Research project
Fragile states and violent entrepreneurs: conflict, climate, refugees
Events
The combined effects of fragile states, conflict, and climate change pose severe challenges to development and governance. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Sahel region. Understanding the conditions of fragility is therefore a precondition for responding to one of the most important challenges to development and human security today. FRAGVENT will contribute with knowledge needed to help tackle this challenge.
The project investigates how changes and breakdowns in neopatrimonial rules and networks in the Sahel have eroded state capacity, particularly in peripheral areas. These changes have opened up new spaces through which insurgents can seek local integration, via the establishment of various types of violent order. These violent entrepreneurs are armed actors possessing some degree of political agenda, which is acted out in tandem with different types of income-generating activities. They rule by force and violence, but they also distribute resources, provide some order, and offer protection for populations under their control. This project investigates the forms of authority that underpin, enable, and extend violent entrepreneurs' rule, and how different populations adapt.
FRAGVENT will produce and communicate knowledge crucial for national, regional, and international attempts to stabilize the Sahel; for the efforts of humanitarian and development actors; and for the broader goals of mitigating the negative effects of climate change and the migratory push factors in the Sahel. It will push forward research agendas related to armed actors and insurgencies in Africa; political economies of international interventions; and governance and African statehood.
Fieldwork is carried out on Mali, Niger, Mauritania and Libya.
The core team of FRAGVENT is Research Professor Morten Bøås (Project Leader, NUPI), Senior Researcher Kari Osland (NUPI), Research Professor Francesco Strazzari (Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies), Research Fellow Luca Raineri (Sant’Anna) and Research Fellow Abdoul Wahab Cissé (Alliance pour Refounder la Gouvernance en Afrique).
Project Manager
Participants
Articles
The violence in Mali is getting bloodier, but religion is not necessarily at its root
The massacre of Fulani in central Mali on 23 March marks a grave, new turn in the conflict. How did we get here? NUPI researchers Natasja Rupesinghe and Morten Bøås provide insight into possible reasons.
New publications
The Dangers of Disconnection: Oscillations in Political Violence on Lake Chad
Narrations on fragility and resilience in the Sahel paint a picture about the region’s inherent ungovernability that lead to consider an endless state- and peace-building process as the most feasible governance solution. Everyday practices of violent entrepreneurship, coalescing with inter-community and land-tenure conflicts, now inform social relations and are transforming moral economies around Lake Chad. While competition over territory suitable for farming, grazing and fishing has intensified, dispute-settlement practices organised by community-level authorities have proven ineffective and lacking the necessary means to respond to the encroachment of a wide range of interests claimed by increasingly powerful actors. Meanwhile, communities organised in self-defence militias are undergoing a process of progressive militarisation that tends to normalise violence and legitimise extra-judicial vigilante justice, further empowering capital-endowed arms suppliers gravitating in the jihadi galaxy, such as the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).
Explaining violence in Tillaberi: insurgetn appropiration of local Grievances
The Tillabéri region in Niger has quickly lapsed into a state of violence and come under the control of ‘violent entrepreneurs’ – that is, non-state armed actors possessing some kind of political agenda, which is implemented in tandem with different types of income-generating activities. Violent entrepreneurs rule by force and violence, but they also distribute resources, provide some level of order and offer protection to (at least parts of) the population in the areas they control, or attempt to control. In many local communities in peripheral areas of the Sahel, these violent entrepreneurs have a stronger presence than international community actors and their national allies. This situation is partly the result of spill-over effects from the war in Mali and local herder-farmer conflicts, but the key factors are the ability of jihadi insurgents to appropriate local grievances and the failure of the state to resist this.
