Den norske Atlanterhavskomité: Spranget inn i fremtiden
Europe is at war. Putin's attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022 marks a turning point in European security. The war is also a preliminary climax in Russian revisionism, which dates back to 1990 and became more marked from 2007 and 2014. Some saw the war coming. From October 2021, insightful analysts and actors in intelligence and decision-making circles in the United States, NATO Belgium and some circles in Norway became increasingly confident that war was on the way. The inner circles had access to very good intelligence. People in positions with deep insight into Russian history watched with growing concern as Russia's bloodthirsty imperial tradition resurfaced, brutal and unadorned - this unpleasant habit of Romanovs and communists to devour neighbors. People in positions with broad knowledge of both literature and governance saw that the authoritarian Russian regime moved in a totalitarian direction and isolated itself, something we recognize from other totalitarian regimes. Experts in the public sphere did not see war as likely, with some exceptions. It was not rational, sort of. Nor had they imagined that the Soviet empire would fall apart. We see what we have seen before: That experts are best at explaining in retrospect why things went the way they did. And that they blame the politicians for not reacting in time. No one knows how long the war will last and how long Putin's Russia will remain a pariah. It is noted that a number of European leaders are working to create peace, several of them in such a way that they themselves can shine. Here we will look beyond the war itself and have a special eye on traditional power and interest politics: What are the long-term challenges and threats of significance to Norway? How should we organize our security policy and our defense? This is a time of great challenges, but also many opportunities. Crises create opportunities. There is an opportunity to make Norway better equipped to handle major changes in geopolitics and technology. We will dwell on the surroundings, especially Russia and the north. We will discuss the Nordic region in NATO as a security policy project. We will discuss the Armed Forces' design, especially the ability to think consistently from thought to action. And we will finally present five bold postulates, which transcend conventional thinking, about what Norway will be able to prioritize in the years ahead.
Revisiting nuclear hedging: ballistic missiles and the Iranian example
Technological shifts have made nascent nuclear arsenals more vulnerable. In this article, Henrik Stålhane Hiim argues that this provides “nuclear hedgers” – states that deliberately seeking to develop the ability to go nuclear – with strong incentives to acquiring ballistic missiles. The article illustrates this tendency through a case-study of the Iranian missile and rocket programs. It finds that missile acquisition has indeed been an integral part of Iran's hedging strategy, and that several of the systems it has acquired indicate an interest in nuclear weapons delivery.
Networked territoriality: A processual–relational view on the making (and makings) of regions in world politics
This article proposes a processual–relational perspective on region-making and its effects in world politics. It revisits the concepts of regionalism and regionalisation to unearth the relational mechanisms underlying these archetypical pathways of regional emergence. Regionalism refers to the bounding of regions – the definition of its inside and outside, and of which actors fall on either side. Regionalisation denotes the binding of regions, the amalgamations of relations around a shared territoriality. I argue that regions affect world politics in their making through the boundaries raised and relations produced in the process. I then mobilise network theory and analysis to propose a framework for studying the making and makings of regions. Regions’ binding and bounding are rooted in brokerage dynamics that sustain clusters of relations denser inside a regional boundary, rather than outside, and allow some actors to control interactions across that boundary. I illustrate this framework with a case study on the emergence of the Amazon as a region in world politics. I analyse interaction networks in UN-level environmental negotiations involving the ecosystem. The analysis shows how the making of the Amazon has been tied to preserving the position of Amazonian states as the main brokers, speaking for and acting on behalf of the region.
RUSMENA round tables in Rome and Florence on 1 and 2 June 2022
Webinar: Shifting from External Dependency: Remodelling the G5 Sahel Joint Force for the Future
The Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON), Training for Peace (TfP) and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) are pleased to invite you to a webinar on the G5 Sahel Joint Force (G5S-JF).
Webinar: IUU fishing and the challenges of sustainable fisheries management: the role of Norway and international cooperation.
In this seminar, we will discuss the role of international cooperation and development assistance in addressing Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing.
Re-imagining African—Nordic relations in a changing global order
This study asks how the special relationship between countries in Africa and the Nordic region may be affected by a changing global order, that the African-Nordic cooperation can continue to evolve and remain relevant for both regions. The meeting in Helsinki on 14 June 2022 is the 20th meeting of the forum of African–Nordic Foreign Ministers. The forum was established in 2000 between five Nordic countries and ten African countries. It was intended to emphasize the political importance of Africa and to demonstrate that Africa–Nordic relations went beyond development cooperation. The forum meets alternately and rotates among African and Nordic countries and African hosts have included Benin, Botswana, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania. The number of African countries expanded over time and now numbers around 25. The annual meeting is an opportunity to consolidate the special relationship between African and Nordic countries and creates a space where political issues of mutual concern can be discussed. As such, it has helped to broaden the African–Nordic relations beyond development cooperation and towards a more politically-oriented and interest-based strategic partnership. Beyond the annual foreign ministers meeting, the other aspect the report looks into is what the sum-total of African-Nordic bilateral relations in the areas of trade, development, peace and security and multilateral cooperation reveals about the status of the overall relationship. Africa pursues strategic partnerships that helps it to develop and strengthen the continent’s economic potential, political identity, and its role on the global stage. In this study we pay particular attention to Africa’s relationship with China, Europe, India, Russia and Turkey. One of the dominant features of Africa’s international relations has been its non-alignment. African countries have been careful to seek partnerships with many different states and regions, without being pulled into any one alliance that may prevent it from also gaining support for its development from others. Therefore, in its strategic partnerships, African countries seeks engagements that will help it to grow its economies.
