Valdai Paper #92: Russia’s Far East Initiatives in Troubled Geopolitical Times
The China–Russia rapprochement forms the centrepiece of Russia’s much hyped policy of a ‘turn to the East’, a policy aimed at transforming the Russian Far East from a territorial backwater into a new gateway to China, North-East Asia and beyond. In 2013, President Vladimir Putin declared the development of the Far East a ‘national priority for the entire twenty-first century’. Historically, the Russian Far East was rather a garrison on the distant frontier. But today there is a new development model for the region that is expected to turn it into the gateway to the East, the region of growth and cooperation aimed to reap the benefits of rising Asia, particularly China. New institutions, projects, and financing have been provided for this purpose. What progress has been made so far in implementing the Eastern vector in Russian domestic and foreign policy? Have the ambitious plans indeed borne fruits, like President Xi declared? And what are the main drivers behind the ‘turn to the East’? Do worsened geopolitical relations with Western European actors intensify the turn? Or is it driven by the perceptions of opportunities and long-term objectives in the Asia-Pacific region? The Valdai Paper #92 presents a critical and independent view on Russia’s Turn to the East by the European authors.
Measuring radicalisation: risk assessment conceptualisations and practice in England and Wales
Individual ‘radicalisation’- extremism- and terrorism-related risk assessment tools have become increasingly central instruments of counter-terrorism. The scholarship on such tools, however, is still its infancy, and remains concentrated on methodological issues and on identifying the ‘best’ indicator list for carrying out assessments. This article takes a different approach, and examines England and Wales’ main counter-terrorism relevant risk and vulnerability assessment tools: the Extremism Risk Guidance (ERG22+) and the Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF), concentrating on their shared 22 risk indicators and their uses in counter-terrorism. The article explores the ideas of ‘radicalisation’ emerging from these indicators and from their use at two different ‘ends’ of England and Wales’ counter-terrorism; to assess sentenced terrorism offenders in prison, and to assess non- criminal individuals referred over concerns over their possible ‘radicalisation’. The article hence clarifies the ideas of ‘radicalisation’ underpinning counter- terrorism policies in England and Wales, and considers the operational utility of the tools' present uses. The article finds that the tools' shared indicators suggest a conceptualisation of radicalisation associated with individual psychology and ways of thinking, and do not in and of themselves open for sufficient incorporation of relevant context. While not rejecting the possible value of specialised terrorism-related individual risk assessment tools, the article finds that the ideas underpinning the tools’ uses make their present counter-terrorism roles questionable. It concludes by stressing that any benefit associated with risk and vulnerability assessment tools in the counter-terrorism space would seem conditioned on them being reserved for the uses, target groups and assessors they were originally created for, and on them being used as only one component of a broad, contextual assessment of individuals about whom there is an evidence-based terrorism-related concern.
Did China Bankroll Russia’s Annexation of Crimea? The Role of Sino-Russian Energy Relations
This chapter is an empirical analysis of energy cooperation between China and Russia, centred on the Ukrainian crisis as a defining event of the partnership. Despite China’s officially neutral political stance on Crimea, the increased frequency of meetings to discuss joint energy projects and the signing of the largest energy deal in world history created the impression that China actively stepped in and supplied the necessary financing to get Russia through sanctions over Crimea and the oil price collapse of 2014–2016. The chapter assesses this hypothesis by examining the long-term trends in lending, investments and trade trends between the two countries, and by taking a closer look at Chinese involvement in four concrete energy projects managed by some of the main Russian energy companies: Power of Siberia, Yamal LNG, Vankor and ESPO. While there is evidence of increased Chinese investments in Russia and a surge of Russian oil imports to China after the annexation, the authors conclude that China was not the major force keeping Russia’s wheels turning during the pre- and post-Crimea years. The involvement of China in the major Russian energy projects was planned and negotiated long before the annexation of Crimea. The authors therefore argue that China did not step in to bankroll Russia after Crimea, instead long-term trends in cooperation simply continued. On the other hand, clearly the long-term growth in cooperation between the two countries reduces Russia’s dependency on the West and provides greater elbowroom for its foreign policy.
