Military-Civilian Relations in Interventions
It is frequently claimed that success in interventions hinges largely on military–civilian coherence. Nevertheless, despite high ambitions, coherence among intervening actors has proven challenging to achieve in practice. Why is this so? The thesis asks: How can we theorize and analyse the challenges facing intervening actors to achieve military–civilian coherence in post-Cold War interventions? The thesis firstly develops a holistic understanding of the various actors present in an intervention and their inter-relationships – and offers a taxonomy of various forms of relationships between them. It then focusses on the military actors and discusses how they differ significantly from conventional peacekeeping to robust counter-insurgencies. The thesis then discusses the relations between military and humanitarian actors. Based on the first chapters it is thereafter argued that there is a need for a comprehensive analytical framework to make deductive analyses of interventions possible. It argues that by studying the identification processes of the intervening actors, insights into how they regard their role and how they regard the other actors, international as well as local, can be generated. This analytical framework is then applied to the case of Afghanistan to analyse the identities of three sets of actors – the military, the humanitarians and the state-builders, finding that the three entities appeared largely ignorant of each other, operating in parallel but not in conjunction. The thesis concludes with a discussion of the applicability of the analytical framework on other cases and with other research questions.
Hva om USA ikke kommer?
(Op-ed available in Norwegian only): Det hjelper ikke med all verdens våpen om man ikke er enige om når man skal bruke dem. Politiske vinder kan fort snu, skriver Karsten Friis i denne kronikken.
Fragile states and violent entrepreneurs: conflict, climate, refugees (FRAGVENT)
What forms of authority underpin, enable, and extend violent entrepreneurs in fragile states, and how do the combined effects of fragile states, conflict, and climate impact this?...
Theory Seminar: Lacanian psychoanalysis and the fascination with ISIS in Euro-US security discourse’
Charlotte Heath-Kelly will present her work on how Lacanian psychoanalysis can inform our understanding of the Western need for enmity, and its obsession with enemy entities such the Islamic State.
The Joint Force of the G5 Sahel: An Appropriate Response to Combat Terrorism?
The Joint Force of the Group of Five of the Sahel reflects the commitment of African states to cooperate to address common security challenges. Yet, little is known about its counter-terrorism strategy for the region. This article focuses on the security pillar of the G5 Sahel, the Joint Force (FC-G5S), and provides a critical examination of its mandate to combat terrorism in the Sahel. It explains the context into which the force was deployed and provides an overview of its conceptualisation and configuration. It demonstrates that in its current form, there is a danger of advancing a security-first stabilisation strategy that relies heavily on military-led counter-terror operations to contain and deter the threat of terrorist groups which can have serious consequences for local communities living among insurgents. The article argues that while establishing firmer border control and enhanced intelligence-sharing between the G5 Sahel states is important, the current counter-terror response risks depoliticising insurgents, and neglects the sociopolitical and economic grievances and problems of governance that have enabled violent extremism to take root in the first place. Removing the categorisation of jihadist insurgents as terrorists only and understanding their multifaceted identities – some as legitimate social and political actors – would open up more policy responses, including dialogue and conflict resolution.
The risks of being an ally
States join security alliances to increase their level of security vis-à-vis neighbours that may pose a threat. The deterrence logic that was the main rationale for joining NATO in 1949 still represents the cornerstone of Norway’s security policy. However, belonging to a military alliance can also pose challenges. This policy brief focuses on some possible negative spillover effects that could emerge from being member of a military alliance. The focus here is on current challenges within NATO, and the possible implications for Norway. First, we present a broader conceptual framework. What are the internal and external challenges facing NATO? How do NATO and its members deal with them? We then proceed to the implications for Norway. Due to structural factors that shape relations in Norway’s strategic environment – including the location of Russian strategic bases close to the border, and the clear asymmetry in capabilities – negative developments in other regions and theatres may influence Norwegian security directly. We argue that, in order to minimize the likelihood of negative trends spilling over to Norway’s strategic neighbourhood, it is important to communicate the special features of this neighbourhood clearly to other members of the alliance. Further, to facilitate intra-alliance trust and cohesion, Norway should also emphasize NATO’s internal, shared value-base, in order to make the alliance better prepared to meet external security challenges.
Preventing terrorism through risk assessments – a UK perspective
How does the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy play out in in real-life, and what's the (potential) role of risk assessments in the prevention of terrorism? Marek Hubert, former academic and a current Police Officer, visits NUPI to talk about these issues.
The EU in the Middle East - how to prevent terrorism and violent extremism?
That was the topic for the project EUNPACK's contribution to the MERI Forum 2018.
China's notion of cybersecurity: The importance of strategic cultures for cyber deterrence
This paper debates the importance of different strategic cultures in cyberspace through the example of China. More than any other form of security cyber security is interpreted and acted on differently by different states. While the idea that the Internet would be a liberalizing force throughout the globe was dominant for a long time, over the last few years it has become evident that states have different interpretations and values attached to Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). These differences in valuation in turns leads to different conceptualizations of cyber security, giving the term different meanings for different actors. As states disagree over what cyber security is, they are also likely to disagree on how it is to be achieved. This paper evaluates the impact of these differences in light of a frequently used concept in security studies, namely that of deterrence.
Hybrid warfare – how to counter it?
In this NUPI Podcast episode, a panel of experts takes a closer look at the challenges posed by hybrid warfare in liberal democracies.