020 crisis, China delivered the increase for protective medical equipment while Western Europe delivered the drugs. Western Europe has 3/4 of world exports of drugs, and for Norway, trade with Europe is an important aspect of preparedness. During the 2020 crisis, Norway benefited from European cooperation through open borders for trade; common approval of medicines; and access to vaccines. Several countries introduced export restrictions for medical goods; India also for drugs, with resulting supply problems in Norway for some items. Global vaccine distribution will be a new test for world trade, and Norway contributes financially. Globalisation of the value chains for off-patent drugs (generics) has in recent year led to frequent supply shortages, independently from the Covid-19 crisis.
EUs grønne giv – implikasjoner for norsk europapolitikk
EU lanserte mot slutten av 2019 European Green Deal. Dette er en klimastrategi for å nå målene i Parisavtalen, men også en økonomisk vekststrategi, og forventes å definere EUs sentrale prioriteringer i årene fremover. Hvordan vil dette påvirke Norge, og norsk europapolitikk? En ny NUPI-rapport, forsøker å gi svar. Norge er tett koblet til EU via EØS avtalen og en lang rekke andre avtaler, herunder Klimaavtalen som definerer rammene for norsk klimapolitikk frem mot 2030. Når EU endrer sine mål og sin virkemåte, så vil dette også påvirke Norge i stor grad. Noen sentrale observasjoner i rapporten er at: • Det er en spenning i Norge mellom energipolitikken i form av fortsatt olje- og gassproduksjon, på den ene siden, og ambisiøse klimamål, på den andre. EUs grønne giv løfter klimapolitikken til politikkens elitedivisjon og kan gjøre det mer krevende å håndtere denne spenningen. Tradisjonelle allierte i EU - som Sverige og Danmark - har f.eks et annet syn på gass som del av løsningen enn det Norge har. • Grønn Giv innebærer at EU utvikler nye regler med potensielt stor betydning for Norge, men det forvaltningsmessige oppsettet for vurdering og håndtering av nye EU regler i Norge er ikke tilpasset en slik økning i volumet på nye regler. • Grønn giv er "sektorovergripende" og trekker EU Kommisjonen i retning av større integrasjon på tvers av ulike saksfelt. Norsk forvaltning er imidlertid definert av et sektor-prinsipp. Dette innebærer en betydelig økning av behovet for koordinering på tvers av ulike departementer og etater i Norge. • Fordi Norge står utenfor EU, har Norge størst mulighet til å påvirke innretting på nye regler og tiltak tidlig i prosessen, gjennom deltakelse i ekspertgrupper i en forberedende fase. Tempoet og omfanget av nye regler som nå utarbeides gjør dette arbeidet krevende. • Grønn giv innebærer en serie med endringer som potensielt griper inn i eksisterende konfliktlinjer i norsk politikk knyttet til EØS og suverenitetsavståelse. • Det er behov for økt kunnskap og dialog mellom forvaltningen, næringslivet, akademia og sivilt samfunn om hvilke muligheter og utfordringer EUs grønne giv innebærer. Et "grønn giv forum" kan være nyttig for å sikre at ulike norske aktører utnytter de muligheter som ligger i EUs grønne giv. • Grønn giv viser at EØS avtalen har sine begrensninger som det sentrale tilkoblingspunktet til EU. En mer institusjonalisert dialog på øverste politiske nivå mellom Norge og EU vil kunne bidra til å bøte på disse utfordringene. Rapporten er finansiert av Utenriksdepartementet.
Research group for Russia, Asia and International Trade
Research group for Russia, Asia and International Trade
Seven new research projects to NUPI