Publikasjoner
Cyber Security Capacity Building: Security and Freedom
The threats associated with ICT are multifaceted. The present report posits that cyber capacity building (CCB) should not be considered simply a risk management endeavor. The potential for malware, cyber attacks, and cyber crime are not the only challenges associated with the rapid spread of ICT. Policymakers must also consider the intersection of technology and politics, particularly in developing countries still transitioning into democracies.
Nord Stream 2: policy dilemmas and the future of EU gas market
The Nord Stream 2 (NS2) gas pipeline project is one of the most controversial issues in EU gas-related debates today. Its proponents hold that the project is driven by purely commercial considerations, while opponents label it as political and contradictory to EU goals and rules. The project has also contributed to raising several questions concerning the role of commercial actors in the shaping and realization of the EU energy policy as well as the impact on EU internal cohesion and relations with Ukraine and Russia. Realization of NS2 may boost the role of Russian gas in the European energy mix, especially in northwestern Europe; however, it could also undermine the credibility of the common EU energy policy, which aims, at least formally, at diversification of supply routes and suppliers as a joint and coordinated response to the energy-security challenges faced by the EU as a whole and by its member states. This Policy Brief sheds light on the current state of the debate on this project and examines the possible short-, mid- and long-term implications.
Reform, Renegotiation and Referendum
The UK stands on the brink of a momentous decision: whether to leave or remain in the European Union. Unlike all the other states that have sought late entry to the EU, the UK did not hold a referendum on whether to join in 1973: the decision was taken on the basis of a parliamentary vote. However, in 1975 voters were asked whether they wished to stay in the European Community, and a strong vote to remain was thought to have resolved the matter. However, in 2013, divisions within the Conservative Party led Prime Minister David Cameron to promise to engage in reform of the EU and to renegotiate the UK’s terms of membership before holding a referendum on whether to stay in. It was a high-risk, high-stakes proposition. Cameron must persuade his party, the British lectorate and his partners in the other EU member states of the merits of his case. The negotiation covers four areas of concern for the UK: economic governance, competitiveness, sovereignty, and immigration. To some British Eurosceptics, the emands seem woefully inadequate; to fellow EU leaders, they pose significant difficulties. The formal negotiations began in late 2015, after months of exploratory talks with the other member states, and are expected to be completed by the end of February, with the referendum coming as early as June 2016. While those who seek to leave the EU have been honing their arguments at least since the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, just that they envisage leaving the EU to look like is unclear. Brexit could take many forms, representing a journey to an unknown destination.
“For Every Action...” The American pivot to Asia and fragmented European responses
In this two-part paper, Thomas Wright and Will Moreland respond to an assessment of Europe's reaction to the U.S. rebalance to Asia by Bjørnar Sverdrup-Thygeson, Marc Lanteigne, and Ulf Sverdrup of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Download the full report here for a complete set of recommendations and detailed analysis. In 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama declared an American strategic shift towards the Asia-Pacific—what would colloquially be known as the “pivot to Asia”—with the words “Here, we see the future.” For the American allies on the opposite end of the Eurasian continent, this announcement was a source of consternation. Was Europe to be left in the past? In the first part of this paper, Bjørnar Sverdrup-Thygeson, Marc Lanteigne, and Ulf Sverdrup of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) consider Europe's response to the pivot. They note that while the U.S. pivot to Asia has been the catalyst for a European pivot, the response has not been coherent among European governments. Instead, they oscillate between four distinct Asia policy options based on: formal cooperation with the United States; coordination with Washington in which European "soft power" complements U.S. leadership; co-existence with an "independent" European position; or competition and radical political realignment. The first part concludes by arguing that European Union governments must decide whether to align, compete, or find some sort of middle path; the authors anticipate that a combination of the coordination and co-existence policy options will define any potential coherent European response. The authors caution that Europe cannot enter the Asian century on American terms and should thus instead capitalize on Europe's comparative advantages stemming from economic and "soft" power. In the second part of the paper, Thomas Wright and Will Moreland of Brookings respond. They disagree that Europe has been "left in the past" by the American pivot, stressing that there is little evidence that the pivot to Asia has resulted in the United States doing less on security in Europe than its European partners want it to do. They also warn of the potential repercussions of a prioritization of economic incentives over security interests in the region. As Chinese financial clout grows and Europe’s economic recovery continues to stagnate, there is the concern that the need for a good trade or investment deal with Beijing would outweigh the ambition to craft a collective EU commitment to maintaining the post-World War II order in Asia—a system from which both the United States and Europe have benefited in terms of security and economic prosperity. Finally, they look at the spectrum between the coordination and co-existence policy options using the example of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Wright and Moreland conclude with several general recommendations for transatlantic cooperation in Asia. For one, the United States should not expend its political capital in ultimately counterproductive efforts to remove all daylight between U.S. and European strategies in Asia. Such an approach would inevitably result in forcing Europe to choose between amiable Euro-American relations and its economic relations with China. The United States should also support reforms of existing international institutions. Although segments of the United States—most importantly in the U.S. Senate—would prefer rising powers simply conform to current norms and institutions, this approach is in dangerous ignorance of the realities of changing global power dynamics. Finally, to be effective, U.S. policy must focus more on sharing a strategy rather than sharing a burden.