Re-imagining African-Nordic relations in a changing global order
Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet: Sudan
Shifting from External Dependency: Remodelling the G5 Sahel Joint Force for the Future
After a decade of battling jihadist and violent extremist groups in West Africa, France has initiated the restructuring and relocation of its largest overseas military mission in the Sahel with an announcement of the withdrawal of Operation Barkhane (the French military counterterrorism intervention) from Mali. The exit over the coming months may signify an important shift of western military operations in Mali and the Sahel. France’s deployment in the Sahel was initially triggered by the activities of Tuareg separatists in the northern part of Mali. Islamic extremists closely associated with Al-Qaeda took advantage of the situation, seizing north Mali and spreading their activities southwards in 2012. Despite French counterterrorism operations, instability worsened, and Islamists controlled vast swathes of northern and central Mali, parts of Burkina Faso, and western Niger. Over time, under the motivation of France, the G5 Sahel Joint Force (G5S-JF) was created to address the everyday challenges of terrorism and transnational organised crime among the five member states (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger). For a force supported by three United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2359 (2017), 2391 (2017) and 2480 (2019); and with a force strength of 5600 troops organised around three sectors,1 its operational successes have been a mixed bag (ten joint border operations). Operation Barkhane together with European Union Training Mission Mali (EUTM), the Capacity Building Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) and Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), has enhanced the operational readiness and capabilities of the G5 Sahel through mentoring, training, and funding of the joint-force operations. Additionally, these external operations, particularly Barkhane, have been supportive of the activities of G5S-JF by providing intelligence, supporting logistical and joint planning, providing aerial and air support, and engaging in medical evacuation. Notwithstanding, the Joint Force has been contending with weak intelligence, shortfalls in equipment, limited aerial capabilities and a lack of rapid response, which invariably hinders operational effectiveness. The Joint Force represents an essential step toward addressing the instability that affects Mali and the broader Sahel, but as of yet, the G5S-JF has been unable to fully demonstrate its effectiveness as a force despite significant support from donor countries such as France. Moreover, it is uncertain how Mali´s withdrawal from the Joint Force will impact on the overall strategy of the G5S-JF and its sustainability going forward, especially given Mali’s recent announcement of withdrawing from the G5 Sahel. The departure of Barkhane, together with Takuba and other European arrangements from Mali, raises many unanswered questions about the funding, operational capacity and political cooperation between the other member states of the Joint Force. Even though France has reiterated that it will continue to support peacekeepers serving under MINUSMA; and Malian troops continuing to battle Islamic violent extremism after the Barkhane withdrawal, the response time to jihadist attacks and activities inside Malian territory will not be the same. Without Barkhane, the G5S-JF will struggle to protect civilians, evacuate soldiers in need of medical attention, and support effective joint planning and coordination of G5S-JF and intelligence sharing —which has been instrumental in the fight against jihadist. To address emerging challenges, enhance the ability of the G5S-JF and sustain its support, this report proposes four possible options that could fill the gap resulting from the current security vacuum being created following the possible withdrawal of some of the external military forces from Mali, and Mali itself from the G5S-JF. In arriving at these proposed options, emphasis is placed on regional perspectives, which draws on African frameworks and the use of African resources, experience, capabilities and understanding. The report argues that this would allow better ownership and closer proximity to the issues, ensuring that international partners are not dictating how the region and African Union (AU) Member States (MS) should solve challenges. The evaluation considered the full spectrum of options to include: • A reconfigured and scaled-up G5 Sahel Joint Force (Plus); • A reconfigured G5 Sahel Joint Force and revised MISAHEL through the AU, ECOWAS, ECCAS and CENSAD; • An integrated ECOWAS (deployment of the African Standby Force) utilising the G5 Sahel force; and • Elevating the G5 Sahel force to an AU (Peace Enforcement mission) with UN support. The proposed options focus on military and hybrid solutions that can tackle existing challenges in the Sahel and West Africa as a whole. However, defeating jihadism and violent extremism is essentially a job that should include intelligence and police authorities to win the hearts and minds of the population, but this cannot be done solely with hard stabilisation efforts. Tackling the vast challenges in the Sahel requires a careful mix of adaptive, agile and sustained efforts that cut across social, economic, political, developmental, humanitarian and recovery instruments and support. Thus, the report suggests additional stabilisation efforts to support the Sahel focused on local, national, regional and international initiatives that can connect to the ground and tackle internal challenges comprehensively. These initiatives, it will be argued, can plug into existing structures but also help to support structures not fully recognised. Efforts to resolve the problems in the Sahel stand a much greater chance of success if fully supported with buy-in from the AU, together with ECOWAS and support from the UN, EU and donors that can draw on the full spectrum of available instruments which have a demonstrable desire to work with like-minded partners. The authors of this report believe that a scaled-up and reconfigured G5 Sahel Joint Force (G5 Sahel Plus) option (discussed below) would have been the optimal model. However, following the recent withdrawal of Mali from the G5S-JF and the deteriorating political landscape in the region and between states, the authors’ reassessment calls for an AU Peace Enforcement mission as the most appropriate, given the current situation. It is important to note, the recommendations provided in this report hinge on the ability of the current and former G5S-JF states to address and resolve the deteriorating political situation, which is fluid in nature and continuously evolving. This will require all states (current and former G5S-JF) to recognise that they need each other to address these challenges, and that any reconfiguration (the models provided in this report) depends on the political situation being fully addressed. There is a need, as the models indicate, to have more joint efforts between the AU and ECOWAS to assist in resolving the current impasses in the region.