Changing or frozen narratives? The Arctic in Russian media and expert commentary, 2021–2022
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has brought Russia–West relations to its lowest point since the Cold War. Relations in the Arctic region are not excepted, evidenced not least by the other seven member states’ pausing their participation in Russia’s Arctic Council chairmanship (which concluded in May 2023). To the extent that “Arctic exceptionalism” – the notion that the Arctic has been characterised by a cooperative mode between Russia and the West which has remained relatively untouched by increasing tensions elsewhere – was ever an appropriate description, Western analysts have now declared it firmly dead. How does this situation look from within Russia? This research paper investigates how the Russian state media and the foreign policy expert community have portrayed the Arctic in 2021 and 2022. How much change has been seen since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine? By surveying “the story about the Arctic” as presented by mainstream narrators and experts, we gain insights into, among other things, how changes in Arctic cooperation, sanctions, the role of China in the Arctic, and the question of climate change are conveyed to Russian audiences. The paper proceeds as follows. We start by briefly explaining the methods and data used. We then present a portrayal of the Arctic in Russia’s government’s newspaper Rossiiskaya gazeta, followed by the role of the Arctic in analyses published by the Russian International Affairs Council and the journal Russia in Global Affairs. Lastly, we conclude by discussing a general continuity in the way the Arctic is framed in the material, and foreground three core themes: climate change, security, and cooperation.
Africa in a time of global crisis: Some trends
Africa is facing major challenges. Poverty is increasing again after many years of decline, and many countries are experiencing an economic crisis as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, including rising inflation. Several countries are indirectly affected by Russia’s war in Ukraine, which has led to high energy prices and reduced access to grain and fertiliser. Several countries and regions are also marked by terrorism and violent conflicts, and climate change is creating increased risks of floods, droughts and heatwaves. Parallel to this, the role of the great powers in Africa is changing rapidly. After a period of strong European and American dominance, other great powers, such as China and Russia, have stepped up their activities in Africa. China has invested heavily in infrastructure, trade and development aid, while Russia has gained an important role in a number of countries, particularly through military aid and arms supply. Other countries, such as India, Turkey and Qatar, have also invested heavily in Africa. These developments are taking place simultaneously as Africa’s global significance is set to increase. First, the region has important natural resources, such as oil and gas, as well as rare minerals and earth metals that are in high demand in the context of the green transition. Second, Africa is severely affected by climate change, which can lead to social unrest, violent conflicts and extensive migration. In a time of increasing geopolitical rivalries and instability, this means that developments in Africa will have considerable global ramifications. Although other countries have increased their interest in and become more important partners for African countries, the EU and Europe are still Africa’s largest trading partners and providers of development aid. The influence of the EU and Europe in Africa is not challenged in this respect, but rather in areas such as governance, infrastructure and energy, and specifically from the Russian side within what we can call a niche of security markets. Russia has been able to operate here by offering arms sales, military training and services from the Wagner Group (a private military company) to regimes that Europe and the United States are not willing to provide that type of support for. The struggle for political and economic influence in Africa is stronger and more intense than since the Cold War, and there is reason to believe this will continue. This also gives African countries more choice and autonomy vis-à-vis external actors. African states are not just objects to be acted upon by the international community, whether through development aid, investment or in international forums; they are also active agents who, with increased self-awareness, will seek to navigate the new landscape of global power rivalries and fragmentation. This is a development that must be taken seriously. Neither Norway nor Europe can afford to take Africa and African support for our positions in international politics for granted. This report provides a brief overview of the key trends in Africa, which form the basis for Norway’s development of a new strategy for Africa.
From partners to allies: Finland and Norway in a new era
Finland’s decision to apply for NATO membership in 2022 altered Nordic security and defence dynamics. It also reset Finland’s relations with its neighbouring states – including longstanding NATO member Norway. In this policy brief, we discuss the evolving relationship between Finland and Norway. Despite their history as peaceful neighbours, divergent security arrangements generated political distance between Finland and Norway during the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, their security policies gradually became more aligned, as evident also in heightened Nordic security cooperation, Finnish and Swedish participation in NATO exercises, and, more recently, the signing of a series of defence agreements with each other as well as with Sweden and the United States. Following Finland’s NATO accession, both states have anticipated a deepening of the Finnish-Norwegian alliance. We identify some areas where Finland and Norway may benefit from collaborating and exchanging perspectives in the coming years. This includes in the management of shared institutional frameworks, security concerns in the Arctic and Baltic Sea regions, the future relationship with the United States, and a more antagonistic Russia.
