NATO and Collective Defence in the 21st Century: An Assessment of the Warsaw Summit
This book presents a cutting-edge assessment of NATO's collective defence strategies in the immediate aftermath of the July 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit. Collective defence and deterrence came back on the agenda at the 2014 Wales Summit following the Russian annexation of Crimea, and was in many respects a game changer for NATO. The Warsaw Summit was a follow-up and operationalization of the Wales Summit, as well as adding further initiatives to the agenda. But is NATO delivering? This book provides a thorough assessment of the on-going debates and discussions taking place within and outside of NATO in Europe and North America. In its return to deterrence, NATO is confronted with challenges relating to strategic thinking, capability development, and the role of nuclear weapons. It has also raised questions about the future prospects for NATO membership for countries such as Sweden and Finland, with broader implications for the security situation in the Baltic region. Central to all this is of course NATO’s relationship with Russia and questions of a new security dilemma, in turning bringing to the fore the challenge of maintaining an appropriate balance between deterrence and dialogue. The chapters in this volume address these questions and provide a much-needed analysis of the results of the NATO Warsaw Summit. This book will be of interest to policymakers and students of NATO, international security, European Politics, security studies and IR in general.
Conclusions: Looking towards Brussels 2017 and Istanbul 2018
This book presents a cutting-edge assessment of NATO's collective defence strategies in the immediate aftermath of the July 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit. Collective defence and deterrence came back on the agenda at the 2014 Wales Summit following the Russian annexation of Crimea, and was in many respects a game changer for NATO. The Warsaw Summit was a follow-up and operationalization of the Wales Summit, as well as adding further initiatives to the agenda. But is NATO delivering? This book provides a thorough assessment of the on-going debates and discussions taking place within and outside of NATO in Europe and North America. In its return to deterrence, NATO is confronted with challenges relating to strategic thinking, capability development, and the role of nuclear weapons. It has also raised questions about the future prospects for NATO membership for countries such as Sweden and Finland, with broader implications for the security situation in the Baltic region. Central to all this is of course NATO’s relationship with Russia and questions of a new security dilemma, in turning bringing to the fore the challenge of maintaining an appropriate balance between deterrence and dialogue. The chapters in this volume address these questions and provide a much-needed analysis of the results of the NATO Warsaw Summit. This book will be of interest to policymakers and students of NATO, international security, European Politics, security studies and IR in general.
Introduction: NATO after the Warsaw summit
This book presents a cutting-edge assessment of NATO's collective defence strategies in the immediate aftermath of the July 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit. Collective defence and deterrence came back on the agenda at the 2014 Wales Summit following the Russian annexation of Crimea, and was in many respects a game changer for NATO. The Warsaw Summit was a follow-up and operationalization of the Wales Summit, as well as adding further initiatives to the agenda. But is NATO delivering? This book provides a thorough assessment of the on-going debates and discussions taking place within and outside of NATO in Europe and North America. In its return to deterrence, NATO is confronted with challenges relating to strategic thinking, capability development, and the role of nuclear weapons. It has also raised questions about the future prospects for NATO membership for countries such as Sweden and Finland, with broader implications for the security situation in the Baltic region. Central to all this is of course NATO’s relationship with Russia and questions of a new security dilemma, in turning bringing to the fore the challenge of maintaining an appropriate balance between deterrence and dialogue. The chapters in this volume address these questions and provide a much-needed analysis of the results of the NATO Warsaw Summit. This book will be of interest to policymakers and students of NATO, international security, European Politics, security studies and IR in general.
NATO and Russia: Spiral of distrust
This book presents a cutting-edge assessment of NATO's collective defence strategies in the immediate aftermath of the July 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit. Collective defence and deterrence came back on the agenda at the 2014 Wales Summit following the Russian annexation of Crimea, and was in many respects a game changer for NATO. The Warsaw Summit was a follow-up and operationalization of the Wales Summit, as well as adding further initiatives to the agenda. But is NATO delivering? This book provides a thorough assessment of the on-going debates and discussions taking place within and outside of NATO in Europe and North America. In its return to deterrence, NATO is confronted with challenges relating to strategic thinking, capability development, and the role of nuclear weapons. It has also raised questions about the future prospects for NATO membership for countries such as Sweden and Finland, with broader implications for the security situation in the Baltic region. Central to all this is of course NATO’s relationship with Russia and questions of a new security dilemma, in turning bringing to the fore the challenge of maintaining an appropriate balance between deterrence and dialogue. The chapters in this volume address these questions and provide a much-needed analysis of the results of the NATO Warsaw Summit. This book will be of interest to policymakers and students of NATO, international security, European Politics, security studies and IR in general.
