Publikasjoner

Counterproliferation Bargaining with the United States: China and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

Hatet mot George Soros

Ingen enkeltperson er hatet så mye av både det nasjonalistiske og ekstreme høyre som ungarsk-amerikanske George Soros.

Familien i internasjonal politikk

Tradisjonelle familieverdier» blir stadig oftere brukt for å rettferdiggjøre systematisk stigmatisering av homofile i vidt forskjellige land verden over, skriver Minda Holm i denne kronikken.

The risks of being an ally

States join security alliances to increase their level of security vis-à-vis neighbours that may pose a threat. The deterrence logic that was the main rationale for joining NATO in 1949 still represents the cornerstone of Norway’s security policy. However, belonging to a military alliance can also pose challenges. This policy brief focuses on some possible negative spillover effects that could emerge from being member of a military alliance. The focus here is on current challenges within NATO, and the possible implications for Norway. First, we present a broader conceptual framework. What are the internal and external challenges facing NATO? How do NATO and its members deal with them? We then proceed to the implications for Norway. Due to structural factors that shape relations in Norway’s strategic environment – including the location of Russian strategic bases close to the border, and the clear asymmetry in capabilities – negative developments in other regions and theatres may influence Norwegian security directly. We argue that, in order to minimize the likelihood of negative trends spilling over to Norway’s strategic neighbourhood, it is important to communicate the special features of this neighbourhood clearly to other members of the alliance. Further, to facilitate intra-alliance trust and cohesion, Norway should also emphasize NATO’s internal, shared value-base, in order to make the alliance better prepared to meet external security challenges.

The Joint Force of the G5 Sahel: An Appropriate Response to Combat Terrorism?

The Joint Force of the Group of Five of the Sahel reflects the commitment of African states to cooperate to address common security challenges. Yet, little is known about its counter-terrorism strategy for the region. This article focuses on the security pillar of the G5 Sahel, the Joint Force (FC-G5S), and provides a critical examination of its mandate to combat terrorism in the Sahel. It explains the context into which the force was deployed and provides an overview of its conceptualisation and configuration. It demonstrates that in its current form, there is a danger of advancing a security-first stabilisation strategy that relies heavily on military-led counter-terror operations to contain and deter the threat of terrorist groups which can have serious consequences for local communities living among insurgents. The article argues that while establishing firmer border control and enhanced intelligence-sharing between the G5 Sahel states is important, the current counter-terror response risks depoliticising insurgents, and neglects the sociopolitical and economic grievances and problems of governance that have enabled violent extremism to take root in the first place. Removing the categorisation of jihadist insurgents as terrorists only and understanding their multifaceted identities – some as legitimate social and political actors – would open up more policy responses, including dialogue and conflict resolution.

Donor-driven state formation: friction in the World Bank–Uganda partnership

The chapter explores the partnership relation between the World Bank and Uganda from 2000 and onwards. It demonstrates how the notion of politics frames apolitical development discourses, and argues for how the formation of partnership entails specific tacit governance mechanisms that have been central to the formation of neoliberal Uganda, the latter being the anthology's overall topic. The donor's governance mechanisms mediated through partnership are indeed powerful, but this does not mean that the aid recipient is prostrate and without any theoretical or empirical possibilities for resistance. The formation of neoliberal Uganda in the context of development aid should thus be understood in the nexus between external governance mechanisms and local means for translation and resistance.

WPS and Female Peacekeepers

The chapter provides an overview of the participation of female peacekeeping personnel in UN missions, tracing key target and agenda- setting policy events, as well as examining causes for the slow progress in female participation. The chapter considers female participation in the military, police, and civilian components of UN peacekeeping operations. It then critically discusses the drawbacks of the “gender- balancing” agenda advanced by the UN, which critics argue has often amounted to “tokenism.” This necessary, but insufficient goal of increasing numbers alone, has been prioritized over the more comprehensive and potentially transformative goal of gender mainstreaming. Gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping is defined as “a way of guaranteeing that the concerns, requirements and opinions of women and men are included equally into every aspect of peacekeeping.” Moreover, each component of the mission should include a “gender perspective in all its functions and tasks from start- up to draw- down” (United Nations 2014: 21– 22). Failing to address the complexity of gender relations and the militarized, masculine, institutional structures within peacekeeping missions themselves will ultimately constrain gender equality. Seeking to situate the WPS agenda within the broader context of UN peace operations, the chapter concludes by reflecting on some of the possible implications of the trend toward militarization and securitization within peacekeeping which will have consequences for women’s active and quality participation in peacekeeping.

Same word, same idea? Sustainable development talk and the Russian Arctic

Sustainable development has become an ‘obligatory’ concept that can encompass many kinds of policies and practices, including in the Russian Arctic. Russia inherited a set of ‘home-grown’ science-policy vocabularies and practices relating to environmental risk and a strong focus on protected areas/national parks from the Soviet Union. Likewise, a preoccupation with questions of equality – particularly in response to obvious economic inequalities generated by natural resource extraction projects – is another trademark of the post-Soviet era in local debates. Therefore, while it is an easy assumption to make that ‘sustainability talk’ functions primarily to appeal to international financial institutions, mirror the Arctic policies of other Arctic states and/or mitigate the reputational risks of Russian and international extractive companies, these historical factors alone suggest that it is worth taking a look at the rhetorical work the concept does in a Russian policymaking context. This chapter examines kind of high-level political work the concept of sustainability is doing in Arctic policymaking in Moscow through an analysis of Russian policy documents and political statements and the statements of RAIPON, the organization for the indigenous peoples of the Russian North.

China's notion of cybersecurity: The importance of strategic cultures for cyber deterrence

This paper debates the importance of different strategic cultures in cyberspace through the example of China. More than any other form of security cyber security is interpreted and acted on differently by different states. While the idea that the Internet would be a liberalizing force throughout the globe was dominant for a long time, over the last few years it has become evident that states have different interpretations and values attached to Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). These differences in valuation in turns leads to different conceptualizations of cyber security, giving the term different meanings for different actors. As states disagree over what cyber security is, they are also likely to disagree on how it is to be achieved. This paper evaluates the impact of these differences in light of a frequently used concept in security studies, namely that of deterrence.

Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Norway’s Options

What would the late political economist and intellectual Albert O. Hirschmann have said if asked to assess the developments in Europe – and its future – at a time when decision makers and voters feel that the quality of their community is decreasing, or fail to see the benefits of its achievements? Drawing on Hirschmann’s works, NUPI Director Ulf Sverdrup offers three intertwined strategies for European states’ approach to Europe in the time to come: “Exit”, “voice” and “loyalty”. Sverdrup reminds us that most would agree that being European is something more than being a EU citizen. According to him, there are good reasons to believe that non-members, like Norway, can contribute to developing Europe in the future. However, a common challenge for both outsiders and insiders is to recognize the multifaceted nature of Europe, and to encourage non-members not to disengage from Europe while, at the same time, encouraging the EU to relate to its European partners outside the EU.