Publikasjoner
The Chinese Cyber Sovereignty Concept (Part 1 & 2)
Cyber sovereignty is a distinct concept from the more familiar term cybersecurity, which concerns protecting the infrastructure and processes connected to the Internet. Cyber sovereignty, on the other hand, is concerned with the information and content the Internet provides. China’s cyber sovereignty concept is based on two key principles: The first is that unwanted influence in a country’s “information space” should be banned. In effect, this would allow countries to prevent their citizens from being exposed to ideas and opinions deemed harmful by the regime. The other key principle is to move the governance of the Internet from the current bodies, which includes in them academics and companies, to an international forum such as the UN. This move would also entail a transfer of power from companies and individuals to states alone.
Norge, USA og folkeretten
Når det gjelder USA og folkeretten, er problemet ikke så mye Trump, som at USA konsekvent bryter de verdiene de selv forfekter, skriver MInda Holm i denne Dagsavisen-kronikken.
Xi og Kina på terskelen til en ny tid
Etter fem år med Xi Jinping ved roret for den spirende supermakten Kina, ser verden allerede annerledes ut. Beijing har i økende grad beveget seg mot begivenhetenes sentrum i en tid hvor globale institusjoner har blitt svekket av krefter fra mange sider, og den allerede pågående maktforskyvningen østover har blitt påskyndet av Trump-administrasjonens isolasjonistiske slagside.Når så både Kinas og verdens politiske strukturer er i rask og grunnleggende endring, mens mer politisk og økonomisk makt forskyves til Kina, og makten i Kina i økende grad konsentreres hos Xi Jinping, er kunnskap om de sosiale, økonomiske og politiske prosessene innad i Kina vitalt viktige. I en slik betydningsfull periode for Kina er det dermed særdeles betimelig at fire nordiske forfattere har bidratt med nyutkomne bøker som analyserer og belyser de viktigste trendene i den påbegynte Xi-æraen. Disse verkene skiller seg noe ad, fra Stein Ringens politiske taksonomi av ettpartistaten Kina, til Börje Lundgrens encyklopediske ettbindsverk, og de to redigerte bokutgivelsene av henholdsvis Ross & Bekkevold og Ross & Tunsjø, som begge skilter med et mangfold av ledende bidragsytere. Til felles har dog disse bøkene at hovedfokuset er på Kinas interne utfordringer, det nye lederskapets rolle under Xi, og hvordan disse interne politiske prosessene kan gi seg utslag internasjonalt. De er med andre ord gode bøker til rett tid, og er verdt å motta oppmerksomhet fra så vel Kina-forskere som den jevne samfunnsborger.
A Command-Chain of Brothers: Kinship in Chinese Foreign Policy
If kinship matters as a foundational concept in international relations, and if kinship is a socially constituted concept, two key claims for which this volume argues, one would assume that when kinship is constituted differently, the concept will also frame international relations in a differing way? A tacit Eurocentric assumption is underpinning many of the treatises on the importance of kinship. The concept of brotherhood in particular, is commonly regarded as a structuring concept that is fundamental and intuitively recognizable for the entire‘brotherhood of man’. That Western concepts of brotherhood, intimately connected to the rise of the Westphalian state order, are now widespread as a frame of reference, should not preclude us from investigating how differently constituted kinship relations may be relevant, both historically and in contemporary international relations. In particular, this should hold true in a world where two of the three largest economic powers, namely China and Japan, are societies where kinship relations traditionally are constituted differently in some core aspects. This chapter investigates these questions through an exploratory study of Chinese foreign policies, and how the traditional Confucian brotherhood concept may have been intertwined with how foreign relations have been talked and thought about in two key eras of Chinese history; first in the case of imperial China’s struggle with neighbouring states demanding equal relations, second with regards to China’s long transition into the Westphalian state system. Following on this is a brief look on how Chinese kinship concepts might have relevance for even current-day Chinese foreign policy.
Kinship in Indian Politics: Dynasties, nepotism and imagined families
While kinship is among the basic organizing principles of all human life, its role in and implications for international politics and relations have been subject to surprisingly little exploration in International Relations (IR) scholarship. This volume is the first volume aimed at thinking systematically about kinship in IR – as an organizing principle, as a source of political and social processes and outcomes, and as a practical and analytical category that not only reflects but also shapes politics and interaction on the international political arena. Contributors trace everyday uses of kinship terminology to explore the relevance of kinship in different political and cultural contexts and to look at interactions taking place above, at and within the state level. The book suggests that kinship can expand or limit actors’ political room for maneuvereon the international political arena, making some actions and practices appear possible and likely, and others less so. As an analytical category, kinship can help us categorize and understand relations between actors in the international arena. It presents itself as a ready-made classificatory system for understanding how entities within a hierarchy are organized in relation to one another, and how this logic is all at once natural and social.
