EUs utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk og implikasjoner for Norge
EUs samlede respons på krigen i Ukraina illustrerer bredden i EUs utenriks-politiske virkemidler og medlemslandenes økte vilje til å løse felles utfordrin-ger innenfor EU systemet. Det har også blitt tydeligere hvordan EU og Nato i økende grad komplementerer hverandre. Krigen og en endret geopolitisk situasjon illustrerer også hvordan sikkerhet i økende grad spiller over i andre politikkområder i EU som handel, energi, teknologi, kommunikasjon og kri-tiske råvarer. Vi befinner oss dermed i en europeisk sikkerhetspolitisk kontekst som er radikalt endret siden 1994. En hovedutfordring for Norge er at avta-lene med EU ikke reflekterer denne utviklingen. For å kompensere for dette må man dermed stadig søke å inngå nye avtaler for å sikre norske sikkerhets-politiske interesser, noe som er krevende og uforutsigbart. Så langt har det for eksempel skapt utfordringer knyttet til en eventuell norsk tilknytning til EUs nye satellittkommunikasjonssamarbeid (IRIS²) og helseunion. Denne artikke-len diskuterer EUs utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk og implikasjoner for Norge. Vi redegjør for viktige utviklingstrekk og drivere av EUs utenrikspolitikk, før vi går litt mer i dybden på hva slags utenrikspolitisk aktør EU er i dag. Til slutt diskuterer vi betydningen av denne utviklingen for Norge
Jenny Lorentzen
Jenny Lorentzen er Seniorforsker ved NUPI i forskningsgruppen for Fred, Konflikt og Utvikling.Lorentzen forsker på Kvinner, fred og sikkerhet (KFS...
Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions (RE-ENGAGE)
RE-ENGAGEs skal hjelpe EU med å styrke sin utenrikspolitiske verktøykasse, inkludert utvidelses- og naboskapspolitikken. Dette vil styrke unionens geopolitiske innflytelse og gi den bedre verktøy for ...
European Actorness in a Shifting Geopolitical Order. European Strategic Autonomy Through Differentiated Integration
This is an open access book. Over the past decade, the global geopolitical context has changed significantly, with a geopolitical power shift and a more assertive Russia and China. With the unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine, European security has been put on high alert. The implications of the Russian military invasion are many and difficult to grasp in full. But the need for greater European strategic autonomy appears increasingly evident. But how can this be achieved in the short run? The answer to this question is often that it is impossible and that this can only be achieved in the long run. The aim of this book is to present a different perspective. It aims at showing that it should be possible to make the most out of the current European system if we adjust our understanding of how it works. The book argues that strategic autonomy may be reached—also in the short run—if differentiated integration is seen as an asset rather than a challenge. While the EU remains the core in such a system (together with NATO in the military domain), there is a multitude of other (bilateral and minilateral) regional and sub-regional integration processes that need to be taken into account to get the full idea of how European strategic autonomy can be achieved. This book starts by presenting a theoretical framework for how to study European actorness beyond the EU, then this framework will be applied both to the development towards the EU as a foreign policy actor through the mechanisms of enlargement.
Europa ruster opp
"Vi lever i et tidsskille", sa Tysklands forbundskansler Olaf Scholz da han annonserte at Tyskland skulle ruste opp sitt forsvar med 100 milliarde...
Collective defence in Europe: What place for the EU?
Collective defence is the cornerstone of Europe’s security architecture, anchored in NATO’s Article 5 stating that an attack against one ally is an attack against all. With the deteriorating security environment in Europe, questions have been asked about whether, and if so how, the EU’s clause on mutual defence – article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union – could be operationalized and perhaps be a supplement to NATO’s article 5 as a guarantor of collective defence in Europe. The debate is driven by perceived limits in NATO’s ability to deal with hybrid threats, the broader implications of Russia’s war on Ukraine, and the necessity for European states to take more responsibility for their security. For EU member states to succeed with its collective defence obligations within the union, political will, legal interoperability with NATO and capability development should be addressed further.
Algoritmenes etikk: ansvarlig styring av kunstig intelligens
Hvordan utvikle kunstig intelligens på etisk vis?
Adapting to turbulent waters: EU maritime security and implications for Norway
Maritime security has become a top priority for the EU, as evident in its Strategic Compass for security and defence (2022) where it was identified as a strategic domain. The intensification of geopolitical tensions has further extended strategic competition to the seas. At the same time, a proliferation of threats has emerged at sea, including the security of migration routes, human rights at sea, implications of climate change and global warming, and the pressing challenges posed by organised crime and marine terrorism. The attacks on the Nord Stream pipelines have heightened the urgency for safeguarding critical infrastructure at sea, for surveillance, and coastal and offshore patrolling. Governance of the high seas invites further challenges. They are considered part of the Global Commons that, as with outer space, the atmosphere and the poles, are largely beyond the jurisdiction of nation states. Against the backdrop of escalating tensions and decline in international cooperation, enhancing the EU’s maritime presence has been recognised not only as a paramount security imperative, but also as an economic interest of the Member States: The EU has the largest maritime territory in the world (counting exclusive economic zones), is home to 329 key seaports and most goods to and from Europe travel via the sea (90% of trade exports). In addition, up to 99% of global dataflows travel via subsea cables, and the EU’s energy dependence on oil and gas, which largely travels to the EU via the sea, remains high. Maritime security is thus among the fastest-growing EU policy areas. In addition to the threats listed above, Russia and China's increasing assertiveness at sea has intensified longer term processes towards an increasingly robust and multifaceted EU maritime foreign and security policy.
Command and Control in Northern Europe: Challenges and Potential Solutions
Command and control (C2) is a fundamental requirement for military action. Despite the regional tensions currently faced in Northern Europe, however, deficiencies remain in NATO’s current system. As such, this policy brief examines NATO’s ability to perform C2 amid the region’s evolving security landscape, and how this might be strengthened going forward. The brief concludes that the newly established Joint Forces Command (JFC) Norfolk should assume responsibility for Allied C2 in regional crisis management and conflict. •NATO enlargement, coupled with technological and political changes – including the rise of China and Russian aggression in Ukraine and other parts of Europe – has placed new demands on Allied C2 arrangements. •More specifically, the entry of Finland and (soon) Sweden into NATO has spurred debate over the future C2 architecture for NATO forces in the Nordic–Baltic region. •Following the end of the Cold War, NATO chose to abolish its existing C2 architecture, which was designed to counter the Soviet threat in Europe and the North Atlantic, and instead focus on out-of-area operations. •Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, and especially its invasion of Ukraine in 2014, have led to changes in NATO’s military organisation, notably the establishment of a new JFC in Norfolk, Virginia.
PODKAST: Europa rustar opp