Critical communication infrastructures and Huawei
Recently, there have been growing cyber-safety concerns over telecom equipment made by the Chinese vendor Huawei. This has led many countries to ban Huawei from supplying equipment for building the next generation of mobile networks, 5G. Responses from mobile operators and the telecom community in general have been mixed. For instance, many European mobile operators have stated that these concerns are overblown and that such a ban would delay 5G rollout by two to three years in the best case. Moreover, some operators have directly questioned the ability of the other vendors to timely deliver a complete 5G network. However, these claims have mostly not been grounded in empirical data. This paper takes a multi-perspective approach to investigating this problem empirically. We start by categorizing responses from different countries to using Huawei equipment in 5G. We then analyze the importance and readiness of Huawei for supplying 5G equipment. This analysis is based on contributions to standards and patents. We also present a conceptual risk analysis framework to qualitatively evaluate the ability of a single vendor to cause considerable damage to critical communication infrastructures. This model aims at exploring a set of relevant axis. More specifically, we look at potential for harm in different political climates that is peace, crisis and war. Another axis is whether banning a particular vendor from supplying equipment for the upcoming mobile networks generation is useful without having a backward compatible ban. A third axis is the ability of a vendor to cause harm as a function of the type of supplied equipment, for example radio towers vs network management systems. Combining the analysis of readiness for supplying 5G and potential for causing harm allows us to roughly estimate the likely impact that a complete ban would have on 5G rollout in different parts of the world. We find that such a ban can possibly delay 5G by two years or more for operators with high dependence on Huawei. Consequently, we explore potential approaches that would both reduce vendor-related risk and do not significantly delay the rollout of 5G. These include heterogeneous multi-vendor deployments, equipment verification and testing, international collaboration as well as signing non-aggression treaties. Unfortunately, there is no technological solution that fully remedy this problem. Combining technical solutions with efforts to build trust between countries, enforce existing alignments or create new ones seems a promising way forward.
What global role for the EU after Brexit?
When the UK eventually leaves the EU, the EU's role as an actor in the world will change. In this seminar, Professor Mike Smith from the University of Warwick will present his work on the the interplay between Brexit and the EU’s international roles.
Is this Russia's Kodak moment? Russian perspectives on the energy transition (KODAK)
This project will examine whether Russian energy actors are aware of the possibility of swift decarbonization of the global energy supply, what consequences they think it would have for demand for Rus...
Debunking renewable energy myths
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Tax and fragile states: Challenges for Norwegian development assistance
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Environmental challenges know no borders – Foreign policy for a habitable planet
What obstacles is there in solving the climate crisis? Who is responsible for saving us from it? Does it matter what we do locally and nationally? What role does foreign policy play in reaching the goal? WWF, J.M. Stenersens Forlag and NUPI invites you to a mini-lecture with David Wallace-Wells and a panel discussion on the importance of a greener foreign policy.
Top marks for NUPI’s EU project
Reviewers find NUPI-led research on the EU’s crisis response "exceptional"!
Theory seminar: States and Nature – The Effects of Climate Change on Security
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Norge må tenke nytt i Persiabukta
(In norwegian only) I stedet for å si ja til å bidra militært i Persiabukta, er det mulig å tenke seg en mye mer proaktiv og klok norsk linje. Sommertid er glemselstid. Verden går tilsynelatende i sine vante spor. Og når vi endelig vender tilbake til kontorpulten, synes beste måte å takle jobbens utfordringer på å gjøre som vi pleier. Det bør ikke gjelde for norsk utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk. For der står vi ved et veiskille, og i løpet av sommeren har det dukket opp en ny prøvestein for Norge.
Konflikt, ustabilitet og migranter: "post-Gaddafi blues" i Sahel
(In norwegian only) Hvilke lærdommer kan vi trekke av bombingen av Libya i 2011? Var krigføringen i tråd med krigens folkerett? Brøt norske myndigheter grunnloven i forbindelse med krigsdeltagelsen? Levde media opp til sitt samfunnsoppdrag så lenge krigføringen i Libya pågikk? Ble det norske folk holdt for narr om de egentlige årsakene til krigen? Og hva ble konsekvensene av Libya-krigen for nasjonen Libya, regionen og verdenssamfunnet? Libya: Krigens uutholdelige letthet setter et kritisk søkelys på Norges deltagelse i den Nato-ledete operasjonen i Libya. Blant forfatterne finner vi folkerettsjurister, historikere, militære, statsvitere og professorer i journalistikk og fredsforskning. Et felles utgangspunkt for alle bidragsyterne er spørsmålet om hva norske politikere, militære og det norske folk kan og bør lære av Norges første krig i Afrika.