Publikasjoner

The EU's Crisis Management in the Kosovo-Serbia crises

Best practices in EU crisis response and policy implementation

This report has two aims. First, to take stock of how the Europen External Action Sercvice (EEAS) and the Commission have institutionalized lessons-learned mechanism. Second, to discuss the extent to which these mechanisms and practices incorporate the EU’s ambitions for a ‘conflict-sensitive’ and ‘comprehensive’ crisis-response approach. In this sense, this report will serve as a point of departure for case-study research to be undertaken within the framework of Work Packages 5–7 of the EUNPACK project, on whether there is a gap between policy and practice with regard to institutional learning.

Understanding the EU’s crisis response toolbox and decision-making processes

Hvor går nordisk samarbeid?

I en tid med geopolitiske omveltninger snakker Nordens regjeringer med fornyet kraft om nordisk samarbeid. Men stopper det med fine ord, eller følges visjonene opp av konkrete handlinger?

Transatlantisk trøbbel. Europa og USA orker ikke lengre å skjule spenningene.

Sikkerhetskonferansen i München har tradisjonelt vært stedet for å dyrke det transatlantiske samarbeidet. Årets versjon var derfor et deprimerende skue. Avstanden mellom Europa og USA har lenge vært stor, men nå orket ingen lengre å legge skjul på spenningene og misnøyen. Visepresident Mike Pence var av en annen mening. Hans tale var skarp og formanende. Han skrøt av USAs økonomiske, militære og teknologiske styrke. Han hadde noen positive formuleringer om Nato. Men mellom linjene sto det: enten er dere med oss, eller så er dere mot oss. Og for øvrig, dersom det transatlantiske samarbeidet skulle ryke, er ikke det USAs problem, det er Europas. Amerikanerne fremsatte en lang kravliste: At alle Nato land snarlig oppnår toprosentmålet i Nato og at de også når målet om å øke sine investeringer og anskaffelser til 20 prosent. At allierte skal avvise North Stream 2 og heller kjøpe amerikansk lng-gass. At allierte ikke kjøper teknologi fra Huawei, og at man ikke gjør seg sårbar i forhold til kritisk infrastruktur. At Europa trekker seg fra Iran-avtalen og blir med i presset på Iran, og at Europa avstår fra å «undergrave» USAs politikk i Midtøsten. At Europa øker presset på Nord-Korea og Venezuela, samt at Europa tar sin del av opprydningen og gjenoppbyggingen i Syria. Samtidig snakket Pence lite om det som opptar mange i Europa, som for eksempel Russland, klima, migrasjon, reformer i internasjonale institusjoner og så videre, og han sa intet som kunne redusere den fornyede usikkerheten om en forsterket handelskonflikt mellom Europa og USA. Det nye formen for amerikansk lederskap besto derfor i å formane og diktere andre. Det var i beste fall et motsetningsfylt budskap, han dyrket egen suverenitet og «America first», men ville samtidig ikke at andre skal utøve sin. At det kunne være i USAs egeninteresse å samarbeide med Europa virket fremmed. Å lede gjennom eksempel, gjennom inklusjon, eller på grunnlag av felles verdier eller institusjoner syntes også forlatt. Budskapet ble formidlet, men det traff ikke. I forkant var det vage håp. Europa ønsket forsikringer om at USA under president Donald Trump fortsatt var forpliktet til samarbeid, og at de så på Europa som alliert med respekt og verdi. USA hadde også varslet at de ville delta med en rekordstor delegasjon. Den tyske forsvarsministeren innledet med å si det USA ønsket å høre, nemlig at Europa burde og ville bidra mer i Nato, men hun minnet samtidig om betydningen av verdifellesskap, og behovet for at det var en rimelighet og rettferdighet, også når det gjelder beslutningstaking.

Norges nye Kina-strategi kan komme fra Brussel

Bare hvis Europa står sammen kan man ha tilstrekkelig makt til å motstå press fra Kina.

Comparing Cyber Security. Critical Infrastructure protection in Norway, the UK and Finland.

Cyber security and protecting critical infrastructures from digital harm are of increasing importance for governments around the globe. Tackling this issue is challenged by two distinct features of cyber security in Western states: Firstly, the transnational nature of digital risks and threats necessitates cooperation and engagements beyond the state, through international and regional organizations and institutions. Secondly, the considerable extent of private ownership forces states to rely on and engage with private companies, through regulation or public–private partnerships (PPP). Through comparative analysis of the approaches taken to PPP and European cooperation for energy and telecommunication in Finland, Norway and the UK, this report examines how states engage with these issues. The greatest difference is found to lie between the two Nordic states and the UK. This is not the result of divergent national perceptions and understandings, but of the more centralized and intelligence-centred approach taken by the UK in contrast to the whole-of-society trust-based approach of the Nordic states. Both approaches entail distinct benefits and drawbacks. The major concern in the Nordic states is the lack of public resources and capacity, as well as the fragmentation of responsibility and capabilities. Realizing the importance of culture, context and history in shaping how public authorities respond to cyber-security concerns is of vital importance for enabling better policies. This report concludes by presenting a set of best practices identified in the three case countries.

The Politics of Stability: Cement and Change in Cyber Affairs

In November 2018, the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, inaugurated one year earlier ‘to develop proposals for norms and policies to enhance international security and stability and guide responsible state and non-state behavior in cyberspace’, launched six norms pointing ‘the way to new opportunities for increasing the stability of cyberspace’. However, the Commission has not examined or explained the very concept it was established to explore. Quite the contrary, the Commission argues that its proposed norms will be used to define what cyber stability actually is. Focusing on the interrelationship between international peace and stability, and ways of achieving both in the context of ICTs, the authors will offer a model of stability of cyberspace. They begin by examining the concepts of ‘stability’ and ‘strategic stability’ as understood with regard to international security. This conceptual analysis is followed by a presentation of the political claims of stability expressed in national and international cyber-and information-security discourses. Drawing on the conceptual approaches and the political claims, the report then model the stability of cyberspace in three interlinked and reinforcing dimensions: 1) equal and inclusive international relations; 2) prevention of war: the minimal peace, with emphasis on averting a devastating nuclear war between the superpowers; and 3) the functionality of global and national technical systems and services. After discussing how international law, preventive diplomacy, confidence-building measures, and norms of responsible state behaviour can support cyberspace stability, this report concludes with recommendations for action aimed at helping to create and maintain a stable - resilient and adaptive - cyberspace.

Putin's Power Revisited: How identity positions and great power interaction condition strategic cooperation in Syria

This article investigates how Russian foreign policies are shaped in a two-level interactive social game. Russian foreign policies take their cue from ingrained identity positions articulated by the state leadership and negotiated in domestic debates, but they are also informed by interaction with other states. The article explains the shift in Russian policies away from pragmatic cooperation with the West in Syria from autumn 2015 onwards. While the Russian leadership initially sought such cooperation, the prominence of anti-Western discourse in Russia following the crisis in Ukraine as well as the West's rejection of Russia in this period spurred Russia to act independently in Syria.

Ten Years On: Reassessing the Stoltenberg Report on Nordic Cooperation

Ten years ago, the report ‘Nordic cooperation on foreign and security policy’ was presented to the Nordic foreign ministers at an extraordinary meeting in Oslo, Norway. Penned and fronted by Norway’s former foreign minister Thorvald Stoltenberg, the report proposed thirteen ways in which Nordic cooperation in the foreign and security domain could be formalized and strengthened. Generally well-received in the Nordic capitals, today, the report is regularly referred to in assessments of Nordic foreign and security cooperation, or when Nordic heads of government meet in public to discuss past and future accomplishments.