Governance, fragility and insurgency in the Sahel: a hybrid order in the making
Once a region that rarely featured in debates about global security, the Sahel has become increasingly topical as it confronts the international community with intertwined challenges related to climate variability, poverty, food insecurity, population displacement, transnational crime, contested statehood and jihadist insurgencies. This Special Issue discerns the contours of political orders in the making. After situating the Sahel region in time and space, we focus on the trajectory of regional security dynamics over the past decade, which are marked by two military coups in Mali (2012 and 2020). In addressing state fragility and societal resilience in the context of increasing external intervention and growing international rivalry, we seek to consider broader and deeper transformations that can be neither ignored nor patched up through the framework of the ‘war on terror’ projected onto ‘ungoverned spaces’. Focusing especially on the mobilisation of material and immaterial resources, we apply political economy lenses in combination with a historical sociological approach to shed light on how extra-legal governance plays a crucial role in the deformation, transformation and reformation of political orders.
The Fragility Dilemma and Divergent Security Complexes in the Sahel
Despite an exponential increase in international resources devoted to the Sahel, the situation on the ground continues to deteriorate. This is largely due to the so-called “fragility dilemma”, faced by fragile states that are in critical need of external assistance, but have limited absorption capacity and are governed by sitting regimes that dictate the terms and upon which external actors must rely. This dilemma has contributed to an increasing divergence between a state-centric regional and a people-centric transnational security complex. In particular, a heavy-handed approach to violent extremism and external policies aimed at curbing “irregular” migration have had a number of unintended consequences, disrupting livelihoods and further exacerbating instability in the Sahelian states.
“Irregular” Migration and Divergent Understandings of Security in the Sahel
On 23 September 2020, the EU launched its new Pact on Migration and Asylum. In a refreshingly blunt press-release accompanying the Pact one could read: “The current system no longer works. And for the past five years, the EU has not been able to fix it”. The stated aim of the Pact is a fairer sharing of responsibility and solidarity between member states while providing certainty for individual asylum applicants. This is intended to rebuild trust between EU members as well as improve the capacity to better manage migration. However, whether the Pact will be implemented and have an effect on EU external migration policy in the Sahel remains to be seen. Following the 2012 crisis in Mali and further spread of instability to neighbouring Niger and Burkina Faso, the central areas of the Sahel region have gained prominence as “producers” of transnational security threats, such as violent extremism, “irregular” migration and human trafficking. With Niger also being a major transit hub for northbound “irregular” migrants, this trend was further exacerbated by the so-called European refugee and migration crisis in 2015. This has led to unprecedented international attention in recent years, and consequently, a growing number of bilateral and multilateral donor assistance programmes and external military interventions. Since 2015, the number of refugees and asylum seekers coming from this area to Europe has been reduced. At first glance, this could mistakenly be understood as a success-story in migration management, or alternatively, that fewer people want to travel the dangerous route across the Mediterranean. However, the situation on the ground is going from bad to worse, despite increased levels of international resources invested to foster stabilisation and development in the region. Why? This IAI Commentary is based on the authors’ forthcoming journal article: “The Fragility Dilemma and Divergent Security Complexes in the Sahel”, in The International Spectator, Vol. 55, No. 4 (December 2020).
Islamic Insurgents in the MENA Region. Global Threat or Regional Menace?
This working paper analyses a broad range of Islamic insurgents, spanning from the Sahel and North Africa to the Middle East, examining the threat that these groups represent on a regional and global scale. We assess their local, regional and global strategies and evaluate the extent to which they make use of Jihadist discourse to further local/regional aims, or whether they are more truly devoted to a global struggle, operationally as well as in discourse and rhetoric. We make use of several analytical dimensions and factors in a way that allows us to develop a threat assessment that seeks to disentangle the local, the regional and the global levels. In doing so, our aim is also to develop a methodological framework that may be used for analytical updates and future research in this region and elsewhere.
Chad’s Pivotal Role in the Regional Crisis
An analysis of Chad's regime role in the context of the military and humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad Basin
Mali's Religious Leaders and the 2018 Presidential Elections
Mali is by constitution a secular state, but here as elsewhere in the Sahel the role of religious leaders is increasing both in the social and the political sphere. This HYRES research brief explains how, why, and in what ways religious leaders tried to gain influence in the 2018 presidential campaign. While the research brief shows that there has been a fusion of politics and religion that can increase the political influence of Malian religious leaders, such engagement can also be a double-edged sword as Malians tend to see ‘politics as dirty’ and not a field that pious men of faith should get too deeply involved in.
