Publications
Missiles, Vessels and Active Defence What Potential Threat Do the Russian Armed Forces Represent?
In 2019, Russia’s Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, presented a ‘strategy of active defence’, a possible prelude to the forthcoming Russian military doctrine. This article examines this strategy with particular emphasis on the role of precision-guided missiles, tactical nuclear weapons and the role of the navy. It provides insights on the shape of new Russian military doctrine and the military threat Russia might represent to the West. Maren Garberg Bredesen and Karsten Friis conclude that the active defence concept may imply a lowering of the use-of-force threshold. Russia’s continued build-up of tactical nuclear weapons integrated into the conventional forces reinforces this concern.
Spiraling toward a New Cold War in the North? The Effect of Mutual and Multifaceted Securitization
Building on a discourse-theoretical reading of securitization theory, this article theorizes and examines how two political entities can become locked in a negative spiral of identification that may lead to a violent confrontation. Through mutual and multifaceted securitization, each party increasingly construes the other as a threat to itself. When this representation spreads beyond the military domain to other dimensions (trade, culture, diplomacy), the other party is projected as “different” and “dangerous” at every encounter: positive mutual recognition is gradually blocked out. Military means then become the logical, legitimate way of relating: contact and collaboration in other issue-areas are precluded. Drawing on official statements 2014–2018, this article investigates how Norwegian–Russian relations shifted from being a collaborative partnership to one of enmity in the High North. The emerging and mutual pattern of representing the other as a threat across issue-areas since 2014 has become an “autonomous” driver of conflict—regardless of whether either party might originally have had offensive designs on the other.
The Nordic Balance Revisited: Differentiation and the Foreign Policy Repertoires of the Nordic States
Nordic governments frequently broadcast their ambition to do more together on the international stage. The five Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden and Norway) also share many basic goals as foreign policy actors, including a steadfast and vocal commitment to safeguarding the ‘rules-based international order.’ Why then, do we not see more organized Nordic foreign policy collaboration, for example in the form of a joint ‘grand strategy’ on core foreign policy issues, or in relation to great powers and international organizations? In this article, we draw on Charles Tilly’s concept of ‘repertoires’ to address the discrepancy between ambitions and developments in Nordic foreign policy cooperation, highlighting how the bundles of policy instruments—repertoires—that each Nordic state has developed over time take on an identity-defining quality. We argue that the Nordic states have invested in and become attached to their foreign policy differences, niches, and ‘brands.’ On the international scene, and especially when interacting with significant other states, they tend not only to stick to what they know how to do and are accustomed to doing but also to promote their national rather than their Nordic profile. While Nordic cooperation forms part of all the five states’ foreign policy repertoire in specific policy areas, these are marginal compared to the distinctive repertoires on which each Nordic state rely in relation to more powerful states. It is therefore unlikely that we will see a ‘common order’ among the Nordic states in the foreign policy domain in the near future.
Liberal fred
Over the last years, the EU has become a more important actor in international security relations. Whereas its core objective used to be to prevent a return to Europe's bloody past, EU is now increasingly a defender of liberal values and the international order. In Norway, this security dimension of the Union has not been very present in the EU-debate. But is should be now.
Hvorfor sier regjeringen nei til forsvarsfondet?
The Norwegian government has decided not to join the European Defence Fund (EDF) at this stage - despite having lobbied for an invitation to be included for years.
Intergovernmental checkmate on cyber? Processes on cyberspace in the United Nations
Cyberspace is an increasingly controversial field on the international agenda. Despite the fact that processes on the thematic have been going on in the UN since 1998, a more significant international agreement is needed on what basic principles should apply in cyberspace. Small states have the opportunity of pushing cybersecurity as a thematic priority in the United Nations Security Council – a path Norway could pursue in its forthcoming 2021–2022 Security Council term. The attribution of the assumed Russian cyber operations toward the Norwegian parliament earlier this year actualizes the addressing of the issue in the Council. The policy brief discusses the GGE negotiations on cyberspace in 2015 and 2017 - and gives policy recommendations on the way forward.
