Russiske røster mot krig
How the UK’s post-Brexit foreign policy came home
After leaving the EU, the UK needed to rethink its place in the world. Kristin Haugevik and Øyvind Svendsen examine the aspirations and meanings underpinning the “Global Britain” narrative and argue that its scope and ambitions have changed significantly in the years following the Brexit referendum.
Command and Control in Northern Europe: Challenges and Potential Solutions
Command and control (C2) is a fundamental requirement for military action. Despite the regional tensions currently faced in Northern Europe, however, deficiencies remain in NATO’s current system. As such, this policy brief examines NATO’s ability to perform C2 amid the region’s evolving security landscape, and how this might be strengthened going forward. The brief concludes that the newly established Joint Forces Command (JFC) Norfolk should assume responsibility for Allied C2 in regional crisis management and conflict. •NATO enlargement, coupled with technological and political changes – including the rise of China and Russian aggression in Ukraine and other parts of Europe – has placed new demands on Allied C2 arrangements. •More specifically, the entry of Finland and (soon) Sweden into NATO has spurred debate over the future C2 architecture for NATO forces in the Nordic–Baltic region. •Following the end of the Cold War, NATO chose to abolish its existing C2 architecture, which was designed to counter the Soviet threat in Europe and the North Atlantic, and instead focus on out-of-area operations. •Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, and especially its invasion of Ukraine in 2014, have led to changes in NATO’s military organisation, notably the establishment of a new JFC in Norfolk, Virginia.
PODKAST: Europa rustar opp
KRONIKK: Palestina er viktig for Kina. Av flere grunner.
Digitalisering og internasjonal politikk
Hvilke sikkerhetspolitiske valg og dilemmaer representerer den nye digitale hverdagen for Norge og resten av verden? Kampen for å påvirke hvordan internett skal fungere er godt i gang. Utbyggingen av 5G-nettverk har blitt en global dragkamp der land presser hverandre til å velge bort bestemte leverandører, og private selskaper i den digitale sektoren får stadig større økonomisk og politisk makt. Internasjonale aktører som FN og NATO strever med å finne sin plass i det nye landskapet. I FN pågår det en intens strid om hvilke internasjonale normer som skal gjelde i det digitale rom, og NATO har definert cyber som et eget domene på linje med land, luft og sjø. Alt dette tilsier at digitalisering vil være med på å definere internasjonale konfliktlinjer i lang tid fremover. Men hvordan? I denne boken samler Håkon Bergsjø og Karsten Friis ulike perspektiver fra ledende fagmiljøer på hvordan digitalisering påvirker internasjonal politikk og konfliktdynamikk.
Innledning. Fokus: Krigen og forskningen
Russlands angrep på Ukraina 24. februar kom overraskende på mange. Det medførte flere debatter i media, der forskere kritiserte hverandre for å ikke ha sett hva som var på gang, for å ha vist for stor forståelse for Putin-regimets posisjoner, og for å la sine politiske holdninger farge analysen. I denne Fokus-spalten vil vi forsøke å løfte disse diskusjonene opp på et akademisk nivå. Ikke for å fordele skyld, men for å ta faglig lærdom. I denne innledningsteksten vil jeg blant annet peke på behovet for mer analytisk bredde, for å fokusere på både språk og materialitet, og for å være ekstra bevisst på egne holdninger når man beveger seg inn i en normativ politisk debatt.
NATO and Transatlantic Security Relations
NATO regnes som den viktigste institusjonen i det transatlantiske sikkerhetsforholdet. Organisasjonens historie er preget av kontinuitet, motstandskraft og bevisst tilpasning til et stadig skiftende og mer komplekst sikkerhetsmiljø. Dette kapittelet søker å vurdere noen av de viktigste historiske vendepunktene for å belyse hvordan NATO har klart å forbli relevant gjennom alle disse årene, og spesielt hvordan har de siste turbulente årene i Washington D.C. og de fornyede spenningene med Russland påvirket organisasjonen. Forfatterne hevder at en kombinasjon av sterkt amerikansk engasjement og lederskap med en bredt delt trusseloppfatning blant allierte (primært mot Russland) er kombinasjonen som fortsetter å gjøre NATO til en betydelig legemliggjøring av transatlantiske sikkerhetsrelasjoner.
Working paper on EU’s policies and instruments for PVE
This working paper maps and analyses the toolbox of the EU and a handful of European countries by providing a comprehensive overview of existing measures aimed at preventing violent extremism (PVE) within and outside the EU. It lists the institutional set-up, the decisionmaking processes and coordinating practices at both the EU and state levels. In addition to an analysis of counter-terrorism and PVE strategies at the level of EU institutions, the toolbox of four EU member states (Germany, France, Ireland, Spain) and one former member state (UK) is analysed because of their particular experiences with and competences in the area of prevention of violent extremism.
Working paper on the implementation of the EU’s policies
This working paper builds on earlier research in which we mapped and analysed the toolbox of the European Union (EU) and a handful of European countries by providing a comprehensive overview of existing measures aimed at counter-terrorism (CT) and preventing violent extremism (PVE) within and outside the EU. It listed the institutional setup, the decision-making processes, and co-ordinating practices at both the EU and state levels. In addition to an analysis of CT and PVE strategies at the level of EU institutions, the toolbox of four EU member states (Germany, France, Ireland, Spain) and one former member state (UK) was unpacked because of their particular experiences with and competences in the area of prevention of violent extremism. Overall, our research found that the PVE agenda is quite a recent phenomenon in most member states and principally aims at preventing violent Islamist extremism through community engagement. The UK has been a pioneer in developing a ‘prevent’ pillar as part of its 2003 CT strategy and has since then actively contributed to the development of an EUlevel PVE framework. This EU framework has in turn pushed other member states, such as Ireland and Spain, to develop their own national PVE strategies in recent years. While Germany has also over the past decade made significant strides in preventing involvement in extremism and has brought its national practices to the EU level, France has generally favoured a more securitized than preventive approach. The present working paper takes the research one step further by looking more closely at the implementation of adopted PVE measures and practices in the EU and the abovementioned key states, both domestically as well as vis-à-vis the Western Balkans and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. As such, we present a more evaluative overview geared towards identifying best practices and lessons learned in this field. The paper not only focuses on how policy is implemented and followed up, but also assesses the EU’s experiences in co-operating with member states and vice versa. In doing so, the research tries to take on board key recent developments, in particular in France and at the EU level, in response to a new series of terrorist attacks that took place in Paris, Nice, and Vienna between the end of October and mid-November 2020. The research builds on a set of in-depth interviews with PVE officials and practitioners within the EU and national administrations.