To engage or not engage? Libyan Salafis and state institutions
At the beginning of the recent escalation of hostilities in Libya in April 2019, one of the key questions posed was what role, if any, quietist Salafis would play. Followers of this trend have grown significantly in influence in recent years, including in the security sphere and government institutions. As a result, their decisions, especially those regarding military engagement, have the potential to have important consequences at the national level. The fact that these “quietist” Salafis in Libya are armed already poses interesting ideological questions. Moreover, the fact that their behaviour during the recent fighting in Tripoliihas been somewhat unpredictable indicates that their ideology of obedience to the sitting ruler requires further interrogation.This research brief looks at the way in which the quietist Salafis have evolved to gain such a strong position in Libya, assessing their behaviour in four distinct periods. It contrasts this behaviour with other Salafi trends in Libya, particularly the political Salafism associated with certain former leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). It argues that Libyan Salafis have adapted and renegotiated ideologies in the changing political context after 2011. More than pure ideology, the way in which they have responded to the constraints and opportunities created by this context has been the key factor in the evolution of the different groups and ultimately their fortunes.
The Joint Force of the G5 Sahel: An Appropriate Response to Combat Terrorism?
The Joint Force of the Group of Five of the Sahel reflects the commitment of African states to cooperate to address common security challenges. Yet, little is known about its counter-terrorism strategy for the region. This article focuses on the security pillar of the G5 Sahel, the Joint Force (FC-G5S), and provides a critical examination of its mandate to combat terrorism in the Sahel. It explains the context into which the force was deployed and provides an overview of its conceptualisation and configuration. It demonstrates that in its current form, there is a danger of advancing a security-first stabilisation strategy that relies heavily on military-led counter-terror operations to contain and deter the threat of terrorist groups which can have serious consequences for local communities living among insurgents. The article argues that while establishing firmer border control and enhanced intelligence-sharing between the G5 Sahel states is important, the current counter-terror response risks depoliticising insurgents, and neglects the sociopolitical and economic grievances and problems of governance that have enabled violent extremism to take root in the first place. Removing the categorisation of jihadist insurgents as terrorists only and understanding their multifaceted identities – some as legitimate social and political actors – would open up more policy responses, including dialogue and conflict resolution.
Pathways to reconciliation in divided societies: Islamist groups in Lebanon and Mali
Why do some population groups choose to turn away from the state and opt for violence, while other groups that may be equally frustrated with the state remain engaged with the existing polity? This question has become particularly salient and complex in the last five years following the Arab revolutions and counter-revolutions. In a number of states, Salafi groups had to choose between standing outside the domestic political game or participating in formal and informal ways in national and local politics. We approach Sunni and Shi’I Islamism not as monolithic blocks, but as ideological arenas of dispute between competing and evolving social movements, operating in specific local contexts. Thus, focusing on cases from Tripoli, Lebanon and Bamako, Mali we show that religious actors are positioned in multiple fields at the same time. No position or pattern of allegiance should therefore be seen as permanent, but rather possible flexible and shifting. We analyse how such actors navigate such situational fields, what factors that determine their strategies’ potential for contributing to peaceful reconciliation, the sustainability of such reconciliation, and what lessons learned from the divided societies of Lebanon and Mali that are relevant for the case of Syria.
Africa's Insurgents: Navigating an Evolving Landscape
Amid an array of shifting national, regional, and global forces, how have African insurgents managed to adapt and survive? And what differences and similarities can be found, both among the continent's diverse rebellions and guerrilla movements and between them and movements elsewhere in the world? Addressing these issues, the authors of Africa's Insurgents explore how new groups are emerging and existing ones changing in response to an evolving landscape.