Women and minorities in the Lok Sabha: Intersectionality in the Indian elections
It is well known that women are under-represented in India’s legislative assemblies. The historically marginalised Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs), on the other hand, have reserved seats proportional to their share of the population that guarantee them a political presence. What does this mean for SC and ST women? Perhaps counter-intuitively, the answer is that there are more women candidates and winners in reserved seats than in general category seats.
Should I stay or should I go? Security considerations for members leaving al-Shabaab in Somalia
The Somali jihadi organization al-Shabaab, yet again featured in the news internationally when they attacked a business and hotel complex in Nairobi 15 January this year. This is not the first time the group carries out largescale attacks outside the Somali boarders. Other examples are the Garissa University College attack in 2015, the mass shooting at Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi in 2013 and the Kampala attacks in 2010. However, the majority of the atrocities committed by al-Shabaab take place in South Central Somalia. The Global Terrorism Index 2018 ranked Somalia as number 6 on its list of countries most impacted by terrorism in 2017.1 Al-Shabaab was behind the deadliest terrorist attack in 2017 worldwide, when a suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden truck, killing 587 people in Mogadishu. Although al-Shabaab has had several military setbacks the last few years, the group still poses a significant threat to security and stability in the region. As the name al-Shabaab (‘the youth’) indicates, young people predominate in the group. This means that thousands of individuals spend parts of their youth in al- Shabaab. The question then arises: how to best assist the ones who want to leave the group?
Constructed anarchy: governance, conflict and precarious property rights in Bukavu, DR Congo
What is the nexus between conflict, property rights and land governance in some parts of DR Congo?
Transatlantisk trøbbel. Europa og USA orker ikke lengre å skjule spenningene.
Sikkerhetskonferansen i München har tradisjonelt vært stedet for å dyrke det transatlantiske samarbeidet. Årets versjon var derfor et deprimerende skue. Avstanden mellom Europa og USA har lenge vært stor, men nå orket ingen lengre å legge skjul på spenningene og misnøyen. Visepresident Mike Pence var av en annen mening. Hans tale var skarp og formanende. Han skrøt av USAs økonomiske, militære og teknologiske styrke. Han hadde noen positive formuleringer om Nato. Men mellom linjene sto det: enten er dere med oss, eller så er dere mot oss. Og for øvrig, dersom det transatlantiske samarbeidet skulle ryke, er ikke det USAs problem, det er Europas. Amerikanerne fremsatte en lang kravliste: At alle Nato land snarlig oppnår toprosentmålet i Nato og at de også når målet om å øke sine investeringer og anskaffelser til 20 prosent. At allierte skal avvise North Stream 2 og heller kjøpe amerikansk lng-gass. At allierte ikke kjøper teknologi fra Huawei, og at man ikke gjør seg sårbar i forhold til kritisk infrastruktur. At Europa trekker seg fra Iran-avtalen og blir med i presset på Iran, og at Europa avstår fra å «undergrave» USAs politikk i Midtøsten. At Europa øker presset på Nord-Korea og Venezuela, samt at Europa tar sin del av opprydningen og gjenoppbyggingen i Syria. Samtidig snakket Pence lite om det som opptar mange i Europa, som for eksempel Russland, klima, migrasjon, reformer i internasjonale institusjoner og så videre, og han sa intet som kunne redusere den fornyede usikkerheten om en forsterket handelskonflikt mellom Europa og USA. Det nye formen for amerikansk lederskap besto derfor i å formane og diktere andre. Det var i beste fall et motsetningsfylt budskap, han dyrket egen suverenitet og «America first», men ville samtidig ikke at andre skal utøve sin. At det kunne være i USAs egeninteresse å samarbeide med Europa virket fremmed. Å lede gjennom eksempel, gjennom inklusjon, eller på grunnlag av felles verdier eller institusjoner syntes også forlatt. Budskapet ble formidlet, men det traff ikke. I forkant var det vage håp. Europa ønsket forsikringer om at USA under president Donald Trump fortsatt var forpliktet til samarbeid, og at de så på Europa som alliert med respekt og verdi. USA hadde også varslet at de ville delta med en rekordstor delegasjon. Den tyske forsvarsministeren innledet med å si det USA ønsket å høre, nemlig at Europa burde og ville bidra mer i Nato, men hun minnet samtidig om betydningen av verdifellesskap, og behovet for at det var en rimelighet og rettferdighet, også når det gjelder beslutningstaking.
Lunch seminar: Peace, war and alliances in cyberspace
What are cyberspace operations? In what ways is conflict in this “domain” different from conflict in physical domain? And how do cyberspace operations relate to information warfare, what are the similarities and differences?
Comparing Cyber Security. Critical Infrastructure protection in Norway, the UK and Finland.
Cyber security and protecting critical infrastructures from digital harm are of increasing importance for governments around the globe. Tackling this issue is challenged by two distinct features of cyber security in Western states: Firstly, the transnational nature of digital risks and threats necessitates cooperation and engagements beyond the state, through international and regional organizations and institutions. Secondly, the considerable extent of private ownership forces states to rely on and engage with private companies, through regulation or public–private partnerships (PPP). Through comparative analysis of the approaches taken to PPP and European cooperation for energy and telecommunication in Finland, Norway and the UK, this report examines how states engage with these issues. The greatest difference is found to lie between the two Nordic states and the UK. This is not the result of divergent national perceptions and understandings, but of the more centralized and intelligence-centred approach taken by the UK in contrast to the whole-of-society trust-based approach of the Nordic states. Both approaches entail distinct benefits and drawbacks. The major concern in the Nordic states is the lack of public resources and capacity, as well as the fragmentation of responsibility and capabilities. Realizing the importance of culture, context and history in shaping how public authorities respond to cyber-security concerns is of vital importance for enabling better policies. This report concludes by presenting a set of best practices identified in the three case countries.
The Politics of Stability: Cement and Change in Cyber Affairs
In November 2018, the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, inaugurated one year earlier ‘to develop proposals for norms and policies to enhance international security and stability and guide responsible state and non-state behavior in cyberspace’, launched six norms pointing ‘the way to new opportunities for increasing the stability of cyberspace’. However, the Commission has not examined or explained the very concept it was established to explore. Quite the contrary, the Commission argues that its proposed norms will be used to define what cyber stability actually is. Focusing on the interrelationship between international peace and stability, and ways of achieving both in the context of ICTs, the authors will offer a model of stability of cyberspace. They begin by examining the concepts of ‘stability’ and ‘strategic stability’ as understood with regard to international security. This conceptual analysis is followed by a presentation of the political claims of stability expressed in national and international cyber-and information-security discourses. Drawing on the conceptual approaches and the political claims, the report then model the stability of cyberspace in three interlinked and reinforcing dimensions: 1) equal and inclusive international relations; 2) prevention of war: the minimal peace, with emphasis on averting a devastating nuclear war between the superpowers; and 3) the functionality of global and national technical systems and services. After discussing how international law, preventive diplomacy, confidence-building measures, and norms of responsible state behaviour can support cyberspace stability, this report concludes with recommendations for action aimed at helping to create and maintain a stable - resilient and adaptive - cyberspace.
How to negotiate with difficult partners?
Ambassador Christopher R. Hill shares his insights and experiences from the frontline of American diplomacy in this episode of NUPI podcast.
EU Integration and Differentiation for Effectiveness and Accountability (EUIDEA)
EUIDEA is a H2020 project, which aims to break new ground on differentiated integration in terms of conceptual approach, policies and networks....