Publikasjoner
Policy brief on the implementation of the EU’s policies
Violent extremism is not a new phenomenon and terrorism has a long history in Europe, often linked to separatist movements, anarchism, and far-right and far-left extremism. The trends, means, and patterns of radicalization have evolved rapidly since the Arab uprisings flared exactly a decade ago. Counter-terrorism (CT) and preventing violent extremism (PVE) strategies have developed alongside these trends at the national and supranational level. In the wake of a series of Jihad-inspired terror attacks in Spain, France, Germany, Belgium, the UK, and elsewhere, European Union (EU) member states ramped up their military campaigns against the Islamic State (ISIS, aka Daesh) and al-Qaeda in Syria and Iraq. But since the fall of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), governments’ interest in fighting terrorism in the Middle East has decreased. Nevertheless, some European countries remain on the front foot in their securitized PVE approach. Although there is no apparent connection between the anti-jihad war waged by the French army in Mali and the radicalization in France, the government is calling for more support from European countries to fight against jihadi movements in the Sahel. But the appetite for costly expeditionary campaigns is decreasing. By and large, the phenomenon of violent extremism is perceived as homegrown. And whereas large differences remain in individual countries’ approaches to tackling the challenges posed by violent extremism, it has nevertheless become increasingly clear that today’s security challenges – whether it is terrorism, organized crime, cyberattacks, disinformation, or other evolving cyber-enabled threats – are shared threats that require a transnational approach. Indeed, Europe as a whole faces new security issues and specific challenges for preventive work that (lone) actors and (returning) foreign terrorist fighters raise, while the internet and social media give extremist and terrorist groups and their sympathisers new opportunities for spreading their propaganda, mobilization, and communication. It is against this changed backdrop that this policy brief asks what lessons the EU can learn from best practices identified at the national level, and in the co0ordination efforts with the supranational institutions.
Digital Vulnerabilities and the Sustainable Development Goals in Developing Countries
Hvordan fører digitalisering til nye globale koblinger og fra-koblinger i utviklingsland? Og hvilken rolle spiller digitaliseringen for FNs bærekraftsmål? Dette kapittelet viser hvordan kapasitetsbygging, når det gjelder digitalisering og cybersikkerhet, henger tett sammen med hvor bærekraftig bistandsprosesser i utviklingsland vil være.
Vietnam: Six Ways to Keep Up the Renewable Energy Investment Success
Vietnam is one of the most attractive destinations for renewable energy investment in ASEAN. In 2018, the country attracted USD 5.2 billion. In 2019, the share of renewable energy in the energy mix was 9%, thus already exceeding the 7% target set for 2020. If Vietnam is to continue its success and compete globally for investment in renewable energy, it will need to further develop its investment climate. The competition is heating up in this area, and an increasing number of countries have similar conditions and frameworks for renewable energy investment. Therefore, every improvement may help boost a market’s relative attractiveness. We propose six actions that can further enhance the attractiveness of Vietnam’s renewable energy sector for investment from both domestic and international investors: prioritise renewable energy in the governance system; streamline the regulatory framework; facilitate market entry for investors; improve transparency and communication about the investment regime; improve grid expansion planning; join IRENA to further build the capacity for renewable energy governance.
Thailand: Improving the Business Climate for Renewable Energy Investment
Thailand er ledende på fornybar energi blant ASEAN-landene. Fra 2006 til 2018 tiltrakk Thailand seg mer enn 10,7 milliarder USD i investeringer i fornybar energi. Landets kapasitet for fornybar energi utgjorde i 2019 over 60% av den totale kapasiteten i ASEAN-området. Fornybare energikilder utgjorde 15% av den thailandske energimiksen i 2018, og målet er at denne andelen skal øke til 30% i 2036. Til tross for dette stagnerte investeringene i Thailand i 2018-2019. Forfatterne av denne policy brief-en foreslår fem tiltak som kan forbedre attraktiviteten til Thailands investeringsklima både på kortere og lengre sikt: 1) Få på plass et dedikert departement for fornybar energi. 2) Utvide og forbedre regelverket. 3) Legge bedre til rette for direkte energihandel mellom energiprodusenter (peer-to-peer) 4) Bygge opp kapasitet for styring av fornybar energi.