The paradox of gender equality
‘Development doesn’t necessarily promote equal opportunities’, says Francesca Refsum Jensenius.
Ytre Høyre, Foren Eder!
Ytre høyre forfekter nasjonalstaten, men er stadig mer internasjonale. Båndene er særlig sterke mellom bevegelser i USA og Russland.
A Pivot to What? Asia-Pacific Foreign Policy under Trump
Despite the difficulty in making predictions about an incoming American administration even before the inaugural process has been completed, the first two months since the US elections in November 2016 have already generated a great deal of debate and concern, about uncharted new directions in US foreign policy under president elect Donald Trump. Certainly the new president faces a host of international challenges,including Middle East security and chaotic relations with Russia, but arguably the most critical tests for the incoming government will be found in the Asia-Pacific region. As within other areas of foreign policy, Trump as a candidate oscillated,at times wildly, between interventionism and isolationism in his approach to Pacific Rim affairs, and as the year came to a close there was much watching and waiting in policy circles to see which of these would dominate. In addition, Trump assumes the presidency with the dubious distinction of possessing the lowest amount of foreign policy background in the history of American politics, so there is also the question of his administration’s ‘learning’ curve in crucial areas including the Asia-Pacific, with China relations at the forefront.
The Arctic and a Trump Administration Yet to Come
How may the Trump administration affect the Arctic? This is the topic for Elana Wilson Rowe's High North News commentary.
TTIP and Norway: Impact and trade policy options
This study analyzes TTIP, its implications for Norway and Norway’s trade policy choices. TTIP will hardly be concluded under Obama's presidency, but the agreement could become a reality within a few years. TTIP aims at comprehensive cooperation in the regulatory area. In the short term there will be limited harmonization of standards but regulatory cooperation between different systems. In the long term, the goal is stronger cooperation in the regulatory area. TTIP will from what we know not lead to a lowering of European health regulations or a "race to the bottom". If TTIP is realized and Norway remains outside, the EEA Agreement will be little affected and the overall economic impact is moderate. If Norway joins TTIP, there will be a significant real income gain, with estimates ranging from 2236 to 6772 NOK per capita in the various scenarios. There is considerable variation across sectors. With Norway outside TTIP there will be a moderate negative impact for a majority of the sectors, especially some manufacturing sectors that face tougher competition in the EU and USA export markets. The oil industry will benefit from increased demand and higher prices. If Norway joins TTIP, a clear majority of industries will benefit; especially business services and a number of other service industries. The public sector gains from TTIP, mainly due to cheaper inputs. TTIP will contribute to the dismantling of import protection for Norwegian agriculture and without compensating measures, production and employment will be reduced. TTIP will still allow some import protection and this margin of maneuver, which depends on future negotiations, is important for the outcome. With a larger margin of manoeuvre and unchanged budgetarty support, most of Norway’s agriculture can be maintained. With less margin of manoeuvre, it will be more challenging. Norwegian accession to TTIP may occur in the form of a standard trade agreement in which Norway or EFTA are formally equal to the EU and the United States. Alternatively, Norway may participate in a European pillar as in today's "Open Skies" agreement on air traffic. If TTIP succeeds in establishing comprehensive regulatory cooperation, the latter solution is most likely. Such a solution implies that Norway will become more closely integrated with the European Union also in trade policy towards third countries. Norwegian entry into TTIP implies that we have to accept the established rules and negotiate bilaterally with the EU and the USA on market access. The negotiations with the USA will apply to all aspects of market access, while negotiations with the EU will apply only to areas in which the EEA agreement is not already deeper. The negotiations with the EU for TTIP entry will thus include, among other issues, tariffs for seafood and agriculture. As an alternative to membership in TTIP, Norway or EFTA may initiate a trade agreement with the USA. Such an agreement would likely be less extensive in the regulatory area. Such an agreement will also provide an economic gain for Norway, but less than accession to TTIP. For Norway as a whole, accession to TTIP creates a real income gain between 12.5 and 35 billion NOK according to various scenarios, while a free trade agreement with the United States results in a gain of about 7.4 billion NOK. TTIP also includes negotiations on so-called Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), whereby foreign-owned companies can sue a state if they are unfairly or inappropriately treated. Such rights also exist in national law but international tribunals have to some extent extended the interpretation of what is considered unfair. The European Union has proposed a solution in TTIP with a permanent court as well as rules that discipline the interpretation of the principles, and thus avoids that ISDS unduly interferes into the states’ "right to regulate". This and many other issues are analysed in this report and six background papers.