Haukene tar over i Japan
Kina er i full fart mot supermaktstatus. Hva skjer så i Japan?
Valdai Paper #92: Russia’s Far East Initiatives in Troubled Geopolitical Times
The China–Russia rapprochement forms the centrepiece of Russia’s much hyped policy of a ‘turn to the East’, a policy aimed at transforming the Russian Far East from a territorial backwater into a new gateway to China, North-East Asia and beyond. In 2013, President Vladimir Putin declared the development of the Far East a ‘national priority for the entire twenty-first century’. Historically, the Russian Far East was rather a garrison on the distant frontier. But today there is a new development model for the region that is expected to turn it into the gateway to the East, the region of growth and cooperation aimed to reap the benefits of rising Asia, particularly China. New institutions, projects, and financing have been provided for this purpose. What progress has been made so far in implementing the Eastern vector in Russian domestic and foreign policy? Have the ambitious plans indeed borne fruits, like President Xi declared? And what are the main drivers behind the ‘turn to the East’? Do worsened geopolitical relations with Western European actors intensify the turn? Or is it driven by the perceptions of opportunities and long-term objectives in the Asia-Pacific region? The Valdai Paper #92 presents a critical and independent view on Russia’s Turn to the East by the European authors.
Et fotballag i en grotte. Et drama Hollywood verdig. Hvilken historie ble vi egentlig fortalt?
Ansiktsløse masser og abstrakt lidelse sliter i kampen om verdens oppmerksomhet, skriver NUPI-forsker Frida Bjørneseth i Aftenposten-kronikk.
Measuring radicalisation: risk assessment conceptualisations and practice in England and Wales
Individual ‘radicalisation’- extremism- and terrorism-related risk assessment tools have become increasingly central instruments of counter-terrorism. The scholarship on such tools, however, is still its infancy, and remains concentrated on methodological issues and on identifying the ‘best’ indicator list for carrying out assessments. This article takes a different approach, and examines England and Wales’ main counter-terrorism relevant risk and vulnerability assessment tools: the Extremism Risk Guidance (ERG22+) and the Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF), concentrating on their shared 22 risk indicators and their uses in counter-terrorism. The article explores the ideas of ‘radicalisation’ emerging from these indicators and from their use at two different ‘ends’ of England and Wales’ counter-terrorism; to assess sentenced terrorism offenders in prison, and to assess non- criminal individuals referred over concerns over their possible ‘radicalisation’. The article hence clarifies the ideas of ‘radicalisation’ underpinning counter- terrorism policies in England and Wales, and considers the operational utility of the tools' present uses. The article finds that the tools' shared indicators suggest a conceptualisation of radicalisation associated with individual psychology and ways of thinking, and do not in and of themselves open for sufficient incorporation of relevant context. While not rejecting the possible value of specialised terrorism-related individual risk assessment tools, the article finds that the ideas underpinning the tools’ uses make their present counter-terrorism roles questionable. It concludes by stressing that any benefit associated with risk and vulnerability assessment tools in the counter-terrorism space would seem conditioned on them being reserved for the uses, target groups and assessors they were originally created for, and on them being used as only one component of a broad, contextual assessment of individuals about whom there is an evidence-based terrorism-related concern.
Did China Bankroll Russia’s Annexation of Crimea? The Role of Sino-Russian Energy Relations
This chapter is an empirical analysis of energy cooperation between China and Russia, centred on the Ukrainian crisis as a defining event of the partnership. Despite China’s officially neutral political stance on Crimea, the increased frequency of meetings to discuss joint energy projects and the signing of the largest energy deal in world history created the impression that China actively stepped in and supplied the necessary financing to get Russia through sanctions over Crimea and the oil price collapse of 2014–2016. The chapter assesses this hypothesis by examining the long-term trends in lending, investments and trade trends between the two countries, and by taking a closer look at Chinese involvement in four concrete energy projects managed by some of the main Russian energy companies: Power of Siberia, Yamal LNG, Vankor and ESPO. While there is evidence of increased Chinese investments in Russia and a surge of Russian oil imports to China after the annexation, the authors conclude that China was not the major force keeping Russia’s wheels turning during the pre- and post-Crimea years. The involvement of China in the major Russian energy projects was planned and negotiated long before the annexation of Crimea. The authors therefore argue that China did not step in to bankroll Russia after Crimea, instead long-term trends in cooperation simply continued. On the other hand, clearly the long-term growth in cooperation between the two countries reduces Russia’s dependency on the West and provides greater elbowroom for its foreign policy.