Do regime differences shape developmental engagement? How China and Japan compete in post-coup Myanmar
The 2021 military coup in Myanmar has left the country significantly isolated on the world stage. Politically, foreign governments have avoided recognizing the junta rulers, although quasi-official engagement is still underway. Economically, foreign investments into Myanmar have dropped by 42% from 2021 to 2022, off levels that had already massively decreased since the 2017 Rohingya expulsion. However, despite the international outcry over the new regime’s open warfare against civilians and the escalating violence in Myanmar’s multi-front civil war, both China and Japan have remained engaged in development cooperation, pursuing ambitious projects for economic corridors and special economic zones (SEZs) that were contracted under the deposed civilian government; in the case of China, even some new projects have been launched.
Dialogue with Northern Norwegian youth
The EU Trapped in the Venezuelan Labyrinth: Challenges to Finding a Way Out
This report explores how EU Foreign and Security Policy towards the political crisis in Venezuela can be assessed against the backdrop of diverging positions within the EU and as well as between the EU, the United States and other powers. The EU’s Venezuela policy has been anchored in three main pillars: first, supporting dialogue platforms between the government and the opposition; second, sanctioning the Maduro regime to force it to negotiate; and third, providing humanitarian aid helping neighbouring countries’ attend to the massive migratory flow of Venezuelans. Intra-EU contestation was linked to the recognition of opposition leader Guaidó as Venezuela’s interim president in 2019, but has eased since the EU dropped its recognition in 2021. Multipolar competition, and how it plays into patterns of regional fragmentation, has been another significant obstacle to the EU achieving its main foreign policy goal of free, fair and democratic elections. In the future, the EU approach should build on the renewed consensus between member states and focus on mediation, conditional sanctions relief, electoral observation, parliamentary diplomacy, support for regional governance and interregional cooperation.
EUs utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk og implikasjoner for Norge
EUs samlede respons på krigen i Ukraina illustrerer bredden i EUs utenriks-politiske virkemidler og medlemslandenes økte vilje til å løse felles utfordrin-ger innenfor EU systemet. Det har også blitt tydeligere hvordan EU og Nato i økende grad komplementerer hverandre. Krigen og en endret geopolitisk situasjon illustrerer også hvordan sikkerhet i økende grad spiller over i andre politikkområder i EU som handel, energi, teknologi, kommunikasjon og kri-tiske råvarer. Vi befinner oss dermed i en europeisk sikkerhetspolitisk kontekst som er radikalt endret siden 1994. En hovedutfordring for Norge er at avta-lene med EU ikke reflekterer denne utviklingen. For å kompensere for dette må man dermed stadig søke å inngå nye avtaler for å sikre norske sikkerhets-politiske interesser, noe som er krevende og uforutsigbart. Så langt har det for eksempel skapt utfordringer knyttet til en eventuell norsk tilknytning til EUs nye satellittkommunikasjonssamarbeid (IRIS²) og helseunion. Denne artikke-len diskuterer EUs utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk og implikasjoner for Norge. Vi redegjør for viktige utviklingstrekk og drivere av EUs utenrikspolitikk, før vi går litt mer i dybden på hva slags utenrikspolitisk aktør EU er i dag. Til slutt diskuterer vi betydningen av denne utviklingen for Norge
Constraints, Dilemmas and Challenges for EU Foreign Policy in Venezuela
Years of increasingly authoritarian rule and economic mismanagement by President Nicolás Maduro have turned Venezuela into a source of regional instability. The European Union’s (EU) main foreign policy objective towards the country has been a peaceful transition to free and transparent elections and its re-introduction into regional and global trade and political frameworks. The strategies pursued by the EU to mitigate the constraints on its foreign policy towards Venezuela have helped to bring about more EU unity, but have failed to have a significant impact in the country itself. Multipolar competition between the EU and the United States (US) on the one hand and between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia on the other, have undermined the EU’s attempts to contribute a peaceful solution to the process. Most recently, the war on Ukraine has created a new dilemma for the EU in its dealings with Venezuela, that is, having to navigate between maintaining pressure on the Maduro regime, keeping up momentum for negotiations and deciding whether to follow the US in resuming oil trade with Caracas to mitigate the energy crisis in Europe.
Jenny Lorentzen
Jenny Lorentzen is a Senior Research Fellow in the Research Group for Peace, Conflict and Development.Her main areas of expertise are the Women, P...
Re-Engaging with Neighbours in a State of War and Geopolitical Tensions (RE-ENGAGE)
RE-ENGAGE’s overarching ambition is to assist the EU in refining its foreign policy toolbox, including its enlargement and neighbourhood policies. This will enhance the Union’s geopolitical leverage a...