Lonely Minds: Natural Resource Governance without Input from Society
This concluding chapter draws together the threads from the 18 case studies of oil- and gas-producing countries, relating them to the theoretical concept of ‘public brainpower’ and the arguments presented in the introductory chapter. It elaborates on the concept of public brainpower in greater detail, adding important caveats related to some possible detrimental effects of public debate: volatility, polarization, populism and mock democracy. Ten tenets on how to achieve public brainpower are formulated, and a ranking of the public brainpower of 33 resource-rich countries is presented. The chapter rounds off with suggestions for further research.
Variations on Public Brainpower: Findings from Country Case Studies of Oil- and Gas-Producing Countries
This chapter sums up the 18 case-study chapters that make up the bulk of this volume and prepares the ground for the concluding chapter. It begins by reviewing and highlighting the case-study findings, followed by notes and reflections on some general challenges encountered in the preparation of the book and the research conducted for the case studies. Inaccessibility of information and lack of expertise in some countries indicate a lack of available minds and voices to record, analyse, comment on and propose changes to petroleum policy in those countries. The impact of censorship extends well beyond the borders of authoritarian states, affecting, for instance, the statements and publications of foreign experts who may fear losing access to visas and contacts in countries where they have spent their entire careers building up their professional competence.
Russia: Public Debate and the Petroleum Sector
In Russia, civil society engagement with the petroleum sector is surprisingly rich and varied for a country that is ranked low on most democracy-related indicators. This chapter finds that there is a lively and varied public debate, with business associations, research institutes, independent experts, indigenous organizations and the few surviving independent media actively and often competently analysing and commenting on a broad range of issues related to the oil and gas sector. Russians were early users of social media, which occasionally also function as a platform for discussion of petroleum policy issues. However, the real impact of civil society on decision-making and policy formulation in the petroleum sector is not as great as the diversity of actors and discussion might imply. One key reason is the tight government control over mainstream media outlets. The situation for free speech and civil society worsened steadily from around 2004 to 2016. As in neighbouring Kazakhstan, the Russian population puts a high premium on stability over freedom. While a central concern in this book is whether the media and civil society have any influence on the petroleum sector, in Russia the paradoxical situation is that the relationship is often reversed: the gas company Gazprom, rather than another organizational vehicle, is used by the government to control key mass media; and the oil company Yukos played a central role in promoting civil society until its main owner Mikhail Khodorkovskiy was arrested and the company was carved up.
Norway: Public Debate and the Management of Petroleum Resources and Revenues
This chapter assesses the importance of civil society involvement and public debate for Norwegian petroleum governance. It finds that during the early years of the country’s oil and gas development most important choices were made by a small number of decision-makers in government with little input from the broader society. The attitude of government officials was therefore decisive for Norway’s early successes. During the two first decades of Norway’s petroleum era, also economists at the Ministry of Finance, the Norwegian School of Economics, Statistics Norway and the University of Oslo played important roles. One of the greatest successes of Norwegian oil and gas governance, the sovereign wealth fund, was created by technocrats in interaction with politicians. However, over time, and in a way similar to the Netherlands, civil society and public debate came to play more influential roles. What characterizes contemporary Norwegian petroleum governance is that it has many legs to stand on: an active and diverse civil society, free and diverse media, many political parties representing differing interests, numerous institutions of research and higher education and, importantly, a strong technocracy inside and outside government. In combination, these legs provide for both reliability and dynamism, as Norwegian petroleum governance is constantly evolving. Finally, a key aspect of Norway’s Nordic model is constant compromise – which is difficult to achieve in more polarized societies.
Introduction: Civil Society, Public Debate and Natural Resource Management
The introductory chapter establishes the analytical framework for this edited volume. The literature on the resource curse and institutions is briefly discussed, along with the work on civil society and the public sphere by Almond and Verba, Dahl, Habermas and Putnam. Drawing on these classics, the theoretical concept of ‘public brainpower’ is formulated. The main pillar of public brainpower is polycentricity, or the coexistence of many different public actors freely expressing their thoughts: individual citizens, political parties, trade unions, charities, companies, research institutes, religious institutions, mass media and government institutions. The more polycentric a society is, the greater is its brainpower: its memory becomes more comprehensive and multifaceted, different actors can perform quality control of each other’s ideas and arguments, and it is more difficult to repress challenging views. Above all, a polycentric society has a broader base for creativity. The greater the public brainpower of a society, the better its management of natural resources. Finally, the 18 case studies of oil- and gas-producing countries are presented, along with the methodology and definitions of key terminology used throughout the volume.