In the shadow of the virus Varieties of power in the COVID-19 crisis in Venezuela
While all states face massive challenges when responding to COVID-19, some are in a more precarious position than others. In Venezuela, the pandemic arrived at the worst possible time for its citizens. Facing one of the deepest economic crises outside of wartime in recent years, its consequences have spilled over to all aspect of social life.1 However, the timing seems to have suited the leaders of the Venezuelan regime well. Rather than constituting a threat to the stability of a regime that has lost both democratic legitimacy and the capacity to provide services and security, the government of Nicolas Maduro (2013-present) has seemingly managed to consolidate itself after several years of instability. The starting point of the discussion is an apparent paradox: how can a regime with neither legitimacy nor capacity, two commonly invoked criteria for effective crisis management, strengthen itself during a crisis such as that spurred by COVID-19? The brief presents an overview of how the Venezuelan regime has responded to COVID-19, and how the government of Nicolás Maduro has applied different strategies to consolidate a favorable political status quo. It takes as its starting point three concepts, namely “state capacity,” “legitimacy,” and “power,” all of which are frequently upheld as fundamental for understanding the varying ways in which states have responded to the pandemic. It highlights how relative power relations have shifted in recent years, and how the pandemic has contributed to skewing the balance of power further in favor of the Maduro government.
Digitale trusler blir kinkig for Norge i Sikkerhetsrådet
De fleste land rangerer trusler via det digitale rom som en av de største utfordringene for det 21. århundret. På tross av dette har tematikken knapt vært nevnt i FNs sikkerhetsråd. Hva kommer det av? Og kan Norge gjøre noe med det? spør Niels Nagelhus Schia og Erik Kursetgjerde i denne DN-kronikken.
Russia’s view of Georgia: a NATO proxy yet again?
Etter Ukraina-krisen, og til tross for en angivelig mer pragmatisk holdning til Russland fra Georgias regjering, fremstiller offisielle uttalelser fra Moskva i stadig større grad Georgia som fiendtlig. Dette kan være et resultat av at Kreml trapper opp en propagandakampanje for å øve press på Georgia, men er også koblet til en økende oppfatning av Georgia som agent for NATO. I tillegg rammes Russlands omfattende retoriske og praktiske støtte til uavhengighet for de to georgiske utbryterrepublikkene Abkhazia og Sør-Ossetia stadig inn som et ‘takk for sist’ med referanse til den fødselshjelp Vesten gav Kosovo. Parallelt med dette russiske synet, er det nesten ingen diplomatisk kontakt mellom Russland og Georgia. Regionale multilaterale rammeverk har blitt dysfunksjonelle, de er gått i stå av polarisering. Tiltagende georgisk integrering med NATO kan innebære en økt risiko for krig. Situasjonen bør avhjelpes gjennom å gjenopprette og styrke direkte bi- og multi-lateral diplomatisk kontakt.
Customs brokers as intermediaries in international trade
Recent studies suggest that intermediaries like merchants facilitate international trade by reducing fixed trade costs for producers that trade through them instead of exporting or importing directly. This study argues that customs brokers–a type of intermediary rarely studied in economics before–play a similar role by reducing fixed costs of clearing goods through customs for firms that use them instead of self-declaring. Using panel data of Norwegian trade transactions, the paper shows that the majority of manufacturing producers participating in international trade use such brokers, and that the brokers typically handle large trade values on behalf of several different produces. In an econometric analysis, the author finds that the share of a producer’s market specific trade that is self-declared rather than handled by brokers increases with the traded value. This is in line with predictions from theoretical models on trade intermediaries and holds after controlling for observed as well as unobserved factors at the producer, country and product level. Results are similar for exporting and importing, indicating that brokers facilitate both modes of trade.
Utenlandsinvesteringer i sjømatnæringen og norsk tilknytning til EU
I kapittelet drøfter vi utenlandsinvesteringer i sjømatnæringen og Norges forhold til EU. Mens eierskap i fangst hovedsakelig er nasjonalt, er oppdrettsnæringen preget av multinasjonale selskaper. Norge og mange EU-land har begrensninger på utenlandsk eierskap i fangst. Derimot er det ikke tilsvarende begrensninger på utenlandsk eierskap i foredling eller i oppdrett. Alternative tilknytningsformer til EU kan påvirke investeringsstrømmer i fiskerisektoren.
Managing a digital revolution: cyber security capacity building in Myanmar
Digitalisering utsetter utviklingsland for et økende antall risikoer, samt muligheter knyttet til tilkobling til Internett. Myanmar skiller seg ut som et kritisk tilfelle av både fallgruvene og fordelene Internett-tilkoblingen kan medføre. Midt i en politisk overgang fra militært styre til et fungerende demokrati, legger Myanmar IKT til sentrale områder som bank og e-forvaltning. Etter å ha vært et av de minst tilkoblede landene i verden for bare fem år siden, kobler landet seg nå til Internett i et enestående tempo, med få institusjoner på plass for å sikre at overgangen går greit. Den raske utvidelsen av Internett-tilkobling kobler stadig flere mennesker til en internasjonal verden av virksomhet, diskurs og underholdning, men også kriminalitet, underordninger og uenighet. Et avgjørende aspekt for utviklingen i årene som kommer vil være å utnytte fordelene, samt redusere ulempene som iboende følger i kjølvannet av Internett-tilgang (Schia, 2018). I dette kapittelet undersøker vi risikoen og potensielle fordelene ved Myanmars omfavnelse av digital teknologi.