Mental health exemptions to criminal responsibility - between law, medicine, politics and security
Ill mental health is a key category for exempting individuals from criminal responsibility. Even in cases where a defendant has been found to have carried out the act, if mentally ‘ill enough’, the person could either be fully exempt from criminal responsibility and found not guilty – or be partially exempt and receive a reduced or special sentence on mental health grounds. Such outcomes might entail diversion into mental health treatment, sectioning – or release. In determining whether a mental health exemption is warranted in individual cases, ordinary practice is that psychologists or psychiatrists forensically assess the severity and nature of the accused’s impairment or disorder. While this might seem like a straightforward medical-juridical procedure of establishing evidence, this article uses a modified ‘genealogy of the present’ to show how mental health exemptions to criminal responsibility involve significantly more complexity. Looking to Norway and the UK, this article highlights differences in frameworks and implementation, including on matters of burden and nature of proof, and on causality. The article uses as an example the particular category of terrorism-related cases to bring out some of the contingencies involved. By doing so, the article shows the tensions inherent to the principle and practice of mental health exemptions, and its location between law, medicine, politics and security.
Framtidig forsvar for Norge: Innspill til langtidsplan og forsvarskonsept
This NUPI Report is in Norwegian only.
Presidential and royal visit to NUPI
Living up to expectations? German political ambitions and military role in the Baltic Sea and North Atlantic
This project will contribute with knowledge and competence building about Germany’s evolving role as a military actor in the Baltic Sea and North Atlantic...
Nagelhus Schia appointed Research Professor
Dealing with the challenge of Russian political warfare in the High North and in the Black Sea Region
How has Russia used other instruments of power than military ones in the context of the war in Ukraine?
Gine Rønne Bolling
Gine R. Bolling is a junior research fellow in the Research group on security and defence. She graduated with an MSc in Politics of Conflict, Rig...
Heimevernet og forsvaret av Norge: Skjerpet trusselbilde, uforløst potensial
I forsvaret av Norge er Heimevernet (HV) en vital del av grunnmuren. Styrken er Forsvarets største, geografisk mest spredte, og har samtidig ansvaret for det bredeste spekteret av oppgaver – i fred, krise og væpnet konflikt. HV leverer mye effekt – og har et uutnyttet potensial til å levere enda mer – for en relativt sett billig penge. Likevel har styrkens andel av Forsvarssektorens samlede driftsbudsjett falt, fra 3,8 % i 2015, til 3,1 % i budsjettet for 2024 – en mulig indikasjon på at styrken ikke er høyt prioritert når det norske forsvarsbudsjettet økes. Dette forskningsnotatet gir en kort beskrivelse HVs ansvar og oppgaver, og peker på utviklingstrekk som vil kunne påvirke disse i nær fremtid. Notatet illustrerer gapet mellom oppgavene, de vedtatte ambisjonene om videreutvikling, og ressursene som blir stilt til rådighet. I forlengelsen av dette svekkes hele samfunnets motstandsdyktighet i en tid hvor usikkerheten er større enn på lenge. Rapporten peker på fire konkrete tiltak som ved hjelp av en relativt moderat budsjettøkning vil kunne utnytte det latente utviklingspotensialet i HV-strukturen og gi betydelig og umiddelbar effekt på Forsvarets samlede evne til å levere beredskap og sikkerhet overalt, alltid – i fred, krise og i krig.
Politics and Security in the Arctic (POPSARC)
At a time marked by major international turbulence – war in Europe, the breakdown of established diplomatic fora, the entry of new actors and stakeholders – there is an urgent need for also understand...
The defence of northern Europe: new opportunities, significant challenges
With Finland and Sweden joining NATO, the Nordics will be united for the first time in a military alliance encompassing not only northern Europe but also the broader transatlantic region. It will eventually fortify northern European security, but several obstacles must be overcome first. NATO has done a formidable job since 2014 in updating its defence plans, cumulating in the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) family of plans approved in Vilnius 2023. Now Finland and Sweden need to be incorporated into these plans. A more challenging task is to implement NATO's New Force Model which is tremendously ambitious. Finland and Sweden's contributions will be important, but new investments must be made. NATO's Command Structure is yet to be fully reformed and fitted to the DDA. Joint Force Command Norfolk must urgently be staffed, without undue politicization in NATO. Nordic defence buildup can draw on regional cooperation in particular in five areas: in strengthening the area's command design through functional double-hatted headquarters; developing close air power cooperation through e.g. a Combined Joint Air Operations Centre; strengthening total defence cooperation across borders and expanding logistical infrastructure; establishing joint intelligence task forces; and joint training and exercises. The contributions of the United States and United Kingdom are indispensable when it comes to upholding the alliance's guarantee in northern Europe. The recent signing of Defense Cooperation Agreements between the US and the Nordics reinforces this—together with an increased presence of air and naval assets in the region. The same applies to the UK and the Joint Expeditionary Force which now has shifted its focus towards northern Europe. This engagement is a crucial addition to Nordic and NATO plans and activities in a period when growth in Nordic defence structures is occurring at a relatively slow pace. Only after the weaknesses and hurdles are addressed will the deterrence and defence of the region attain a fully credible level.