“Irregular” Migration and Divergent Understandings of Security in the Sahel
On 23 September 2020, the EU launched its new Pact on Migration and Asylum. In a refreshingly blunt press-release accompanying the Pact one could read: “The current system no longer works. And for the past five years, the EU has not been able to fix it”. The stated aim of the Pact is a fairer sharing of responsibility and solidarity between member states while providing certainty for individual asylum applicants. This is intended to rebuild trust between EU members as well as improve the capacity to better manage migration. However, whether the Pact will be implemented and have an effect on EU external migration policy in the Sahel remains to be seen. Following the 2012 crisis in Mali and further spread of instability to neighbouring Niger and Burkina Faso, the central areas of the Sahel region have gained prominence as “producers” of transnational security threats, such as violent extremism, “irregular” migration and human trafficking. With Niger also being a major transit hub for northbound “irregular” migrants, this trend was further exacerbated by the so-called European refugee and migration crisis in 2015. This has led to unprecedented international attention in recent years, and consequently, a growing number of bilateral and multilateral donor assistance programmes and external military interventions. Since 2015, the number of refugees and asylum seekers coming from this area to Europe has been reduced. At first glance, this could mistakenly be understood as a success-story in migration management, or alternatively, that fewer people want to travel the dangerous route across the Mediterranean. However, the situation on the ground is going from bad to worse, despite increased levels of international resources invested to foster stabilisation and development in the region. Why? This IAI Commentary is based on the authors’ forthcoming journal article: “The Fragility Dilemma and Divergent Security Complexes in the Sahel”, in The International Spectator, Vol. 55, No. 4 (December 2020).
Security Council Resolution 1325 at 20: What Next for the Women Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda?
This policy brief takes stock of the achievements of the WPS agenda since the passing of its founding Security Resolution 1325, twenty years ago. It outlines the challenges it currently faces like the implementation gap; the global push-back against women’s rights and multilateral cooperation; the increase of a strongly gendered nationalist populism; the political climate amongst UN member states and within the Security Council; and the Covid-19 pandemic. It discusses whether this challenging situation points towards prioritising the maintenance of the gains achieved in the field of WPS since the passing of Security Council Resolution 1325, instead of pushing for progressive changes. It puts forward the argument that the current situation makes it more relevant and necessary than ever to apply a more comprehensive understanding of what gender entails and how it is integral to politics, conflicts and peace efforts. It is argued that this approach must form the basis for analyses of conflict situations, as well as for understanding the challenges that the WPS agenda currently faces. Hence, the promotion and utilisation of such an approach should be a priority for the WPS agenda in the years to come.
Myanmar: How to Become an Attractive Destination for Renewable Energy Investment?
Myanmar is endowed with abundant renewable energy resources, and its solar potential is the greatest in the Greater Mekong Subregion – yet, this potential remains largely untapped. The country’s 50% electrification rate remains the lowest in ASEAN, and the government plans to electrify the entire country by 2030. The share of renewable energy in the energy mix is expected to rise from less than 1% in 2020 to 12% in 2025. In addition to expanding electricity access, renewable energy could also stimulate much-needed employment and economic growth in Myanmar. We propose five actions that can improve the investment climate in Myanmar for renewable energy investment: strengthen renewable energy governance; join IRENA and intensify capacity building; adopt a feed-in tariff or auction mechanism; build a regulatory framework for renewable energy; simplify the business environment for investors.
Malaysia: How to Scale Up Investment in Renewable Energy
Malaysia set a target of 20% renewables in the energy mix by 2025, an 18% increase from the 2% it had in 2018. One of the planned measures is the development of large-scale solar power. To reach the target, it will be necessary to attract a total of USD 8 billion of renewable energy investment during this period. Considering the fact that Malaysia attracted only USD 2.5 billion from 2006 to 2018, the country will need to attract USD 1.3 billion on average every year from 2019. To achieve this, it will need to undertake serious reform measures to improve the investment climate for renewables and conditions for renewable energy deployment. Given the ever-increasing global competition for renewable energy investment, the rapid implementation of such reforms becomes an imperative. This in turn requires strong governance. We propose five actions that can improve the attractiveness of Malaysia’s investment climate for renewable energy to 2025 and beyond: reform energy governance in favour of renewable energy; ensure streamlined management of the regulatory framework for renewable energy; develop a framework for easier grid connection and use; enhance awareness-raising measures for investors; make market entry easy and attractive.