Publications
Small States, Different Approaches. Estonia and Norway on the UN Security Council
In 2021, Estonia and Norway serve alongside Ireland as elected European members on the UN Security Council. In this report we ask: Why do smaller states like Estonia and Norway invest time, energy and resources seeking a non-permanent seat on the Security Council? What can they hope to achieve during their period as elected members? And how did Estonia and Norway work – individually and together – to achieve their ambitions in 2021 when they were both serving on the Council?
Why peace is important for COP and why COP26 is important for peace
In the medium to long-term, the most effective prevention against the worst effects of climate change - including violent conflict over scarce resources - is the reduction of carbon emissions. However, how we go about reducing emissions, and how we choose to adapt and mitigate, can either cause harm, including potentially triggering conflict, or it can contribute to sustaining peace.
Seizing the Momentum. EU Green Energy Diplomacy towards Kazakhstan
The relationship between the EU and Kazakhstan has historically been dominated by trade in oil and natural gas. However, the EU’s Green Deal and commitment to reach climate-neutrality by 2050 means that the bloc is slowly but surely reducing foreign non-renewable energy imports. Moreover, energy transitions and halting climate change have become global developments and commitments, enshrined in the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. Fossil-endowed Kazakhstan has pledged to be carbon neutral in 2060, but its transition policies must pick up speed. Meanwhile, the EU is embarking on a reinvigorated energy diplomacy agenda that should encourage and support other countries to transition towards renewable energy production, export and domestic consumption. This policy brief explores what tools the EU could use to support such transitions and what Kazakhstan could benefit from most. It considers the link with geopolitics and competitiveness and how to overcome obstacles for EU-Kazakhstani renewable energy cooperation, whilst also offering recommendations as to next steps forward.
Digital technology and development
Increasingly, the global challenges posed by digitalization and cybersecurity are emerging as central to the organization of development assistance – with consequences for billions of people in the developing world. The distribution of digital technology and connectivity is occurring at an unprecedented pace, offering new opportunities and contributing to economic growth across the world. While development agencies and donor countries are utilizing such opportunities as a vehicle for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), new societal vulnerabilities are arising alongside them. These vulnerabilities have significant implications in terms of – among other things – freedom of speech, human rights, and modern forms of slavery. This is especially the case in those countries currently making the leap into the digital age, where there is a pressing need for knowledge, education, institution building and experience sharing. Sustainable growth through digital technology is dependent on analogue foundations, with donor countries having an important role to play through development assistance and capacity-building mechanisms. With this in mind, this article looks at the rapid growth in internet usage in sub-Saharan Africa and its implications for governance, cybersecurity and development in the region.
Funding flows for climate change research on Africa: Where do they come from and where do they go?
Africa has only contributed a small fraction of global greenhouse gas emissions yet faces disproportionate risks from climate change. This imbalance is one of many inequities associated with climate change and raises questions concerning the origin, distribution and thematic prioritization of funding for climate-change research on Africa. This article analyses a database comprising USD 1.51 trillion of research grants from 521 organizations around the world and covering all fields of research from 1990 to 2020. At most 3.8% of global funding for climate-change research is spent on African topics – a figure incommensurate with Africa’s share of the world population and vulnerability to climate change. Moreover, institutions based in Europe and North America received 78% of funding for climate research on Africa, while African institutions received only 14.5%. Research on climate mitigation received only 17% of the funding while climate impacts and adaptation each received around 40%. Except for Egypt and Nigeria, funding supported research on former British colonies more than other African countries. The findings highlight the need to prioritise research on a broader set of climate-change issues in Africa and to increase funding for Africa-based researchers in order to strengthen African ownership of research informing African responses to climate change.
Vietnam's solar and wind power success: Policy implications for the other ASEAN countries
This study analyzes the factors that have facilitated Vietnam's recent rapid solar and wind power expansion and draws policy insights for other member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). A policy-mix analysis focusing on targets, incentive instruments, enabling regulations, and policy implementation is carried out, informed by semi-structured interviews with 20 Vietnamese experts during the period January–March 2021. A comparative analysis between Vietnam and the other ASEAN countries provides policy insights. Generous feed-in tariffs are found to have been a key driver, with income tax and land lease payment exemptions also being important. The main barriers include a high level of policy uncertainty and an underprepared transmission grid. Vietnam's case indicates that a strong price signal and a supportive investment environment can pave the way for rapid solar and wind power uptake. Another key lesson is that early preparation of transmission systems for solar and wind electricity is needed to maximize the potential for expanding the use of these technologies.
Ali Hosseini Khamenei: Routinizing Revolution in Iran
This chapter analyzes how Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei consolidated his rule and the political consequences of his survival strategy. The author argues that Iran’s long-serving leader capitalized on the institutional and ideological legacies of his predecessor, Ayatollah Khomeini, as well as on the high potential for repression in revolutionary regimes. Khamenei has invested in nonelected and parallel revolutionary bodies, maintained strong emphasis on the Islamic Revolution’s ideology and recruited a new generation of followers to the ruling coalition. This essay outlines the tensions arising from Khamenei’s reliance on the organizational structures, aims, and elite selection mechanisms of the revolution and the wish of the Iranian population to change the political course of this important Middle Eastern country.
