Cedric H. de Coning

Adaptive Mediation

Traditional state-based and determined-design models are ill-equipped to help mediators manage increasingly dynamic, complex and unpredictable violent conflict systems. In this paper we explore an alternative approach, namely an iterative adaptive mediation process that enables the parties to generate solutions themselves, and that responds more nimbly to the challenges posed by complex conflict dynamics. With Adaptive Mediation, the aim of the mediator is to provide the benefits of external intervention without undermining self-organisation. When this approach is applied to conflict analyses, planning, monitoring and evaluation, the ability of mediation processes to navigate uncertainty and adapt to changing dynamics will be enhanced. In order for more resilient and more self-sustainable agreements to emerge, adaptive mediation requires mediators to apply a lighter touch. This encourages greater interdependence among the parties, and discourage dependence upon the mediator. As a result, utilising an adaptive mediation approach should result in generating peace agreements that are more locally-grounded, that are more self-sustainable and that are better able to withstand set-backs and shocks.

Towards a Comprehensive Results-based Reporting and Performance Assessment Framework for UN Peacekeeping Operations

This report considers the tools and processes that DPKO and DFS currently use to assess the performance of senior personnel, individual units and peacekeeping operations, and proposes a methodology for reorganizing these tools into a single overarching comprehensive planning, reporting and performance assessment framework. We argue for a shared analytical framework for performance assessment, across the UN system, and show how the terminology used by the United Nations Evaluation Group can be applied in peacekeeping operations. Currently, performance assessments of peacekeeping operations are undertaken as a number of independent processes which serve different constituencies and a range of purposes. This report identified eight different tools, each performing its own data collection and analysis. They are concentrated in two distinct areas across the spectrum. On the one hand a group of tools focus on outputs (measurable actions undertaken), and on the other a few tools focus on strategic analysis of the context – where the link to the peacekeeping operation is very tenuous. As a result, the information generated by the current tools are not able to be aggregated into a meaningful overall assessment of the performance of a given peacekeeping operation. The report endorses the principle of establishing a single comprehensive planning, reporting and performance assessment framework (the Framework) which brings the existing policies and tools together into more efficient interaction. In addition to what exists already, we recommend developing a performance assessment design that supports the Framework and the RBB with information on the performance of the mission against its plans, objectives and mandate. 1. We recommend the establishment of a single comprehensive planning, reporting and performance assessment Framework that incorporates the current planning and evaluation policies and tools, including the RBB, and that adds a new performance assessment tool and a predictable planning and decision-making cycle. 2. The Framework needs to envision a strategic planning horizon that is linked to the timeframes necessary to achieve the mission’s mandate, and should not be limited to the period for which the mission is currently authorized. 3. The Framework should contain a performance assessment tool should consisting of three elements, namely a set of indicators for each performance area, a process for analyzing and reporting on performance, and a platform where all the information gathered is stored for current and future use. 4. For each mission, the Framework should be grounded in a context analysis that identifies the key drivers that shape developments in the conflict-system that the peacekeeping operation is intended to influence. It should include in particular the identification of key drivers of change, which are the events or trends which will trigger significant change. The context analysis identifies, and analyse the critical conditions that influence these drivers, and the mission’s effects-based plans should be aimed at influencing these critical conditions, so as to have an impact on the key drivers. 5. Central to a performance assessment is defining the manner in which outputs are intended to influence the critical conditions around key drivers and actors. Clearly articulating the intended influence (the so-called ‘theory of change’ in evaluation terminology) helps to anticipate what impact a peacekeeping operation can be expected to have on a conflict-system, as the triggers, or drivers of the process of change have been clearly identified as part of the context analysis. Operationalizing the Framework requires three streams of elaboration, aimed at different functions within the organisation. It should be noted that it does not add significant new tasks, but aims to bring together what exists into three categories of capacities: • Assessment capacity, existing staff who will be trained in performance assessment; • Planners and managers, who would be given concrete points of reference on which to base decisions (resources, outputs, critical conditions, assumptions under review); and • A digital platform which can capture, through big data solutions, the information in the existing systems, and present it into a single dash-board interface.

Sustaining Peace: Can a new approach change the UN?

When António Guterres started as UN Secretary General, he emphasised that conflict prevention had to be a top priority of the United Nations. This is why the United Nations are currently working on specifying the new ‘sustaining peace’ approach, passed by concurrent resolutions of the UN General Assembly and the Security Council in 2016. What are the challenges with their implementation? How does the current geopolitical situation impact the concept? And does it have the potential to make the UN fit for the 21 century?

