After the Coup: Regional Strategies for Sudan
The civilian leadership that is currently coordinating the civil protest can start talks with the military to hand over power in exchange for immunity. The international community; and particularly the US and its allies in Europe could help those talks through imposing timely targeted sanctions on Al-Burhan and his allies until an agreement is reached and implemented. After a settlement is reached, the civilian leadership needs to coordinate with the FFC, the armed movements, the hold out armed groups that have held out and the new military commanders through an appointed legislative council. The council should be tasked and mandated to set out a comprehensive vision for the transitional period through appointing the remaining institutions of the government and developing a clear and doable road map to the post-transition elections. And, through the legislative council, all three actors need to agree on implementing a series of programmes and deadlines to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate combatants of the armed groups and RSF into the SAF; and depoliticise the SAF which will require technical expertise and support from regional bodies such as the African Union and IGAD. Thus, it is crucial for the AU and IGAD —with support only from the Trokia states only—to consider a coherent stabilisation strategy for Sudan as a part of a broader regional stabilisation strategy anchored on AU principles that take into consideration the fluidity of the context on the ground and puts in place sustained security guarantees, economic, political and technical support with a variety of measures that help to stabilise the country and its future.
Who could replace Sudan’s PM Abdalla Hamdok?
Andrew E Yaw Tchie from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs discusses the resignation of Sudan's Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and how the country can move forward.
ECOWAS leaders hold an emergency summit in Ghana after a series of coups on the continent
At an emergency summit in Ghana, West African regional group ECOWAS held off on ramping up penalties on Burkina Faso over its military coup. Last month, it followed Mali and Guinea, to become the third member of the block to undergo a putsch in less than two years. All three have been suspended from ECOWAS, but Burkina Faso, so far, has not faced the crippling trade and economic sanctions. The Burkina Faso Junta have shown willingness to return to constitutional order. However, there remains a wider concern over the number of coups seen in the region in the last couple of years remains. Dr Andrew E. Yaw Tchie discusses ECOWAS´ condemnations and sanctions over the coups and whether this concern is merited.
Rebel governance? A literature review of Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa Province
The literature on rebel governance has fundamentally challenged the idea that ‘governance’ is the sole prerogative of ‘government’. Despite important advances over the past decade, studies have largely addressed rebel governance from an ‘institutionalist’ approach. This review seeks to go beyond an ‘institutionalist’ approach, by understanding ‘governance’ as the ‘whole set of practices and norms that govern daily life in a specific territory’. Drawing on a thorough review of literature on Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), this working paper analyses five under-examined independent variables that shape rebel governance in Nigeria’s north-east and Niger: illegitimate state practices, community resilience, and cohesion, external counterinsurgency actions, ‘big men’, and ideology.
Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet: South Sudan
Unpredictable annual variations in extreme weather events, like flooding and droughts, affect agriculture-dependent communities and influence pastoralist mobility patterns and routes. Such changes may intensify the risk of tensions between herders and farmers, often in connection with land, grazing, water and communal affairs. Transhumance, including cross-border migration from Sudan through the Greater Upper Nile in particular, exacerbates the spread of veterinary diseases and fuels environmental degradation and competition over scarce resources. Women and girls continue to bear the brunt of the effects of climate change; female-headed households are especially vulnerable. Climate-related livestock losses compounded by pre-existing rivalries increase the risk of cattle raiding, which can trigger retaliation, communal conflict, displacement, deepening intercommunal rivalry and the formation of armed groups.
Making Sense of the European Side of the Transatlantic Security Relations in Africa
This article aims to investigate the character of transatlantic security relations in Africa: How can it be characterized? Have they become weaker or stronger over the past decade? How can this development be explained? As NATO has not yet been heavily engaged on the African continent, it is prudent to study the relations between the EU and the US. Africa has been of concern to the EU (and its member states) for decades due to its geographical closeness and historic bonds. Since 2001, for both Europe and the US, Africa has become a region of increasing security concern due to the threat of international terrorism—for Europe, we can also add the migration concern. The European side of this relationship has also been largely dominated by France, making the transatlantic security cooperation in Africa essentially about French-American relations. As France has taken the lead regarding Europe’s security and defense engagement in Africa, increasingly with the support of other EU member states and associated non-members, this bilateral relationship is more than simply cooperation between two states. By applying a framework that understands EU security and defense policy as a process increasingly characterized as a differentiated and flexible integration under French leadership, the development of the Franco-US security relations in Africa must be understood as an expression of the transatlantic security relations in this region.
Ståle Ulriksen
Ståle Ulriksen is a researcher at the Norwegian Naval College, part of the Norwegian Defence University, with a 20 percent position at NUPI, in Th...
Asha Ali
Asha Ali was an Advisor at NUPI until the summer of 2024. She worked in the Research Group on Peace, Conflict and Development.
Climate, Peace and Security: Sudan
Sudan is severely exposed to climate change. As one of the world’s least developed countries, extreme weather, recurrent floods and droughts, and changing precipitation interact with other vulnerabilities – such as ecosystem degradation, unsustainable agricultural practices, natural resource scarcities and resource-based conflicts – limiting societal capacities to cope and adapt. The economic consequences of COVID-19, ongoing political instability (further aggravated by the October 2021 military coup), and rising inflation all weaken state and societal resilience, livelihoods and food security. ● Rising temperatures, rainfall variability, and droughts and floods negatively impact agriculture, livelihoods and food security. In particular, the adverse effects of climate change, combined with gender-based disparities in natural resource governance, accentuate the climate-related security risks for women and girls. ● High levels of displacement sharpen humanitarian needs and vulnerability to the effects of climate change; shifting migration patterns in response to changing resource availability may increase the risk of local conflicts in some areas. ● Various conflict dynamics and decades of political interference, local conflicts (interlinked with land and natural resources) and ongoing political instability have undermined traditional resource management systems and state governance. ● The legacies of natural resource mismanagement have increased the marginalisation of rural communities and accelerated land degradation, excacerbating local vulnerabilities that add to the human security risks associated with climate change.
Webinar on the United Nations Mission in South Sudan 2022: Risks and opportunities in an uncertain peace process