Surveillance Technology at the Fair: Proliferation of Cyber Capabilities in International Arms Markets
State cyber capabilities are increasingly abiding by the “pay-to-play” model—both US/NATO allies and adversaries can purchase interception and intrusion technologies from private firms for intelligence and surveillance purposes. NSO Group has repeatedly made headlines in 2021 for targeting government entities in cyberspace, but there are many more companies selling similar products that are just as detrimental. These vendors are increasingly looking to foreign governments to hawk their wares, and policymakers have yet to sufficiently recognize or respond to this emerging problem. Any cyber capabilities sold to foreign governments carry a risk: these capabilities could be used against individuals and organizations in allied countries, or even in one’s home country. Because much of this industry operates in the shadows, research into the industry in aggregate is rare. This paper analyzes active providers of interception/intrusion capabilities within the international surveillance market, cataloguing firms that have attended both ISSWorld (i.e., the Wiretapper’s Ball) and international arms fairs over the last twenty years.1 This dataset mostly focuses on Western firms and includes little on Chinese firms, due to historical under-attendance of Chinese firms at ISSWorld. However, the overarching nature of this work will help policymakers better understand the market at large, as well as the primary arms fairs at which these players operate. This paper identifies companies explicitly marketing interception/intrusion technology at arms fairs, and answers a series of questions, including: what companies are marketing interception/intrusion capabilities outside their headquartered region; which arms fairs and countries host a majority of these firms; and what companies market interception/intrusion capabilities to US and NATO adversaries? The resulting dataset shows that there are multiple firms headquartered in Europe and the Middle East that the authors assess, with high confidence, are marketing cyber interception/intrusion capabilities to US/NATO adversaries. They assume that companies offering interception/intrusion capabilities pose the greatest risk, both by bolstering oppressive regimes and by the proliferation of strategic capabilities.2 Many such firms congregate at Milipol France, Security & Policing UK, and other arms fairs in the UK, Germany, Singapore, Israel, and Qatar. The authors found that 75 percent of companies likely selling interception/intrusion technologies have marketed these capabilities to governments outside their home continent. Five irresponsible proliferators—BTT, Cellebrite, Micro Systemation AB, Verint, and Vastech—have marketed their capabilities to US/NATO adversaries in the last ten years.3 This paper categorizes these companies as potentially irresponsible proliferators because of their willingness to market outside their continents to nonallied governments of the United States and NATO—specifically, Russia and China.4 By marketing to these parties, these firms signal that they are willing to accept or ignore the risk that their products will bolster the capabilities of client governments that might wish to threaten US/NATO national security or harm marginalized populations. This is especially the case when the client government is a direct US or NATO adversary. This globalizing shift is important for two reasons. First, it indicates a widening pattern of proliferation of cyber capabilities across the globe. Second, many firms in the surveillance and offensive cyber capabilities markets have long argued for the legitimacy of their business model by pointing to the perceived legitimacy of their customers; yet, their marketing strategies contradict this argument. As the recent indictment of several former US intelligence personnel working for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) confirms, capabilities originally focusing on one target set may be expanded for other intelligence uses.5 When these firms begin to sell their wares to both NATO members and adversaries, it should provoke national security concerns for all customers. This paper profiles these important trends for their practical security impacts, and to enable further research into this topic. The authors suggest that the United States and NATO create know-your-customer (KYC) policies with companies operating in this space; work with arms fairs to limit irresponsible proliferators’ attendance at these events; tighten export-control loopholes; and name and shame both irresponsible vendors and customers. The authors encourage policymakers to focus their efforts to rein in companies that sell these capabilities directly to adversaries, or those willing to ignore the risk that their capabilities may be misused. The dataset presented below is open for use by others who might similarly seek to bring some measure of light to an industry that remains so insistently in the dark.
The potential and limits of EU crisis response
The aim of this chapter is to identify the potential and limits of the EU’s external crisis response. Rather than focusing on the character of the EU as a foreign policy actor, it concentrates on the EU toolbox or repertoire applied in EU missions and activities in various external crises and conflicts in the near and extended neighbourhood, and also how the Union’s activities are perceived by local stakeholders. A key question is whether there is a match or mismatch between EU intentions, the implementation, and the perceptions of local stakeholders. The analysis in this article draws on both a series of qualitative case studies and a quantitative analysis of a large number of EU documents and statements. This mixed method has enabled us to explore the EU’s crisis response repertoire systematically and from various angles.
Matt McDonald, Ecological Security: Climate Change and the Construction of Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021)
This is a book review of Matt McDonald's book titled "Ecological Security: Climate Change and the Construction of Security". This book provides a radical and unusually comprehensive normative framework–an ‘ecological security’ approach—for guiding efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change; one that McDonald argues, provides a morally superior approach to those currently employed within the climate-security policy agenda. Following Andrew Linklater’s (1998) classic description of Critical Theory, the book moves in three steps: (a) it conducts a sociological analysis of the dominant climate security discourses and their deficiencies, (b) lays out an ethical case for ecological security and (c) undertakes a praxeological analysis of the ‘immanent possibilities’ within existing institutions for advancing ecological security (p. 12). At each step, McDonald draws upon an eclectic array of critical scholarship—feminism, political ecology, green state theory, among others—and spends considerable space engaging in good faith with would-be sceptics. Indeed, McDonald’s book offers a tour de-forces and model for combining classic critique of the status quo with a positive normative vision and most unusually, a sustained analysis of how to practically bring it about. Book review of Matt McDonald, Ecological Security: Climate Change and the Construction of Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 240 pp., US$ 99, ISBN: 978-1-3165-1961-5 (Hardcover)