Adaptive peacebuilding

International peacebuilding is experiencing a pragmatic turn. The era of liberal idealism is waning, and in its place new approaches to peacebuilding are emerging. This article identifies one such emerging approach, gives it a name—adaptive peacebuilding—and explores what it may be able to offer peacebuilding once it is more fully developed. It builds on the knowledge generated in the fields of complexity, resilience and local ownership, and may help inform the implementation of the emerging UN concept of sustaining peace. It is an alternative to the determined-design neo-liberal approach that has dominated peacebuilding over the past three decades. It represents an approach where peacebuilders, working closely together with the communities and people affected by conflict, actively engage in structured processes to sustain peace by using an inductive methodology of iterative learning and adaptation. The adaptive peacebuilding approach embraces uncertainty, focuses on processes rather than end-states, and invests in the resilience of local and national institutions to promote change.

Implications of stabilisation mandates for the use of force in UN peace operations

When United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon announced that he will commission a review of UN peace operations during the June 2014 UN Security Council debate on ‘New trends in UN peacekeeping operations’, the main reasons he gave for why such a review was needed, was that UN peacekeeping is now routinely deployed in the midst of ongoing conflicts and, as a result has had to become more robust.[1] This trend has been exemplified by three recent UN peacekeeping mandates, namely the addition of the Forced Intervention Brigade (FIB) to the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). These three missions have been deployed amidst ongoing conflict and they have robust mandates that allow them to use force in order to achieve the missions’ mandate. What sets them apart from other UN peacekeeping missions, however, is that they have all been specifically designated as ‘stabilisation’ missions. Only one other UN peacekeeping mission has had ‘stabilisation’ in its name before, and that is the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). This use of the word ‘stabilisation’ in the mandates and names of these UN peacekeeping mandates seems to signal a clear departure from previous practice. What does ‘stabilisation’ mean in a UN peacekeeping context, i.e. what is the difference between a UN mission that has ‘stabilisation’ in its name and one that does not? And what are the implications for UN peacekeeping doctrine, and specifically its practices around the use of force, of this new trend towards UN stabilisation missions? In this chapter Cedric de Coning considers what stabilisation could mean in the UN peacekeeping context by analysing the mandates of MONUSCO, MINUSMA and MINUSCA, so as to identify what is different in these stabilisation mandates from other UN peacekeeping mandates. He then considers the implications of stabilisation mandates for UN peacekeeping doctrine, including especially the principles and practices around the use of force in UN peacekeeping.

The Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Enhancing and Moving Beyond the United Nations' Peacebuilding Architecture

Une volonté partagée de façonner un nouvel ordre mondial

(Kun tilgjengelig på fransk): In the West, the rise of nationalist populism reached a tipping point in 2016 when it generated both the UK vote for Brexit and the election of President Trump in the US. In contrast, over the same period, the BRICS have invested in strengthening inter-BRICS cooperation and the group’s commitment to the United Nations, global governance and economic globalisation. Their primary focus has been on financial, trade and economic cooperation. However, their ability to develop a shared analysis of the political and security dimensions of the global order seems to have come to a turning point in 2017, when they opted to focus their annual Summit on developing strategies to defend global governance, economic globalisation, free trade, and joint action on climate. How did we get to the point where it seems to be up to the BRICS to rescue globalisation ?

The Role of the Civilian Component in African Union Peace Operations

The role of civilians in African Union (AU) peace support operations (PSOs) is still not fully understood. As a result, civilian capacity development has not been well resourced in comparison with the military and police dimensions of the African Standby Force (ASF) and has only modestly developed since 2006. As at the end of 2016 the AU has deployed approximately 400 civilians across its PSOs in Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Somalia and Sudan. The average size of the actual civilian component in each mission totalled approximately fifty people. The civilian components most commonly found in AU PSOs are Political Affairs, Human Rights and Protection, Public Information, Humanitarian Liaison, Safety and Security, Civil Affairs, Gender and Mission Support. Despite AU policies and PSO doctrine, the value of a multidimensional approach to PSOs, and the role that civilians perform in this larger context, is not widely recognised in the AU Commission, AU PSOs or among the AU’s key PSO partners. The AU has struggled to articulate clearly why it needs a multidimensional approach, what the function and contribution of the civilian components are, and how the civilians staff contribute to achieving the mandate of a particular mission. This will have to change if the AU is serious about undertaking comprehensive stabilisation operations.